Opinion
E074425
06-26-2020
In re D.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.T., Defendant and Appellant.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1600547) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed. Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On December 12, 2019, the juvenile court denied D.T.'s (father) modification petition and terminated parental rights to his son under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He appeals, contending the court erred by denying his section 388 petition to reinstate reunification services, by finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply, and by ordering a permanent plan of adoption instead of legal guardianship. We reject his contentions and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. Detention.
In November 2017, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filed a dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of siblings) on behalf of D.T. (the child) alleging mother (1) tested positive for drugs while giving birth, (2) had a history of abusing controlled substances and engaging in domestic violence relationships, and (3) had previously lost parental rights to the child's half siblings. Father was currently incarcerated "for various charges, including assault with a deadly weapon, inflict corporal injury on spouse/cohabitant, three felony charges of terrorist threats, three battery charges, and numerous prison prior charges." The child was detained and placed in foster care.
Mother is not a party to this appeal and will only be discussed as needed.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report and Hearing.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report filed December 19, 2017, and the addendums filed January 17 and February 7, 2018, father was incarcerated with an unknown release date and had an "extensive" criminal arrest history, including violent crimes and drug-related charges. Father stated he and mother lived together for four months in 2016 and 2017, and he tried to help her get into drug treatment but was unsuccessful. He denied using drugs or alcohol, and claimed to have completed two separate substance abuse programs while incarcerated. The child was exposed to amphetamines while in utero; however, he was doing well and gaining weight. Visitation between father and the child was not appropriate due to father's incarceration.
Initially, DPSS did not recommend reunification services for father because he was an alleged father; however, once paternity test results confirmed that he was the child's biological father, DPSS changed its recommendation. Father "expressed a deep desire to receive Reunification Services and has indicated he is willing to do anything in order to reunify with [the child]." The child remained in foster care because the paternal grandmother could not be approved for placement due to an active felony arrest warrant, and the maternal grandmother was "not currently able to take placement of [the child] because she had her hands full with his siblings." On February 1, 2018, father was sentenced to be incarcerated until August. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the first amended petition, declared the child a dependent, removed him from the parents' custody, and ordered reunification services for father only.
C. Six-month Status Review Report, Addendum, and Hearing.
In the six-month status review report filed July 27, 2018, DPSS recommended an additional six months of reunification services. Beginning on July 9, 2018, the child was placed with his half siblings in the home of the maternal grandmother. Shortly thereafter, upon his release from prison, father reached out to DPSS "to inquire about reunification and visitation with his son." His court-ordered case plan required "participation in parenting [classes], individual counseling, and a domestic violence program." Although he had participated in a correspondence parenting program, father had not passed because he "'did not take the time or make an effort to engage with the materials.'" Also, he had not completed the "Getting Out by Getting In" program in prison. He explained his plan to complete "his domestic violence and counseling services through parole," and to participate in an outpatient treatment program in an effort to complete his services within 30 days. Father "was adamant about his desire to reunify with [the child] and his intent to complete any programs that would allow him to be a part of his son's life." At his first supervised visit on July 19, 2018, father was excited to see the child and was very attentive to his needs.
The child was "reaching his developmental milestones timely," and he was "an active baby who has the ability to recognize familiar faces and respond with appropriate emotion." He was animated when he "sees his siblings and extended relatives," appearing to "have a healthy bond with his sisters and relatives as he is always smiling in their presence."
On August 1, 2018, the juvenile court continued reunification services for father, ordered "liberalized visitation" two times a week for two hours, and further authorized "unsupervised, overnight, weekend [visits] and placement with father on Family Maintenance upon compliance with the Court ordered Case Plan."
D. Twelve-month Status Review Report and Hearing.
According to the 12-month status review report filed January 7, 2019, DPSS recommended terminating father's reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing with a concurrent plan of legal guardianship. Father reported that his nephew, with whom father had been living, was moving to Las Vegas, leaving father homeless. He was unemployed but expressed a plan to go to truck driving school. During the past five months, he had attended weekly, 50-minute therapy and anger management sessions, but he was unable to participate in a parenting course due to his living situation. Nonetheless, father consistently engaged in visitation with his son who "lights up when he sees his father." The social worker commented, father "loves his son very much"; however, out-of-home placement remained necessary due to father's limited resources.
On January 10, 2019, the juvenile court continued services for father and set the next hearing "in accordance with statutory requirements."
E. Eighteen-month Status Review Report and Section 366 .22 Hearing.
In the 18-month status review report filed May 1, 2019, DPSS recommended terminating reunification services, reducing visitation, and setting a section 366.26 hearing with a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal grandmother. Father was living with the paternal grandmother, unemployed, and had not attended his therapy and anger management sessions since December 2018. He was discharged from his substance abuse program due to his behavior. Although DPSS referred father to an eight-week parenting education program, he chose to enroll in a 24-week program, which he attended from January 16 to February 15, 2019, only. In March, DPSS referred him to a different program but he did not attend. Father's parole officer indicated father was "'doing terrible'" on parole because he "was not reporting and was absconding regarding reporting." Father's violation of parole required him to serve six days in jail in December 2018, and 10 days in jail from March 21 through April 1, 2019. While father maintained weekly visitation, he continued to sleep between 20 and 40 minutes during each visit. When the paternal grandmother was present, she supervised the child while father slept, but directed him to wake up after 20 minutes of sleep. Father's visitation was not liberalized due to his failure to comply with his case plan.
Father was terminated from the programs for not attending; however, he had not attended because he was in jail.
A contested section 366.22 hearing was held on May 17, 2019. The social worker testified, confirming the information in his report. Father also testified. Father stated that he loves his son "with all [his] heart," and has a home for him at the paternal grandmother's home. Father asserted the child says, "dada," when he hears father's voice and when the two are "playful." Father "wants to be in [his] son's life," wants "to raise [his] son respectfully," and described having a child as being the "best thing in the world." Father testified that he moved in with the paternal grandmother in December 2018, but he intends to get his own place "soon." He denied refusing to attend the court- ordered programs and claimed he had been "terminated" from the programs. He blamed his recent parole violation on his parole officer who usually showed up at the paternal grandmother's house when father was "out looking for jobs and stuff." He accused the social worker of not providing referrals for counseling and anger management programs, and he justified his failure to enroll in programs by stating, "How can I be in them, ma'am, when I have been going through all of this here?" The paternal grandmother testified that she attended visits with father, and he would only "nod" off during some of the visits. She stated father played with the child, and both of them were welcome to live in her home. The paternal grandmother had met the maternal grandmother, and the two "get along."
The juvenile court terminated reunification services, set a section 366.26 hearing, and ordered bimonthly visitation for father and the paternal grandmother.
F. Sections 366.26 and 366 .3 Status Review Report and Hearing.
According to the sections 366.26 and 366.3 report filed September 3, 2019, the maternal grandmother expressed a desire to adopt the child and indicated she "will have no problem with father seeing [the child] once Parental Rights have been terminated." Father was compliant with his bimonthly visitation, he was attending individual therapy and anger management classes, and both he and the paternal grandmother had obtained a "Triple P Parenting certificate" on July 25, 2019. Nonetheless, DPSS continued to recommend adoption by the maternal grandmother as the most appropriate plan for the child, but requested a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing to obtain the preliminary adoption assessment.
G. Section 388 Petition.
On September 12, 2019, father filed a section 388 petition seeking to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and either place the child with father or grant him six months of family reunification services. As to changed circumstances, father asserted he "has participated in services on his own. Completing Triple P Parenting through MFI Recovery, . . . continu[ing] to participate in services, including Anger Management and Counseling," and "visit[ing] the child regularly and as often as the Court and DPSS permits." As to the best interests of the child, father alleged he "has stepped up to his role as Father from the very beginning of this case. [He] has had regular and consistent visits with the child throughout the child's life. The child enjoys the visits with Father. The child 'lights up when he sees his father,' and DPSS recognizes that Father 'loves his son very much.'"
On September 13, 2019, the juvenile court continued the sections 366.26 and 366.3 hearing and set a hearing on father's petition.
The preliminary adoption assessment was filed on November 15, 2019. The assessment noted the maternal grandmother owned a five-bedroom home, was in good health, had previously adopted the child's half siblings, wanted to keep the siblings together, was committed to adopting the child, and had the support of her family regarding the adoption. The maternal grandmother had been the child's primary caregiver since July 9, 2018. The child was adjusted to his placement, and he was "well bonded" to her, her family, and his half siblings. The child called the maternal grandmother "momma," was very affectionate toward her, and turned to her for comfort and attention. He was a healthy child and was thriving in his placement. The maternal grandmother was willing to allow contact between the birth parents and the child through supervised visitation, as long as they were able to demonstrate sobriety; however, she was not willing to sign a postadoption contract agreement.
On December 9, 2019, DPSS filed an addendum report wherein it "recognize[d] that [father had] made strides to ensure he is a better father for [the child]," but noted he "unfortunately is statutorily out of time regarding his services." DPSS opposed father's request for a change order on the grounds it was not in the child's best interests, opining that while father needed more time to stabilize himself, the child "needs a permanent home in order to achieve stability."
H. Sections 388 and 366 .26 Hearing.
A contested section 366.26 hearing in combination with a hearing on the section 388 petition was held on December 12, 2019. The social worker testified that father had made good progress on his programs since his services had been terminated, he consistently participated in visitation, and the child recognized him, looked forward to and enjoyed their visits, and called him, "Dad." However, the child was inseparable from his sisters, was comfortable in his caregiver's home, and would seek comfort from his caregiver and her family members. The social worker opined that father had benefited from the services, but he "has to get his economics together." The social worked noted that father "will start working in January" and get his own "place."
Father testified that he is "a whole lot different" than he was at the last hearing. He had a good relationship with the maternal grandmother and did not want to move the child away from his half siblings; however, he wants "to come get [him], take him fishing if I want to, to a ball game and be a part of his life." Father provided documentation that (1) he had entered the "Gibson House for Men Recovery Program" on October 7, 2019, and his projected completion date was January 5, 2020; (2) he "continues to address his addiction" and is committed to receiving treatment at the program; and (3) he will have a part time job after he completes his program.
Father's counsel argued that father had "absolutely changed his circumstances," and he had shown that he had made progress in his case plan "enough to warrant six months of family reunification services." Counsel noted that the "only strong male figure" in the child's life was father. In response, DPSS and the child's counsel commended father on his progress, but argued he had failed to carry his burden of proof because his circumstances were still changing, and it was not in the child's best interests. The juvenile court denied father's petition, explaining, "the evidence before the Court demonstrates a changing circumstances, not a changed circumstances." The court stated that it was not in the best interests of the child because he was "two years old, . . . he's been in this home for almost a year and a half, [a]nd he is with siblings."
At the section 366.26 hearing, father's counsel argued the beneficial relationship exception because father had a strong bond with the child. The social worker opined father would be a positive influence in the child's life as long as he continued on the right path, and confirmed that father had been the "only male father figure in this child's life." Thus, counsel asked the court to apply the exception, not terminate father's parental rights, and choose legal guardianship with the maternal grandmother as the permanent plan. Alternatively, counsel requested posttermination visitation. DPSS and the child's counsel argued that no exception applied to prevent termination of parental rights, but they did not oppose father's request for posttermination visitation. The juvenile court found the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply, terminated all parental rights, and ordered adoption as the permanent placement plan. However, the court continued minor as a dependent, stating, "Although the parental rights have been terminated, as the Court believes it was required to do under the law, I do think it is very important for this minor that visitation continue between the father and child. . . . I'm going to order that the current visitation schedule with the father continue. And authorize, again, that the paternal grandmother also be permitted to participate in visitation. I do think it is very important that this young boy continue to have a strong positive male influence." Visitation was conditioned on father's continued progress in his services. Father appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of the Section 388 Petition.
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his section 388 petition. We disagree.
Section 388 is a general provision permitting the juvenile court, "upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, . . . to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court." (§ 388, subd. (a).) The statute allows the modification of a prior order only when the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) changed circumstances or new evidence exists, and (2) the proposed modification would promote the best interests of the child. (In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1193.) A parent seeking relief under section 388 "must show changed, not changing, circumstances. [Citation.] The change of circumstances or new evidence 'must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order.'" (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) Moreover, "'[i]t is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.'" (In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 960.) A parent requesting an order for reunification services after they have been terminated has the burden of proving that the benefit to the child of reinstating services outweighs the benefit the child would derive from the stability of a permanent placement. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464 (Angel B.).) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
Here, father argues he carried his burden of showing a change in his circumstances as evidenced by his completion of a parenting course, his engagement in services at Gibson House, the social worker's opinion that father had benefited from services and only needed to "get his economics together," and the fact that the paternal grandmother supported father and the child living in her home. While we commend father for participating in various programs after his reunification services were terminated, at most, he has shown that his circumstances were changing, but had not changed.
The record demonstrates father had previously started parenting courses and counseling but failed to complete them. Father's prognosis appears favorable but only to the degree he completes his various programs, gains employment, remains employed, and attains housing. Furthermore, father is unable to demonstrate that a change order was in the best interests of the child. While he claims that he occupied a parental role in the child's life as evidenced by his continuous and consistent visitation, the child running to him or sleeping in his arms, and the social worker testifying that father "would be a positive influence to remain in the child's life, visiting, keeping on the program," he has failed to show how his request would advance the child's need for permanency and stability. The child has been living with the maternal grandmother and his two half siblings since July 9, 2018, he is bonded to them, and he is thriving in their home. The child looks to the maternal grandmother for comfort, attention, and to have his needs met. Moreover, "[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.'" (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) The court here recognized this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question—the best interests of the child.
In view of the circumstances, it is difficult to see how placing the child "in a plan of family maintenance with father" or reinstating father's services would be in the child's best interests. The child was bonded to his maternal grandmother, who wanted to adopt and raise him with his half siblings. Father's compliance with his case plan was short-term and ongoing, and he was unable to show how either of his requested changes outweighed the benefit the child would derive from the stability and security of a permanent home. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father's section 388 petition.
We note that father's section 388 petition sought to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and either place the child with father or grant him six months of family reunification services. However, at the hearing, it appears that father was no longer asking to place the child with him. When asked if he wanted "to move the child away from his siblings today," father replied, "No, I don't want to move him. He's in a blessed place."
B. Termination of Parental Rights.
Father argues the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We disagree.
At a permanency planning hearing, once the court finds by clear and convincing evidence a child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, the court is required to terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless the parent shows that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of several statutory exceptions. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) One of the exceptions is the beneficial relationship exception to adoption, which applies when it would be detrimental to the child to terminate parental rights in that "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
"'To trigger the application of the parental relationship exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.' [Citation.] A beneficial relationship 'is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." [Citation.] The existence of this relationship is determined by "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs."'" (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.)
Thus, the nature of the relationship between the parent and child is crucial in determining the existence of a beneficial relationship; it is not sufficient to show that the child derives some benefit from the relationship or shares some "'emotional bond'" with the parent. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 (K.P.).) "To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent's rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed." (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) In other words, the parent must show he or she occupies a "'parental role'" in the child's life. (K.P., at p. 621.)
The parent bears the burden of showing the statutory exception applies. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252.) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
Appellate courts are divided over the appropriate standard of review for an order determining the applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception. We review the juvenile court's findings on the existence of the beneficial parental relationship for substantial evidence. (In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Whether "the relationship is a 'compelling reason' for finding detriment to the child" is a "'quintessentially' discretionary decision" that we review for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1315; see In re J.S. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1080 [applying hybrid standard of review to sibling bond exception].)
The issue is currently pending before our Supreme Court in In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839 (Caden C.).
Here, there is no question father fulfilled the first prong of the beneficial relationship exception, as he consistently visited the child. Thus, the issue before us is whether he met his burden on the second prong that the child would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship. We do not find the evidence favoring father's position compelled the juvenile court to find the exception applied or that this is one of the extraordinary cases where this exception should have been applied.
We acknowledge there was evidence the child enjoyed visiting with father, reacted positively toward father, and called him "dada." But, this evidence fell short of establishing father's relationship with the child promoted his well-being to such an extent that it outweighed the well-being he would gain in a permanent home, with an adoptive parent. The child was doing well with his maternal grandmother and half siblings, and he appeared bonded to them. While visits with father were positive, the child looked to the maternal grandmother as the source of comfort, attention, and to have his needs met. The child was a newborn at removal and has never lived with father. In contrast, he has spent more than half his life living with the maternal grandmother, who is the only person consistently occupying a parental role in the child's life.
Father argues the court's posttermination order for visitation "underscored that [the child's] best interest was served by continued contact with father." We disagree. The posttermination visitation order is not the equivalent of a finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental. The court did not order that father continue his role as a parent, but as a "positive strong male influence." If father stops participating in services, DPSS has the discretion to terminate his visitation. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 581 ["The focus of dependency law is on the well-being of the child, and we do not fault the court for determining forced contact with [a parent] may harm [the child] emotionally."].) This condition places father in a different position than a parent who has a right to visit despite participation in services. (Id. at p. 580 ["Visitation between a dependent child and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome of the proceedings. . . . It is ordinarily improper to deny visitation absent a showing of detriment."].) Also, the court's order limits continued visitation to the time period until the child is adopted, after which visitation would be subject to a postadoption contract agreement.
Nonetheless, father compares his case to In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68 (E.T.), in which the appellate court reversed the juvenile court's order declining to apply the exception, as an example of when the parent's good progress justifies application of the beneficial parental relationship exception. This case, however, does not help father, as it serves as an example of the type of evidence (namely, beyond participation in a case plan) normally required for the court to find the beneficial relationship exception. E.T. involved four-year-old twins, who were "very tied" to their mother. She was able to ease the children's fear and anxiety during weekly visits described as "therapeutic." (E.T., at pp. 73, 77.) The appellate court found the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception because the court applied the wrong standard when it found the bond "'was not to such an extent that they can't be happy in their godparents' placement.'" (Id. at p. 77.) The appellate court explained, "[t]he standard is whether the children benefit from Mother's presence in their lives, not whether they could eventually be happy without her." (Ibid.)
The issue of whether a showing that a parent has made progress in addressing the issues that led to dependency is necessary to meet the beneficial parental relationship exception is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 87, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839. --------
In contrast here, father presented no evidence to show what detriment the child would suffer if the parent-child relationship was terminated. (See, e.g., E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 72 [testimony of social worker that separation from mother caused the children anxiety].) At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the child had been living with the maternal grandmother and his half siblings for approximately 17 months, was bonded with them, and had no reported problems. While the child enjoyed his visits with father, the strong statutory preference for adoption prevailed by the time of the section 366.26 hearing. We do not doubt father cares deeply for his son and has made significant progress in addressing the issues of substance abuse and domestic violence; however, there is no evidence the child would be "greatly harmed" by the termination of the natural parent-child relationship with father. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) We therefore conclude father has not shown that the juvenile court's findings lacked the support of substantial evidence or that its exercise of discretion rested on an unsupported factual basis. In short, the court properly found the parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply.
C. Legal Guardianship
Father also contends the juvenile court should have ordered legal guardianship, as opposed to adoption, as the permanent plan. We disagree.
Under section 366.26, subdivision (b)(1), the statutory preference is to terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. "The Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice. . . . 'because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.' [Citation.] 'Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.'" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Because the child was likely to be adopted and the beneficial relationship exception did not apply to preclude adoption, "it necessarily follows that the juvenile court correctly determined that adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for [the child]." (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1420.)
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders denying father's section 388 petition, terminating parental rights, and placing the child for adoption are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P.J. MENETREZ
J.