Opinion
E053975 Super.Ct.No. RIJ112698
03-06-2012
In re C.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for minors.
Appellant C.G. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to his two minor sons, C.G. (born 2007) and R.G. (born 2008). Father contends the trial court erred when it found the sibling relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) did not apply, because C.G. and R.G. have a significant bond with their four older siblings. Father believes the termination of his parental rights resulted in a substantial interference with the children's sibling relationships, because the court placed them with prospective adoptive parents who live far away, so regular contact with the siblings is now highly unlikely.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 18, 2009, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filed a petition pursuant to subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (g) of section 300 as to Mother's six children. The children were formally detained by the juvenile court on June 19, 2009. At that time, the court ordered reunification services for the parents, supervised visitation for the parents and other relatives, as well as contact among the children.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
In an amended petition filed August 5, 2009, allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (c) were stricken, and the court sustained the remaining allegations at the jurisdictional hearing held August 5, 2009. The amended petition included allegations against Mother and three different fathers. The allegations involved inappropriate use of physical discipline as to three of the children, K.E., M.E., and D.E., while they were in the care of their father, A.E.; and exposure to domestic violence, and substance abuse by the parents. As to A.G., the father of the oldest child, A.Z., it was alleged A.G. was unable to care for his child because he was in prison.
Neither A.E. nor A.G. is a party to this appeal.
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Appellant is the father of the two youngest children, C.G. and R.G. C.G. was 19 months old at the time of the initial detention, and R.G. was seven months old. When the children were first detained, C.G. and R.G. were placed in a foster home with the oldest child, A.Z. The other three children, K.E., M.E., and D.E., were placed together in a separate foster home and were then placed with their paternal grandmother on December 18, 2009. On July 31, 2010, A.Z. was placed with his paternal grandmother; C.G. and R.G. remained in the foster home together. Pursuant to an order by the juvenile court on August 5, 2009, sibling visitation occurred regularly at the home of a maternal aunt.
As Father contends, the record does include statements by the social worker indicating that "all of the siblings are very bonded with one another." The older children said they missed the siblings who were not in the same foster home, and would like to remain together if possible. C.G. and R.G. were not verbal at this time.
As of July 15, 2010, when the social worker prepared a status report in anticipation of the 12-month review hearing, Father had visited his children regularly, attended three parenting classes, and tested negative for drug use three times. However, on September 13, 2010, during a contested 12-month review hearing, Father admitted he was going to prison for 32 months on a firearm charge. The court found Father failed to make substantive progress on his case plan, and there was no probability of return to his custody. Similar findings were made as to the other parents. The court terminated reunification services as to all of the parents, and set a permanency hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
In the social worker's report prepared on December 22, 2010, in anticipation of the section 366.26 hearing, adoption by their respective paternal grandmothers was recommended for the four oldest children, and preliminary assessments were prepared as to each identified prospective adoptive parent. The social worker indicated three relatives had been identified as possible adoptive parents for C.G. and R.G. These included the paternal great-grandmother (PGG), a maternal aunt, and a maternal cousin. However, the maternal aunt decided not to complete the assessment process when her husband lost his job. Both the PGG and the maternal cousin were in the process of being assessed. The maternal cousin had visited with the children, had completed an adoption home study, and was licensed by a foster family agency. At a hearing on January 11, 2011, the court authorized placement of C.G. and R.G. with the maternal aunt in Northern California, and ordered them transported there.
On February 1, 2011, the PGG filed a section 388 petition seeking an order immediately changing the placement of C.G. and R.G. from the maternal aunt to her. She argued placement in Northern California was not in the best interests of the children, because it would interfere with or potentially sever their ties with their siblings and other relatives. The PGG argued it would be beneficial for the children to be placed with her, because they would be able to remain both physically and emotionally close to their siblings and other family members. The PGG also claimed she had been seeking placement of the children but her efforts had been willfully and unnecessarily delayed by the social worker. Alternatively, the PGG requested frequent overnight and extended visitation and a kinship adoption agreement.
In an addendum report filed April 1, 2011, DPSS opposed the section 388 petition, because the children were doing well in their new placement, and it would be detrimental to move them again. The social worker stated the children were placed with the maternal aunt because they had been waiting for a permanent placement since September 13, 2010, when reunification services were terminated. The decision was delayed until December 27, 2010, and this was "the only home that was approved, ready and waiting for the children." The family was approved in May 2010. The PGG did not come forward until September 27, 2010. The social worker reported Mother opposed placement with the PGG and wanted the children placed with maternal relatives, although Mother later denied this,. In addition, DPSS had concerns the PGG would not provide an appropriate level of protection for the children from their father. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the PGG's petition for placement.
On June 13, 2011, the court held a section 366.26 hearing and terminated parental rights. The court also concluded adoption was in the children's best interests, and the children were likely to be adopted.
DISCUSSION
Father argues the court erred when it placed C.G. and R.G. with maternal relatives over 1,000 miles away, because all of the children shared a sibling bond and had regular visits with them throughout the proceeding. According to Father, C.G. and R.G. had an especially close bond with the oldest sibling, A.Z., because he protected them from domestic violence and cared for them while they lived together with Mother. He also lived with them in their initial foster care placement. In support of his argument, Father cites information in the social worker's reports about the relationships among the children. He also cites testimony about sibling visitation and bonding by the PGG, and the court's statement that it found her to be a credible witness. Father believes the benefits of a continuing sibling relationship outweigh an adoption by distant relatives that makes it impractical for sibling relationships to be maintained.
If a child cannot be returned to a parent, "[a]doption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile court must terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence it is likely the child will be adopted. However, the court will not terminate parental rights if it determines doing so would be detrimental to the child based on one of several statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The party challenging the termination of parental rights bears the burden to produce evidence showing an exception applies. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527.) We review the juvenile court's findings for substantial evidence. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947 (L.Y.L.).)
Under subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), the court may find an exception to the termination of parental rights applies when "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship. . . ." (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.) "In enacting this exception, the Legislature was concerned with preserving long-standing relationships between siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil." (Ibid.)"[T]he sibling relationship exception permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child." (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54.) "[T]he application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount." (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
To determine whether the exception applies, "[t]he court must balance the beneficial interest of the child in maintaining the sibling relationship, which might leave the child in a tenuous guardianship or foster home placement, against the sense of security and belonging adoption and a new home would confer. [Citation.]" (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.) In the first part of the analysis, the court determines "whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship" based on the factors set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E). (L.Y.L., at p. 952.) These factors include "whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest . . . ." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
"To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship." (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952, fn. omitted.) "[E]ven if a sibling relationship exists that is so strong that its severance would cause the child detriment, the court then weighs the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would provide." (Id. at pp. 952-953.)
In our view, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding the exception did not apply here. As noted above, C.G. was only 19 months old at the time of the initial detention, and R.G. was only seven months old. The record indicates C.G. and R.G. were not raised in the same home as the three middle children, K.E., M.E., and D.E. Those children lived with their father, A.E. All of the children were together only briefly in Mother's custody prior to their removal on or about June 18, 2009. C.G. and R.G. did visit with the older children regularly before and after removal, so there is evidence supporting the existence of a sibling bond. However, evidence of significant common experiences and a close, strong bond are lacking because of the limited nature of the contacts among these children, and the young age of C.G. and R.G.
It is true the oldest child, A.Z., lived in Mother's home with C.G. and R.G. from the time they were born, and was initially placed in the same foster home. Based on a personal interview at the foster home, the social worker reported A.Z., who was 10 years old at this time, had taken on a "parentified" role toward the younger children, especially as to C.G. and R.G. He told the social worker he babysat all of the children and considered C.G. and R.G. to be his "babies." He wanted to be in the same foster home as C.G. and R.G., because he said it was his job to take care of them. As with the middle children, A.Z. had regular visitation with C.G. and R.G. during the dependency proceeding. Of course, all of this is evidence of a fairly strong bond and some important shared experiences.
On the other hand, A.Z. was able to accept the foster mother's role in taking care of C.G. and R.G. He was then placed separately with his paternal grandmother on July 31, 2010. During later visits by the social worker, A.Z. said he was happy with this living arrangement. By the time C.G. and R.G. were placed with the prospective adoptive parents, C.G. and R.G. were accustomed to living apart from A.Z.
It is also apparent the juvenile court could not ignore the practical realities of the family's circumstances and the difficulty of placing six children who had three different fathers. All of the children were doing well in their prospective adoptive homes and had strong bonds with their respective caregivers. C.G. and R.G. both adjusted well to living with their prospective adoptive parents, appeared to be bonded to them, and displayed no emotional problems or distress over being moved away from their older siblings or other relatives. Particularly because of their young age, C.G. and R.G. needed permanency in a home with competent, stable, caring parents. The older siblings were all being adopted by their respective paternal grandmothers, who shared no biological relationship with C.G. and R.G. Even so, the juvenile court was aware that efforts were being made by all of the prospective adoptive parents for all of the siblings to have continuing contact and visitation. These efforts were being made despite the challenge of the distance between C.G. and R.G's prospective adoptive placement and those of the older half siblings. The record shows C.G. and R.G.'s prospective adoptive parents supported ongoing contact among the siblings, and demonstrated a willingness to facilitate this contact in a number of ways, including telephone calls, video conferencing, correspondence by mail, and visitation.
Under the circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably infer the bond and shared experiences, although meaningful, were not as significant to C.G. and R.G. as infants and toddlers as they were to A.Z. or the other siblings, who were much older. Based on their young ages, the court could also reasonably determine the long-term emotional needs of C.G. and R.G. could best be served by the permanency of adoption, rather than by living in close proximity to their older siblings in order to ensure continued and frequent contact over the years.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's decision not to apply the sibling exception to the termination of parental rights in this case. Father did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the termination of his parental rights to C.G. and R.G. would be detrimental to them, because it would substantially interfere with a significant sibling relationship. In addition, because of their young age and need for permanency in a loving home, the court could reasonably conclude the benefits these children would obtain through an adoption outweighed the benefits of living in close proximity to their older half siblings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
RICHLI
J.