Opinion
E082978
09-17-2024
In re M.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.C., Defendant and Appellant. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsels, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, No. RIJ2000678 Dorothy McLaughlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsels, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, J.C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to her son, M.L., who is now four years old. She argues the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct the analysis in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) for determining whether the parental benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applies in ruling the exception did not apply. She also argues the failure of the juvenile court to conduct the Caden C. analysis was not harmless. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
M.M. (Father) is not a party to this appeal.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of plaintiff and respondent, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in November 2020, after an immediate response referral was received with allegations of general neglect of then-five-month-old M.L. (born May 2020). On the night of November 1, 2020, Mother found M.L. wedged between the mattress and headboard of her bed. M.L. was unconscious, pale and his body "floppy." After she called Father, they took M.L. to the hospital. Medical staff discovered M.L. had been exposed to methamphetamine. Father admitted that, while caring for M.L., he had used marijuana, methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mother tested negative for drugs, but admitted to knowing Father had a substance abuse problem. M.L. was taken into protective custody and placed with a non-related extended family member.
On November 4, 2020, a petition was filed on behalf of M.L. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). M.L. was formally detained from the parents the following day. The parents were provided with supervised visits twice per week.
Mother's Los Angeles County children's social worker reported that Mother had been participating in voluntary extended foster care since May 2018. She noted that there were no safety concerns as to the care Mother had provided M.L. and described Mother as nurturing, attentive, and responsive to the child's cues. She also had no concerns if M.L. was released to Mother on the condition that she continued to receive services and support from her church. She had not witnessed either parent under the influence of any substances.
Mother terminated her relationship with Father. Father thereafter moved in with relatives in Los Angeles County. Mother consistently visited M.L. and was reported to be bonded with the child. The parents were provided referrals to services.
At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on December 1, 2020, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the petition, declared M.L. a dependent of the court, and removed him from Father's care. Finding it was not detrimental to the child to remain with Mother, the court ordered M.L. placed with Mother under a family maintenance plan. The court ordered reunification services for Father.
By May 2021, then 11-month-old M.L. remained in Mother's care in Riverside County. Mother maintained stable housing and remained a non-minor dependent of Los Angeles County. Father progressed to unsupervised visits. According to Mother, M.L. ate well, was in good physical health, was developing well, and able to say "mama" and "papa."
Mother's progress in her services was minimal, despite referrals from the social worker. She reported having difficulty enrolling in services due to delays and a purported lack of response from her service providers. She participated in a counseling program in-take session and was assigned a "parent partner" for a parenting program. Mother reported that she suffered from anxiety and was "afraid that something negative can happen to her child again," which was causing her to lose focus on her services.
At the six-month review hearing on May 18, 2021, the juvenile court ordered family maintenance services for Father and continued family maintenance services for Mother.
By November 2021, Mother remained a non-minor dependent and continued to receive $1,900 a month as a non-minor dependent, but the independent living program allowance will discontinue in March 2022. Father reported that he made efforts to be in a relationship with Mother, but her mental health was unstable and she changed her mind constantly. Father provided Mother with financial support and had stable employment and housing.
Then 17-month-old M.L. appeared to be doing well in Mother's care. Mother had met M.L.'s needs and the child was bonded with his parents. However, Mother made minimal progress on her case plan. She did not understand why DPSS became involved and what was required of her to close the case. Mother stated that she did not have a stable address and needed daycare for her son. Mother attended a psychological evaluation in April 2021 and was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and sleep issues. Counseling was recommended for Mother with the possibility of medication in the future.
On July 12, 2021, M.L. was taken to the emergency room after Mother and M.L. were "pushed by a car while walking." The social worker did not observe any bruises or marks on M.L. On September 29, 2021, Mother drove to the DPSS office, and the social worker observed M.L.'s car seat was not properly installed. When the social worker mentioned the car seat, Mother became upset and reported that she did not know how to install it properly. The social worker provided her with a pamphlet with pictures and instructions in Spanish and also sent a text message with a link to the California law on car seats in Spanish.
On October 19, 2021, Mother was involved in a traffic collision, where a car hit her from behind. Mother took M.L. to a hospital, but they did not find any lifethreatening injuries on M.L. On October 21, 2021, the social worker met M.L. and Mother at her home and, during the visit, suggested Mother touch food she heats prior to giving it to the child. Mother became angry. The social worker also advised Mother that milk in bottles warms up unevenly in a microwave and that some pieces of food heated in a microwave could burn M.L.'s mouth. Mother again became upset and asked why. The social worker suggested Mother take classes that are offered for her to learn more, and she agreed. On October 27, 2021, Mother's parenting program counselor reported that Mother struggled with her organizational skills and attendance. Mother appeared "very overwhelmed" with the child's care and balancing her own responsibilities. Mother was eventually terminated from her parenting program.
At the 12-month review hearing on November 18, 2021, the juvenile court continued family maintenance services to the parents.
By March 2022, Mother's situation had deteriorated. She had moved three times, was being evicted from her current home, and was observed by others to be "not taking care of herself." Mother repeatedly stated her wishes to move out of state or out of the country. On March 28, 2022, Mother reported that she had purchased airline tickets to Texas. DPSS told Mother not to leave the state, but Mother stated she had already made plans to leave and would do so. In addition, on March 28, 2022, DPSS received a new referral with allegations of general neglect.
DPSS filed an ex parte application and order, requesting the court order Mother not to move out of state with M.L. DPSS expressed concerns with Mother's mental health and noted there was an open child welfare case concerning Mother's care of M.L. At the hearing on the ex parte application, the juvenile court ordered Mother not to remove M.L. from her current residence and not to remove the child from Riverside County without further court order.
DPSS expressed concerns as to Mother's mood changes and distress. Mother would be turning 21 in April 2022, and thus she would no longer be eligible to receive funding as a non-minor dependent. On March 3, 2022, the social worker spoke to Mother who was crying and stated that her new home was causing her anxiety because it was not clean. She stated that she felt scared about leaving M.L. unsupervised while she took long showers. The night prior, she spent two hours in the shower and lost track of time. The day prior, she washed her hands so hard, they bled. Mother's hands appeared severely dry. DPSS offered Mother an evaluation for medication, a parent partner, as well as a safety plan, and Mother agreed.
On March 14, 2022, the social worker went to Mother's home and noticed M.L. had a severe diaper rash. Mother said M.L. had diarrhea which caused the rash. Mother's room was a mess and had dirty diapers on the floor. Father disclosed that Mother had been calling him to ask him to help her with M.L. at all hours of the day. He did not believe Mother would harm M.L., but felt Mother crying in front of the child was not good for him. Father was not in a position to care for M.L. as he worked as a truck driver and went out of state for days.
On March 23, 2022, Mother called the social worker distressed and crying, stating that she received a notice to move out and a large medical bill. Mother stated that she "needs a break from the child." She could not control M.L. and he was too much for her. On March 28, 2022, Father informed the social worker that he received a lot of missed calls from Mother while he was sleeping. Mother was screaming and M.L. was crying. Mother also called the paternal grandmother to tell her if Father did not sign a legal paper indicating she could move out of state, she would file a police report for domestic violence so that he would be deported. On the same day, Mother called the social worker to state she had filed a police report against Father.
The social worker also received a call from Mother's homeowner where Mother rents a room. The homeowner reported that Mother took five-hour long showers late at night, leaving M.L. unattended. Mother also regularly screamed at M.L., called him derogatory names in Spanish, and neglected his needs. Per the homeowner, Mother only provided M.L. with one meal per day and another in the middle of the night. Mother had no wipes or diapers, and did not change M.L.'s diaper often, so M.L. always had a diaper rash. The homeowner desired to help Mother, but Mother was not willing to receive any help. Mother also would go outside and leave M.L. with the homeowner without asking someone to care for the child.
DPSS provided Mother a referral for a medication evaluation and a psychological assessment. Mother informed the social worker that she planned to leave the state regardless of what the court orders. Mother was screaming, using profanity, and saying DPSS was making her life impossible. The previous night, March 28, 2022 the landlord heard a loud noise against the wall and M.L. started crying. When the landlord inquired, Mother stated M.L. hit his head and prevented the landlord from checking on the child's condition.
On March 30, 2022, the social worker called Mother, but she did not respond. When the social worker went to Mother's home, the worker found M.L. with the homeowner. The social worker observed a circular red mark on the child's right cheek and a red mark on the right side of his chest. The social worker found Mother at a laundromat. Mother reluctantly agreed to speak to the worker. Mother asserted that DPSS was ruining her life by not allowing her to leave the state and that she would not be participating in any more classes for DPSS. The social worker reminded Mother to take M.L. to the Inland Regional Center (IRC) for an assessment as it appeared he had autism. Instead, Mother called IRC to report that M.L. did not need any services.
On March 31, 2022, Father's friend reported concerns about Mother's behaviors, because Mother constantly texted her to come over, because she "needs a break" and "cannot handle the child anymore." Mother had stated that she "feels like she wants to kill herself sometimes." Due to concerns that Mother was neglecting the needs of M.L. and Father's inability to care for the child, DPSS took the child into protective custody.
On April 5, 2022, DPSS filed sections 342 and 387 petitions to remove M.L. from parental custody due to the parents' failure to comply with their case plans, Mother's unresolved mental health issues, and Mother's neglect of the child.
At the sections 387 and 342 detention hearings on April 6, 2022, the juvenile court detained M.L. from the parents. The parents were provided with supervised visits at a minimum of two times per week.
M.L. was placed with his foster parents, later prospective adoptive parents, on April 8, 2022. DPSS referred M.L. to a specialist for autism. The caregiver reported that M.L. did not talk at all and screamed most of the time. He was unable to feed himself and did not understand age-appropriate commands or directions. When he was placed in her care, M.L. was unable to chew foods, such as fruits or other solid foods. On May 10, 2022, the child was diagnosed with autism and IRC approved him for in-home services. He was extremely delayed for a two-year-old and was functioning at the age of an "8 to 12 month old child."
The parents indicated the foster mother loved M.L. and took good care of him. Mother specifically stated that the caregiver "loves him, he smiles when he is with her. The foster mother is really working with him." Father said that he felt "relieved because they take good care of him. He has improved so much, he eats well, he plays, he runs, he goes down the slide, he's a different kid." The parents visited M.L. once a week for two hours. Mother attended four visits and missed one due to not having transportation. It was reported that Mother only held the child during her visits and did not want him to play or walk around, because she was concerned he would fall and hurt himself. She talked to M.L. and fed him during the visits. Mother was referred to services, but did not participate.
On May 23, 2022, Mother missed her visit, because she said she did not wake up on time. Mother noted she was homeless and sometimes lived with Father, her car, or in hotels. By June 2022, Mother still had not enrolled in services and continued to be homeless. Both parents were "inconsistent" with visits and unable to set a visitation schedule. Mother visited April 15, April 23, May 12, 2022, and missed five visits between April 15 and June 8, 2022.
At the contested section 364 hearing on June 16, 2022, the juvenile court terminated the parents' family maintenance status. At the contested section 387 hearing held the same day, the court found the allegations true as alleged in the first amended petition filed that day, removed the child from the physical custody of the parents, and ordered reunification services for the parents. Mother was provided with supervised visits twice a week for two hours, and Father was provided with unsupervised visits for four hours once a week. At the contested section 342 hearing, the court found true the allegations in the petition and ordered reunification services for Mother.
On August 24, 2022, M.L. was diagnosed with "ankyloglossia, speech delay, bilateral impacted cerumen, sleep-disordered breathing, and snoring" and required surgery to correct the conditions. The court ordered the surgery.
By October 2022, DPSS recommended the court terminate the parents' reunification services. During the review period, the parents continued to struggle to complete their case plan services. Mother had no stable housing, stated she was moving to Texas to obtain employment, was inconsistent in attending counseling, and was often inattentive when she did appear for her services. She was reported to be sleeping during parenting classes. She was not willing to take any medication, even though she reported she suffered from severe depression and sleep deprivation. On October 3, 2022, Mother moved to Texas.
Regarding visits, Mother had not been able to attend all her visits due to struggling with transportation and falling asleep. The caregiver reported no concerns about the visits that did occur and reported Mother was happy during the visits.
By December 1, 2022, Mother still had not been consistent in participating in her services, and the last time she visited M.L. was October 19, 2022.
Meanwhile, M.L. was sleeping and eating well. The caregiver had taught and encouraged M.L. to eat and chew all foods. M.L. had strong motor skills, but had poor balance and poor language skills. He was unable to feed himself and did not understand age-appropriate commands or directions. DPSS noted concerns over Mother's confidence in meeting M.L.'s needs during the visits. M.L. had several doctor and specialist appointments. He received specialized IRC services, speech therapy and physical therapy. The caregiver met all the child's special needs.
By January 2023, Mother still had not completed her case plan with the exception of taking a parenting class and had moved back to California. DPSS noted Mother appeared to have unresolved mental health issues which interfered with her abilities to complete her services.
At the contested six-month status review hearing and contested section 366.25 review hearing on January 9, 2023, the court terminated the parents' reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court continued to provide the parents with supervised visits with no changes.
In April 2023, DPSS requested a continuance to find a prospective adoptive family for M.L. as his caregivers were not willing to adopt M.L. at that time due to his medical concerns. M.L. continued receiving specialized medical appointments. He received speech, occupational and physical therapy. His language skills improved. Since services were terminated, both parents were inconsistent and late to visits. They were appropriate at the visits they attended with no concerns.
At the section 366.26 hearing on April 18, 2023, the court continued the hearing to locate an adoptive home for M.L. DPSS located three families interested in adopting M.L. However, on June 7, 2023, the caregiver expressed that she and her husband were now interested in adopting M.L. DPSS was concerned that the caregivers had waffled back and forth on adoption and believed it was in M.L.'s best interest to be placed with a matched adoptive home.
On June 28, 2023, the caregivers filed a request for de facto parent status.
At a hearing regarding whether M.L. should be removed from his caregivers to a new adoptive home on July 20, 2023, the child's counsel submitted documents to the court and called the foster family social worker to testify. The social worker testified that M.L.'s current caregivers assisted M.L. in learning how to do daily activities, such as chewing food, giving him verbal encouragement, and praising him when he progressed. The caregivers also worked with the professionals to determine the best way to work with M.L. When he was first placed with his caregivers, he was not verbal at all. However, "[e]very day, all day long" the caregivers worked on getting M.L. to say things by modeling, praise, and encouragement. The caregivers and M.L. were mutually bonded. M.L. was doing better with eating and used utensils about 50 percent of the time. The caregivers took M.L. to ongoing IRC services. He received speech therapy, occupational therapy, and physical therapy to work with his broad-spectrum autism issues several times a week. The caregivers had taken M.L. to be evaluated by pulmonary specialists over his sleep and snoring issues, as well as taking him to the school district to evaluate him for an Individualized Education Program.
The foster mother testified that when M.L. first came to her care, the child did not "show any life like skills. He didn't play. He couldn't see. He couldn't hear. He couldn't speak. Nothing. He didn't do anything. He was just-he would just stand almost like lifeless." She noted M.L. did not know even how to chew food. In the beginning, she had to assist in feeding M.L. 100 percent. She took him to different therapy sessions and doctor appointments and he had since progressed immensely. M.L. has had about 150 therapy sessions (four sessions per week). She had also taken M.L. to parental visits. Since M.L. had been in her care, the child now ate everything and could almost feed himself. M.L. called her "mom." The foster mother explained that she desired to adopt M.L. and felt that she was the only mother that the child had known. She believed M.L. would regress if removed from her and her husband because he had shown a lot of love for them. She explained that M.L. "always climbs on top of us, plays with us, jumps, looks for us, and I feel that whenever he doesn't see us, he's gonna feel just the way we would feel, sad."
DPSS's social worker L.D., who had been assigned to the case in December 2020, also testified. L.D. noted M.L. had continuously been with the caregivers since April 2022, two days after removal from Mother's care. The foster mother had complied with all of her requests for the care of the child.
The foster father testified M.L. was very happy and he had seen improvement since he was placed with them. He loved M.L. and wanted him to be his son, despite the child coming to them with challenging issues.
Following argument, the juvenile court ordered M.L. to remain in his current placement. The court found that his caregivers were fully committed to M.L. and that it was not in his best interest to be removed to a new adoptive home. The court granted the caregiver's de facto parent request and continued the section 366.26 hearing.
On June 3, 2023, M.L. had a well-child exam and was determined to be healthy. He was not on track developmentally for his age and was working on skills. He ate and slept well. He could repeat simple words and made sounds that appeared to be words. He paid more attention to the caregiver when she spoke to him. He continued to receive specialized therapy services. As to visits, both parents had been consistent and on-time to visits. They had been appropriate at the visits with no concerns reported.
DPSS recommended adoption of M.L. by his current caregivers who had been caring for the child for the past 19 months, had met his ongoing needs and were committed to adopting him. M.L. displayed a strong attachment to his caregivers and smiled when acknowledged or spoken to. M.L. showed his caregivers his love and affection, while M.L. motivated the prospective adoptive mother to care for him and work hard for him. DPSS observed M.L. to be comfortable, attached, affectionate, and calm in the presence of his caregivers. M.L. referred to them as "mama" and "papa." He approached his caregivers with open arms, requesting attention and affection from them. He smiled at them and appeared comfortable in their embrace.
On December 18, 2023, Mother filed a section 388 petition, seeking family reunification services, alleging that she had stabilized her mental health, participated in services and visits, and had a strong bond with M.L. On this same day, the juvenile court held a combined sections 388 and 366.26 hearing. Mother testified she was working fulltime, attending counseling and parenting classes, and had a car and stable housing. After hearing argument from the parties, the juvenile court denied Mother's section 388 petition.
The court thereafter proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing. Mother's counsel asked the court to "consider guardianship under [section] 366.26[, subdivision] (c)(1)(B)(i)," as Mother and M.L. shared a bond and Mother had recently begun visiting him regularly. DPSS's counsel argued the exception did not apply and counsel for M.L. submitted. The juvenile court terminated the parents' parental rights, finding M.L. adoptable and none of the exceptions to termination of parental rights applicable. Mother timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a proper Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614 analysis for determining whether the parental benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applies in ruling the exception did not apply, and thus the matter should be remanded. She also argues the failure of the juvenile court to conduct the Caden C. analysis was not harmless.
A. Legal Principles
"To guide the court in selecting the most suitable permanent arrangement" for a dependent child "who cannot be returned to a parent's care," section 366.26 "lists plans in order of preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629-630; see § 366.26, subd. (b); In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1149.) If the court finds that the child "is likely to be adopted" and that "there has been a previous determination that reunification services be terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption." (Caden C., supra, at p. 630; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 (Katherine J.).) "But if the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan." (Caden C., supra, at pp. 630-631; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi), (4)(A); In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1225.)
One of those reasons, the parental benefit exception, requires the parent to establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) "the parent has regularly visited with the child," (2) "the child would benefit from continuing the relationship," and (3) "terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 206.) "The first element-regular visitation and contact-is straightforward. The question is just whether 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.'" (Caden C., supra, at p. 632; see Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 316.)
To establish the second element, that the child would benefit from continuing the parental relationship, the parent must show the child has a "substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent-the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 854 (J.D.).) The "focus is the child," and "the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.'" (Caden C., supra, at p. 632; see J.D., supra, at p. 854.) "[C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents." (Caden C., supra, at p. 632; see In re J.D., supra, at p. 854.)
"Concerning the third element-whether 'termination would be detrimental to the child due to' the relationship-the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633; see Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) "When it weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the court is not comparing the parent's attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s).... Accordingly, courts should not look to whether the parent can provide a home for the child." (Caden C., supra, at p. 634; see Katherine J., supra, at p. 317.) "When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn't outweigh its loss, termination would be 'detrimental to the child due to' the child's beneficial relationship with a parent." (Caden C., supra, at pp. 633-634; see Katherine J., supra, at p. 317.)
B. Standards of Review
A "substantial evidence standard of review applies to the first two elements. The determination that the parent has visited and maintained contact with the child 'consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by the court's orders' [citation] is essentially a factual determination. It's likewise essentially a factual determination whether the relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing it." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640; see Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 317318; In re L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)
"The third element-whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child-is somewhat different. As in assessing visitation and the relationship between parent and child, the court must make a series of factual determinations.... [¶] Yet the court must also engage in a delicate balancing of these determinations as part of assessing the likely course of a future situation that's inherently uncertain.... The court makes the assessment by weighing the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home. And so, the ultimate decision-whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child's relationship with his parent-is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; see Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318; In re L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)
C. Analysis
In this case, at the section 366.26 hearing, which occurred over two-and-a-half years after the Supreme Court's decision in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, the juvenile court did not expressly conduct the analysis under Caden C. on the record before finding the exception inapplicable. Mother complains this was an error and requires a remand for the court to conduct a proper Caden C. analysis. However, "we are aware of no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception. To the contrary, we infer from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)-under which the juvenile court is required to 'state its reasons in writing or on the record' when it makes a finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child-that the court is not required to make findings when it concludes that parental rights termination would not be detrimental. [Citations.]" (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156, italics added.) That was not the case here, so the juvenile court was not required to explain its reasoning on the record. "Indeed, this subdivision's silence on this issue is both deafening and dispositive when contrasted with other subdivisions and statutes explicitly requiring juvenile courts to make specific findings to support other rulings in dependency proceedings." (In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1270, fn. 6 ["specific findings are not required absent a statute so requiring"].) Thus, we presume the court understood the applicable law and correctly applied it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 780 ["As a general rule '"a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law."' [Citation.]"].)
Here, although an exposition of findings on each of the prongs by the juvenile court would certainly have made review of the ruling easier, no such exposition is required. So long as this court holds the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and/or that sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's ultimate ruling, the court's reasons for its ruling are irrelevant. (Anderson v. Davidson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 ["'"[W]e will affirm a judgment correct on any legal basis, even if that basis was not invoked by the trial court. [Citation.] There can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct."'"].) Moreover, the parents had the opportunity to object to the court's ruling. Thus, we presume the court properly applied the law.
Mother appears to contend the appellate courts' holdings in In re Dy.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153 (Dy.P.), J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 833 and In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261 (D.M.) support the position that a juvenile court is required to make express findings of the elements articulated in Caden C. We disagree. Unlike in the instant case, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, had not yet been decided when the juvenile court ruled on the parental benefit exception in Dy.P., J.D., and D.M. Those three cases, as explained below, therefore were reversed and remanded to allow the juvenile court to reconsider the parental benefit exception in accordance with Caden C.
In Dy.P., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 153, the juvenile court did not provide its specific analysis of the beneficial parental relationship exception and the appellate court reversed. (Id. at pp. 166-167.) However, the juvenile court issued its ruling before it had the benefit of the Caden C. decision, and the reviewing court expressed concern that, because the agency reports relied heavily on the parents' past issues that led to dependency, the children's bond with their caregivers, and the fact that the parents likely could continue their relationship with the children because the prospective adoptive parents were relatives, the juvenile court may have impermissibly relied on these factors in assessing applicability of the parental-benefit exception. (Dy.P., supra, at pp. 167-169.) Because it found some evidentiary support for each element of the exception, the appellate court concluded the juvenile court's ruling was an abuse of discretion under Caden C. and remanded for weighing of the evidence under the applicable standard. (Dy.P., supra, at p. 167.)
In J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 833, as noted previously, the juvenile court denied application of the beneficial parental relationship exception prior to the court's decision in Caden C. (J.D., supra, at p. 839.) The J.D. court held that remand was necessary "because we cannot be certain the juvenile court did not consider factors disapproved of in Caden C." (Id. at p. 854.) "[I]t is unclear whether and to what extent the juvenile court considered improper factors at the second step of its analysis ...." (Id. at p. 865; but see In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156 , fn. omitted ["J.D. is factually distinguishable and does not suggest in this case that the court below erred."].) Here, because the juvenile court issued its ruling after Caden C. had been decided, we presume the court considered only proper factors when reaching its decision.
In D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 261, without the clarification the Supreme Court later provided in Caden C., the juvenile court erroneously considered the extent to which the father played a parental role in the children's lives. (Id. at pp. 270-271.) The record there also showed that the father visited his three children consistently, and "the youngest child cried when visits concluded. D.M. had lived with father for nearly eight years of her young life, R.M. for nearly five years, and I.M. for nearly two years, in an intact family where father was a breadwinner and custodial parent." (Id. at p. 271.) The Court of Appeal said it could not "know how the court would have exercised its discretion if it had the benefit of the Caden C. analysis when making its ruling," and therefore remanded the matter for a new section 366.26 hearing. (Ibid.)
Because Dy.P., J.D. and D.M. were decided before Caden C., whereas this case was decided over two-and-a-half years after Caden C. on December 18, 2023, Mother's reliance on these cases is misplaced.
Mother complains about the adequacy of the reports with respect to the nature and quality of her relationship with M.L. "beyond bare bones statements." Although we share Mother's concern about the paucity of information regarding visitation in the reports, we hold that Mother forfeited the issue by failing to object on that basis below.
Where "no objection to the sufficiency of the assessment reports was made at time of trial, [we] refer to the familiar principle that failure to object to the admission of improper or inadequate evidence [forfeits] the right to raise the issue on appeal. [Citation.] If the complaint on appeal be deemed not the admissibility . . . of inadequate assessment reports, but substantive insufficien[c]y to establish requisite findings, this complaint, too, [is] [forfeited] by failure to raise it at the trial level. [Citation.]" (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412, fn. omitted; accord In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 67-68 [the mother cannot challenge the adequacy of an assessment when she did not object on that basis below]; In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [failure to raise adequacy of report below forfeited issue on appeal]; In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 [by failing to object in the juvenile court to specific defects in the reports, parents forfeit any challenge to them on appeal].) "'The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672.)
Here, Mother did not object to the admission of the reports. Moreover, she never objected on the specific basis that they lacked sufficient information on visitation between Mother and M.L. Furthermore, the juvenile court had already continued the matter several times; it is likely the court would have proved equally willing to continue the matter to ensure the filing of proper reports had Mother simply interjected a timely objection on that specific basis. Finally, we note there were other ways Mother could have made up for the dearth of information in the reports on visitation, such as requesting a bonding study (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 633, fn. 4 ["Trial courts should seriously consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other relevant expert testimony."]), having the social worker testify, or Mother testify as to her bond with M.L. Mother's failure to do any of these forfeited any objection to the lack of information on visitation in the reports.
Mother further contends that "the record contains sufficient evidence to support [her] claim that the parental benefit exception applied in this case" and that "[b]y not conducting the Caden C. analysis it is unclear whether the juvenile court properly considered that evidence." We find that the juvenile court did not err in finding the parental benefit exception did not apply.
First, the record clearly indicates that Mother did not maintain regular visitation and contact with M.L. throughout the case which commenced in November 2020. In fact, Mother's trial counsel stated at the December 18, 2023, section 366.26 hearing that "Mother has been visiting regularly recently." Second, Mother, who had the burden of proving the applicability of the parental benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 635), did not introduce any evidence M.L. had a substantial, positive, and emotional attachment to her. (Compare D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [the father testified that the children wanted to return to him and that the youngest child cried when their visits concluded]; J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 856 [the mother introduced logs of her virtual visits with her son that detailed the depth of their bond].) Nor was there any evidence suggesting M.L. had such an attachment. (Compare In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1229, fn. 4 [evidence of the way the children greeted their parents with hugs and expressed sadness at the end of visits suggested the parents had a "beneficial relationship" with their children].) To the contrary, the evidence showed a relationship that, at times, may have been harmful to M.L. who required specialized care and assistance. While in Mother's care, Mother often neglected M.L.'s needs and screamed at him. These episodes could not have been a positive experience for M.L. (See Caden C., supra, at p. 637 ["A parent's struggles may mean that interaction between parent and child at least sometimes has a '"negative" effect' on the child."]; In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159 [evidence the father's prior substance abuse had a negative impact on the child "was germane to the court's assessment of '"the strength and quality"' of the parent-child relationship"].)
M.L. was three years and nine months old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing on December 18, 2023. He was removed from Mother's custody when he was two years old and placed with his caregivers on April 8, 2022. At the time he was removed from Mother's custody, M.L. was unable to talk, feed himself or even chew food. He was extremely delayed for a two-year-old child, functioning at the age of an "8 to 12 month old child", and continues to receive specialized IRC services, speech therapy, occupational therapy, and physical therapy. As M.L.'s caregiver explained, when M.L. was removed from Mother's care, he did not "show any life like skills. He didn't play. He couldn't see. He couldn't hear. He couldn't speak. Nothing. He didn't do anything. He was just-he would just stand almost like lifeless." Although Mother loves M.L. and interacted with him during visits, there is no evidence to suggest she attended any of the 150 medical appointments and therapy sessions M.L. required and that M.L. had a strong, positive attachment to Mother.
Finally, for the third element, the court considers whether the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) In determining whether termination would be detrimental, "the question is . . . whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home." (Id. at p. 634.) "Because terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship-in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life." (Id. at p. 633.)
Nothing in the record suggests M.L. would be detrimentally affected by having Mother's rights terminated and being adopted by his caregivers. Rather, as demonstrated at the July 20, 2023 hearing regarding whether M.L. should be removed from his caregivers, M.L. was bonded to his caregivers, who had been providing him with extensive ongoing care for his special needs for the past 19 months, and had a strong, positive attachment to them. Indeed, due to his caregivers' commitment, M.L. was thriving, called them "mama" and "papa," and was able to participate in daily activities. Both parents also acknowledged M.L.'s caregivers' love and care of M.L. with Father stating he was "relieved" they took good care of him and noting M.L.'s improvements while in their care. The evidence in the record is clear that M.L. will not suffer any detriment from the termination of parental rights. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding the parental benefit exception did not apply.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: FIELDS J. MENETREZ J.