Opinion
E083749
10-01-2024
In re D.B. et al., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. H.H., et al., Defendants and Appellants. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant H.H. Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.B. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. RIJ2200417 Dorothy McLaughlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant H.H.
Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.B.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of H.H. (Mother) to her children, D.B. and R.H. (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) Mother contends the juvenile court erred by (1) denying her request to reinstate reunification services (§ 388), and (2) denying her request to apply the parent-child bond exception to terminating parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) C.B., who is the presumed father of D.B. and R.H. and whose parental rights were also terminated, joins in Mother's contentions. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
A. DETENTION
Mother suffers from cognitive delays. Mother was homeless in May 2022. D.B. turned two years old in May 2022. That same month, Mother and D.B. arrived at a shelter. The clothing and items that Mother had for D.B. were dirty. For example, D.B.'s sippy cup "was covered in rot, mold, and dirt." D.B. did not wear shoes. He did not speak, but would" 'randomly scream,' and present[ed] more like a 'six month old than a two year old.'" D.B. had not received medical care since he was born. Mother had to be reminded to feed D.B. and change his diaper. Mother did not know what to feed D.B., so "his diet consisted mostly of juices." Mother had given D.B. juices since he was an infant, when such beverages were inappropriate for his age.
When a social worker from the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) visited Mother at the shelter, Mother did not have diapers for D.B. Mother said she tried to help D.B. to use the restroom, but if that failed, then "he urinates and defecates on the floor or himself, which she then cleans." Mother did not know what size diaper D.B. wore. In June 2022, the Department detained D.B. and placed him in foster care.
In July 2022 Mother gave birth to her daughter, R.H. Other than an ultrasound to discover the baby's gender in April 2022, Mother did not receive prenatal care. When visited by a Department social worker, Mother did not support R.H.'s head and neck while holding her. The social worker instructed Mother on how to hold an infant, and Mother improved her cradling of R.H. Mother had one can of formula. Mother did not know when she last fed R.H. because Mother did not have a clock. Mother fed R.H. when R.H. cried. The social worker provided Mother with newborn diapers, wipes, bottles, formula, a clock, pens, a notebook, and a feeding schedule for R.H. A couple of days after the social worker's visit, the Department detained R.H. and placed her in a separate foster home from D.B.
A social worker from Adult Protective Services assisted Mother with applying for Medi-Cal, CalFresh, and a cell phone. During visits, Mother focused on R.H.-not speaking or playing with D.B. Mother was advised to engage with both children, and Mother began playing with D.B. It appeared Mother would "need assistance with caring for both children." In June 2022, Mother completed a parenting program.
In September 2022, D.B. moved into R.H.'s foster home. An assessment revealed that D.B.'s "cognitive, receptive language, expressive language, social/emotional, and motor skills were below his age level."
B. JURISDICTION
The juvenile court found true the allegations that D.B. and R.H. (collectively, the children) were at substantial risk of suffering physical harm or illness due to Mother neglecting the children's health and safety, being homeless, not providing medical care for the children, and demonstrating limited knowledge of how to parent a child such as only feeding R.H. when R.H. cried. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
C. SIX-MONTH REVIEW
D.B. attended behavioral therapy to improve "his learning, skill development, and behavior change." D.B. was learning to dress himself, swallow solid food, and say words. D.B. did not have tantrums at the children's foster home; however, he bit R.H. during a visit with Mother. It appeared D.B. was "upset and may have acted out in the visit with his mother when she disciplined him." The Department referred Mother to a class to help her learn how to discipline children so that she might be able to progress to unsupervised visits.
In regard to visits, the Department social worker noted the following: "[Mother] continues to struggle with addressing her children's needs and ensuring their safety during visits. Throughout her visits, she seems to need support and guidance on attending to both children, wiping them properly, making the baby formula properly, and discipling her child, [D.B.], when he has tantrums. These concerns have been addressed [with Mother] after the visits." Mother "agreed to more parenting support to improve on her parenting skills since the department still ha[d] concerns on whether [Mother] has the mental capacity to care for her children unsupervised."
D. 12-MONTH REVIEW
In April 2023, the Regional Center "reported that [D.B.] ha[d] made great progress in his developmental levels since being with his foster parents, but his scores are still, 'Lowish.'" Testing "did not indicate Autism Spectrum Disorder for [D.B.]" D.B. would "cry for no apparent reason at times," which was likely caused by "Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) including trauma." The Department referred D.B. to mental health therapy.
On approximately March 28, 2023, Mother "mov[ed] into Protoypes, a long-term women and children's shelter .... On April 6, 2023, [Mother] left Prototypes against medical advice." Mother left the Prototypes shelter because she "was overwhelmed by the classes and not being able to talk on [her] phone."
From April 2023 through June 2023, Mother lived in motels, on the streets, and with family. Mother was pregnant again. Other than one visit to an emergency room, Mother had not received prenatal care. A Department social worker referred Mother to a medical clinic, where it was revealed she was 11 weeks pregnant and anemic. Mother missed visits with the children on March 27 and 29; April 3, 5, 10, 12 and 17; and declined an in-person visit on June 9. Mother completed her therapy and parenting classes; however, she did not appear to benefit from the services. The Department referred Mother to the services again, but she did not re-enroll in the services.
In July 2023, Mother was living with her Godmother and participating in Los Angeles County's Mama's Program. Through that program, Mother could receive assistance with caring for her newborn. Mother's Godmother told the Department that Mother would need assistance with her newborn. Mother missed visits on June 29 and July 18 and 21, 2023. In August 2023, the juvenile court terminated Mother's reunification services. The children's foster parents wanted to adopt the children.
E. REQUEST TO CHANGE A COURT ORDER
In December 2023, Mother requested the juvenile court change its order terminating her reunification services. Mother asserted circumstances had changed because she returned to the Protoypes shelter and was participating in services, such as mental health and behavioral health programs. Mother requested the juvenile court enter an order for family maintenance or reunification services. Mother contended the change would serve the children's best interests because she shares a loving bond with the children. The juvenile court ordered a hearing on the request.
In January 2024, Mother amended her request to inform the juvenile court that she gave birth to the children's sibling in late December 2023, and the sibling remained in Mother's care "with no noted concerns." Mother asserted granting her request would serve the children's best interests by allowing them to have a relationship with their new sibling.
The Department noted that the children were happy and stable in their foster home. D.B. had been living with the foster parents "for over half his young life and [R.H.] has been since she was five days old." The Department expressed doubt that Mother would be able to care for three children when her programs ended and she was living alone in her own home. In February 2024, Mother was still residing in program housing. A pediatric nurse visited Mother and her baby "twice a week for support."
The juvenile court found Mother demonstrated changed circumstances, but Mother failed to establish that reinstating services would serve the children's best interests. The juvenile court reasoned that, because the children had spent so much of their lives with their foster parents and needed stability, it was not in the children's best interests to grant Mother further reunification services.
F. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Mother objected to the termination of her parental rights based on the parentchild bond exception. Mother argued that she had a loving bond with the children, had appropriate visits with the children, the children ran to greet Mother, and they knew Mother as their mom.
The children's attorney argued in favor of terminating parental rights. The children's attorney contended their "foster parent[s] [are] the only parental figure that these children are aware of having in their lifetime, their cognizant lifetime." The children's attorney asserted that the foster parents were able to aid the children in obtaining the necessary services, in particular, D.B. "receives [Regional Center] services, occupational therapy, behavioral therapy, speech therapy, physical therapy, and IEP services." The Department concurred with the children's attorney and noted that Mother had missed visits with the children.
The juvenile court found the parent-child bond exception did not apply and terminated Mother's parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A. REQUEST TO CHANGE A COURT ORDER
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her request to reinstate reunification services. (§ 388.)
A parent seeking to have reunification services reinstated must demonstrate changed circumstances and that the reinstatement will serve the children's best interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1); § 388, subd. (a)(1).) The juvenile court found in favor of Mother on the element of changed circumstances, so we will focus our analysis on the best interests element. We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review. (In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194-1195.)
"The factors to be considered in evaluating the child[ren]'s best interests under section 388 are: (1) the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of the child[ren]'s bond with [their] new caretakers compared with the strength of the child[ren]'s bond with the parent, and (3) the degree to which the problem leading to the dependency may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been." (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 224.)
The problem that led to the dependency was Mother's inability to care for the children by herself. Mother's lack of ability manifested in failing to teach D.B. how to speak, feeding D.B. juices that were inappropriate for his age, not feeding D.B. solid food, not providing any medical care for D.B., and allowing D.B.'s cup to be covered in mold and dirt. In regard to R.H., Mother needed assistance with understanding how to support R.H.'s head and neck, needed to be taught that R.H. should have a feeding schedule, and Mother needed to be given the feeding schedule. The problem was serious because it greatly impacted D.B.'s development and had the potential to greatly impact R.H.'s development.
Six months into the dependency case, during visits, Mother "need[ed] support and guidance on attending to both children, wiping them properly, making the baby formula properly, and discipling her child, [D.B.], when he has tantrums." Twelve months into the dependency case Mother was not receiving prenatal care for her third child. Mother's Godmother believed Mother would need assistance in caring for the newborn. Eighteen months into the case, Mother was "residing with her baby at a Women's Program named Mama's. [Mother] mentioned that she is receiving assistance from the Mama's program.... [A]nd she has a pediatric nurse who visits her twice a week for support."
During the pendency of the case, Mother did not demonstrate that she is capable of caring for three children who are all under the age of five years old. At the 18-month point in the case, Mother needed assistance to care for one infant. Thus, the serious problem of Mother lacking the ability to care for the children was not an issue that would be easily resolved.
Mother asserts that she could remain living in the Prototypes program's housing indefinitely with her children. Prototypes is a long-term shelter; however, it does not appear that Mother had a plan to stay there indefinitely. First, the record reflects Mother was "in the midst of securing her own two-bedroom apartment with the support of affordable housing." Second, Mother had previously checked herself out of the Prototypes program against medical advice, so one can infer she would not stay there indefinitely.
We now turn to the issue of emotional bonds. The children "have developed a positive attachment with the [foster] parents.... [A]ll members of the [foster] family expressed they love [the children] and their lives at home would not be the same without them." The children "both seek out the [foster] parents for comfort, affection, and to meet their daily needs."
For all but the first five days of her life, R.H. resided with the children's foster parents. Therefore, the foster parents are the only parents providing day-to-day care, who R.H. knows. As a result, one can reasonably infer that two-year-old R.H. has a stronger emotional bond with the foster parents than with Mother.
Four-year-old D.B. lived with Mother for the first two years of his life. Those years were chaotic in that Mother lacked housing, did not provide D.B. with medical care, fed D.B. juices that were not age-appropriate, did not provide diapers for D.B., did not teach D.B. to speak, and did not teach D.B. to eat solid food. While in foster care, D.B. would "cry for no apparent reason at times," which was likely caused by "Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) including trauma." One can reasonably infer that the adverse experiences occurred while in Mother's care, resulting in D.B. having a complicated emotional bond with Mother. Meanwhile, D.B.'s emotional bond with his foster parents is positive.
In sum, the problems that led to the dependency are serious and not easily resolved, and the children's emotional bonds with their foster parents are more positive than their bonds with Mother. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err by denying Mother's request to reinstate reunification services.
B. PARENT-CHILD BOND EXCEPTION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her request to apply the parent-child bond exception to termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
"' "Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." . . .' . . . Where possible, adoption is the Legislature's preferred permanent plan. [Citation.]' "Adoption is the Legislature's first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker." [Citation.]' [Citation.] [¶] '" '[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement.'" '" (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 814 (Andrew M.).)
"To establish that the exception applies, the parent must show three things: (1) the parent maintained 'regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted'; (2) 'the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent'; and (3) 'terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.'" (Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 815.)
" 'A hybrid standard governs our review. [Citation.] The first two elements involve factual determinations to which the substantial evidence standard of review applies. [Citation.] The final step, determining whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.'" (In re Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 815.)
Mother missed multiple visits with the children, including March 27, and 29, 2023; April 3, 5, 10, 12, and 17, 2023; June 29, 2023, and July 18 and 21, 2023. Thus, Mother was inconsistent in attending her visitation appointments.
As set forth ante, R.H. only lived with Mother for the first five days of her life.
It can be inferred that R.H. does not have a substantial emotional bond with Mother due to Mother not providing day-to-day care for R.H. for a significant period of her life.
Also discussed ante, it can be inferred that D.B. has a complicated emotional bond with Mother, which results in spontaneous crying due to trauma he experienced while in her care. Thus, D.B. does not have a substantial emotional bond-that is positive-with Mother. Due to the inconsistent visits and lack of substantial, positive, emotional bonds, the juvenile court did not err by not applying the parent-child bond exception to terminating parental rights.
In the alternative, Mother asserts the juvenile court should have imposed legal guardianship rather than terminate Mother's parental rights. Typically, a legal guardianship in juvenile court would not be ordered for a child under the age of six years old who is residing with a non-relative. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(iv) [nonrelatives], compare with, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) [relatives].) The children in this case are under the age of six years old, and they are residing with a non-relative. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err by not ordering a legal guardianship.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J. RAPHAEL J.