'Park purposes' include the privilege of horseback riding in this type of park. See Booth v. City of Minneapolis, 1925, 163 Minn. 223, 203 N.W. 625; City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12, 63 A.L.R. 478; Golf View Realty Co. v. Sioux City, 222 Iowa 433, 269 N.W. 451; Rivet v. Burdick, 255 A.D. 131, 6 N.Y.S.2d 79. In the Golf View Realty Co. case, supra, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated:
The constitutional provision that no county shall contract any indebtedness except for county purposes, is aimed at prohibiting local indebtedness for expenditures which serve no local purpose. It does not, and was not designed to, enjoin a complete separation of local municipal interests from all others. The Constitution may not be read to prevent provision for community colleges which will make their facilities fully useful by opening them to students who reside outside of the county. Where there is, as here, a primary local interest, it is more than sufficient to support the propriety of the municipal purpose even though a larger state interest is served (see Matter of Tobin v. La Guardia, 290 N.Y. 119), and the courts do not insist upon precise measurement of the respective interests. (Cf. Matter of Bryant, 152 N.Y. 412; Rivet v. Burdick, 255 App. Div. 131.) It was the county itself which set in motion the plan for the establishment of the Institute and it was the county which took title to the land purchased and which became the owner of the buildings and equipment.
The Court noted that courts in other jurisdictions had held that a public library may be erected in a park without diverting it from park use, citing Spires v.Los Angeles, 150 Cal. 64, 87 P. 1026 (1906) and Riggs v. Bd. ofEducation, 27 Mich. 262 (1873), but did not say whether it would reach the same result under New York law. Courts following the Williams case have held that improvements for strictly utilitarian purposes, even when beneficial to the public, are not permitted if they are unrelated to the recreational use of the park.SeeFriends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623, 631 (construction of a water treatment plant not permitted);Ackerman v. Steisel, 104 A.D.2d 940 (2d Dep't 1984) (storage of sanitation vehicles and equipment not permitted). On the other hand, purely recreational uses such as ski trails and other winter sports facilities are permitted. Rivet v. Burdick, 255 A.D. 131 (4th Dep't 1938). Additionally, facilities that support recreational use, such as restaurants accessible by park users and other "common incidents of a pleasure ground," are permitted. Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 254;seealso795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 221, 225 (1965). A library is arguably more like the museum prohibited inWilliams than like the restaurant discussed approvingly in that case, because a library — like a museum — is associated more with educational and business purposes than with recreation, and any recreational use of a library — unlike a restaurant — is likely to be unrelated to the use of surrounding parkland.
The use of parkland for recreational activity is a well-recognized proper use of the land. (See Rivet v Burdick, 255 App. Div. 131 [4th Dept, 1938].) We conclude that the Town of LaGrange may undertake hot-air ballooning as a recreational activity and allow its parklands to be used for the launching of hot-air balloons.
On the other hand, courts have permitted intrusions into park land for a number of related purposes. Thus, the use of a public park for agricultural purposes, Huff v. Macon, 117 Ga. 428, 43 S.E. 708, for bridle paths and winter sport facilities, Rivet v. Burdick, 255 App. Div. 131, 6 N.Y.S.2d 79, and even the building of cottages and tourist camps, State ex rel. Minner v. Dodge City, 123 Kan. 316, 255 P. 387, have been held not to be improper diversions of park land, being uses allied to traditional park activities. Defendant, which initially did not appear to question the capacity of the plaintiffs to sue but now does, but see Fetters v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 31 Del. Ch. 338, 73 A.2d 644, and Anderson v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, supra, in opposing the entry of a preliminary injunction and in arguing for a dissolution of an outstanding restraining order, contended that the Water Department of the City of Wilmington is empowered by 1 Wilmington C., section 1803 to acquire by purchase or by condemnation both water and lands for the purpose of furnishing adequate water for the needs of residents of the City and those residing within ten miles of the boundaries of the City and that plaintiffs, who object to the City's project, had an adequate remedy at law fo
Dennis R. House, Supervisor Town of York, 1992 WL 475962, at *1 (collecting cases and internal citations omitted). See also Rivet v. Burdick, 255 AD 131, 134 (4th Dept 1938).
Dennis R. House, Supervisor Town of York, Opns St Comp, 1992 No. 92-49, 1992 WL 475962, at *1 (collecting cases and internal citations omitted). See also Rivet v. Burdick, 255 AD 131, 134 (4th Dept 1938).
The law is clear that where land is acquired with a restriction for park use in the deed, or by an authority whose power is restricted to acquisitions for park purposes, or land is dedicated to park use by the public, such property may not be used for any other purpose unless there is specific authority from the State Legislature. ( Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234; Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248; Rivet v. Burdick, 255 App. Div. 131; Aldrich v. City of New York, 208 Misc. 930; O'Shea v. Hanse, 3 Misc.2d 307.) This principle of law has never been applied to land acquired for general municipal purposes and used for a park.
The State is, therefore, not required to make compensation to claimant for the appropriated lands or the improvements thereon. ( Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161; People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 167; Matter of Central Parkway, 140 Misc. 727; City of New York v. Rice, 198 N.Y. 124; Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, supra; Rivet v. Burdick, 255 App. Div. 131; Aldrich v. City of New York, 208 Misc. 930.) The claim is dismissed.