Opinion
E051554 Super.Ct.No. SWJ009832
08-10-2011
In re S.E. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.E., Defendant and Appellant.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for Minors.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael J. Rushton, Judge. Affirmed.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minors.
Minors S.R.E. (born July 2000) and S.L.E. (born October 2003) (collectively minors) came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Social Services (the department) when a social worker received a report on January 13, 2010, of general neglect, and verbal altercations between mother and mother's boyfriend occurring in the presence of minors. Mother and boyfriend had been involved in an incident of domestic violence on January 10, 2010. Mother called the police, filed for a restraining order, and moved to a new residence. Boyfriend was arrested. Boyfriend had previously been arrested for acts of domestic violence against mother. The social worker directed mother to comply with a verbal safety plan to remove any chance of harm to minors. The department later discovered mother attempted to have the restraining order dismissed and permitted boyfriend back into her home.
The department filed a juvenile dependency petition which, as amended, alleged that pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), minors were at substantial danger of physical harm if continued in mother's custody. On March 1, 2010, the juvenile court detained minors and placed them with their father. On June 30, 2010, the juvenile court took jurisdiction over minors, removed them from mother's custody, and placed them with father. On appeal, mother contends that substantial evidence does not support either the court's jurisdictional or dispositional orders. Finding no error, we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The initial report to the department reflected that boyfriend and mother had engaged in verbal altercations in front of minors; boyfriend had thrown objects, and broken glass had been left on the floor for four to five days. However, by the date of the social worker's initial interview with mother, mother had already moved out of the home and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent boyfriend from contacting her or minors. Mother wrote in the application for the TRO that boyfriend had "cornered me, threw a towel in my face, punched a hole in the wall, kicked a door in, threw my personal property down the stairs, blocked me from leaving and said 'make me' when I asked him to let me alone." She further reported that boyfriend "stomped on my glasses [and] broke our banister railing. He also threw my keys at me."
On January 21, 2010, the social worker conducted a follow-up check on mother. Minors disclosed that mother had no contact with boyfriend in the interim. S.L.E. indicated mother had broken up with boyfriend because he was "'punching walls and destroying things.'" She also reported, "there has been broken glass in the garage from a Christmas ornament that broke and that . . . was why she could not go into the garage. She did not know why her mother had not cleaned up the glass." She stated boyfriend kicks doors and breaks things. She reported that on one occasion boyfriend broke glass on the floor; mother left it there for several days but mother "was not going to pick up the glass because [boyfriend] broke the glass"; S.L.E. stepped on the glass, but denied incurring any injury. S.R.E. reported witnessing domestic violence between mother and boyfriend; boyfriend had broken things, kicked a hole in the wall, kicked down the door to her mother's room, smashed her mother's eyeglasses, and broken a family picture. She stated she felt scared that she or her sister would be hurt. When asked about the broken Christmas ornament in the garage, she reported having to "'hop over'" the glass to get to the refrigerator in the garage. She did not know why her mother had not cleaned up the glass. Mother told to the social worker she was moving out of the home for "the safety of [her] children." When asked about the broken glass on the floor reported by minors, mother stated it had derived from something boyfriend had broken.
The origin of the broken glass is unclear from the record. When questioned by the social worker, mother reported the "glass on the floor in their old residence" was from something boyfriend broke; the "glass in the garage" was from a light bulb dropped by S.L.E.
At the following check-up on February 23, 2010, minors disclosed that mother had ongoing contact with boyfriend; boyfriend had been living in the new home for one or two weeks, which made minors anxious. S.L.E. reported that mother was looking for an apartment with boyfriend in San Diego. When confronted by the social worker with boyfriend's presence in the home, mother replied, "'That's my choice, if he's back in my life.'" She stated minors simply needed to come to terms with boyfriend being involved in her life. Mother reported the restraining order had been dismissed on February 02, 2010. She reported boyfriend had enrolled in a 52-week batterer's class. The social worker checked the superior court records regarding the restraining order; she found that mother had attempted to have the restraining order lifted provided boyfriend took a 52- week batterer's class; the court denied the request and the restraining order remained in effect.
During a follow-up interview the next day, S.R.E. reported that her mother had criticized her for telling the department too much. She indicated the police had been to their old residence on four occasions; each time they offered to take boyfriend to jail, but mother refused. S.R.E. reported she did not feel safe living with mother; she wished to live with her father, with whom she did feel safe. Mother told the social worker she intended to move to another county and homeschool minors so the department could never speak with minors again. Mother reported minors were simply jealous that she had a boyfriend. The maternal grandparents reported boyfriend had been arrested twice for domestic violence against mother; they alleged that he also had charges against him for domestic violence against his ex-wife. A review of the family's prior history with the department reflected at least three prior referrals, both substantiated and unsubstantiated, going back to August 2002, with the latest before the instant incident occurring in April 2006.
In the jurisdictional and dispositional report filed on April 1, 2010, the social worker reported that S.L.E. reiterated boyfriend had "'punched the wall, broke the stairs, broke the coffee table. He completely destroyed the place.'" Minors stated that they did not feel safe living with mother while boyfriend was around. On March 23, 2010, their father stated the minors became upset, because they found out that mother was still seeing boyfriend. Mother admitted that she and minors spent time with boyfriend after the issuance of the restraining order; however, mother reported that she recently requested another dismissal of the restraining order. Mother stated that she remained in contact with boyfriend (despite the restraining order) but averred that they were no longer a couple.
In an addendum report filed May 12, 2010, mother reported that she and boyfriend were in individual counseling with regard to the past incidents of domestic violence. She maintained that they retained separate residences, but continued to have contact with one another. The restraining order against boyfriend was dismissed on April 5, 2010, pursuant to mother's request. Mother stated that since she and boyfriend were no longer a couple, and her children were no longer residing with her, there was no longer any need for the restraining order. She also posited that it posed difficulties for boyfriend with respect to his own child. The social worker called mother's cell phone and heard an outgoing voicemail in boyfriend's voice, identifying boyfriend by name. Mother asserted that she had originally purchased the phone for boyfriend, had just recently received it back from him, and had yet to obtain the password to change the voicemail message. S.R.E. reported that she felt safe staying with her father and would continue in his custody if the decision were left to her. S.L.E. stated that she could not decide with whom she wished to reside. The social worker reported that mother had still failed to enroll in any domestic violence victim or parenting classes. She concluded that "[b]ecause . . . mother has minimized the behavior, the domestic disputes, despite having the restraining order, she continues to have contact with [boyfriend]. Therefore, it would be suspect as to how forthcoming she has been or would be regarding the frequency and severity of the domestic disputes."
In an addendum report filed June 2, 2010, minors both reported feeling safe living with their father. S.R.E. again reported that her choice would be to continue living with her father. S.L.E. ambivalently reported that she would choose to live with mother. Minors indicated that mother remained in contact with boyfriend. Mother subsequently enrolled in a parenting course on June 17, 2010.
The three-day contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing began on June 23, 2010. Dr. Lamont Lee, a marriage and family counselor, testified on mother's behalf that he first began seeing her in 2005; he had treated her for most of that year, but more recently began seeing her again in 2009, when he had two sessions with her. He had five sessions with mother since April 2010. Dr. Lee discussed mother's domestic violence issues with her. Mother accepted that she can no longer live with men. He testified that he believed mother had separated from boyfriend in April or May. However, even without contact with boyfriend, he advised her she needed to take separate parenting and domestic violence courses. She had signed up for a parenting course that covered, in part, domestic violence issues. She had placed a deposit on a residence of her own.
On cross-examination, Dr. Lee testified that mother did not go into the details of the domestic violence against her; the focus of their discussions was not violence against mother, but minors' perception of the violence. She never informed him that boyfriend was violent towards her; she just relayed what minors reported. Dr. Lee testified he is not a domestic violence counselor; he contended that mother "absolutely" needed to see someone who specialized in that field. Dr. Lee concluded that minors could not be immediately returned to mother, because she does not currently have a residence of her own. Dr. Lee also suggested that he would want some feedback from the recommended parenting and domestic violence courses before he would recommend returning minors to her custody; mother needed to demonstrate some "follow through" and benefit from the courses before return of custody would be appropriate.
The maternal grandfather testified that he had submitted a letter to the department on April 25, 2010, in which he wrote minors would be better off placed with their father. However, he currently testified he now believed that minors would be better off being placed with mother. He changed his opinion because mother was currently enrolled in a parenting class, had broken off her relationship with boyfriend, and had not seen boyfriend in six or eight weeks. He testified he never would have written the letter if he knew it would have been used in a determination regarding permanent custody of minors.
The social worker who responded to the initial referral testified that when she first interviewed mother, mother informed her she had obtained a TRO, would take the requisite steps to make it permanent, that boyfriend did not know the location of her then-current residence, and that she had moved out in order to keep the minors safe. Mother had informed her that domestic violence had been occurring between mother and boyfriend for the past few years. During a later visit, minors informed the social worker that they did not feel safe. Mother lied to the social worker when she said the TRO had been dismissed. Although the social worker conceded that no written safety plan had been given to mother, the social worker testified she gave referrals to mother for a program titled "Alternatives To Domestic Violence." She specifically informed mother that if she failed to follow through with the restraining order and referral, minors could be removed from her custody. The current social worker testified that, as far as she knew, mother never signed up for or attended any domestic violence classes.
Mother testified that she had not lied about the dismissal of the TRO; she attempted to have it dismissed, but the court inadvertently dismissed it in the wrong case; the court clerk informed her it would be lifted within 72 hours. She testified she requested the dismissal because she needed to have contact with boyfriend in order to settle financial entanglements between them. When she told the social worker the TRO had been dismissed, she believed that it had been. Mother later actually had the TRO against boyfriend dismissed. She made the request for dismissal at that juncture because she believed that minors had been detained due to the social worker's perception that mother had lied about the dismissal of the TRO. Mother confirmed she had continued to communicate with boyfriend since the minors were taken from her custody; however, she testified they do not currently have a dating relationship. That relationship ended when the children were first taken from her custody. Her continued contact with boyfriend has consisted solely of a few phone calls discussing financial matters; the last time she had any contact with him was two months earlier.
Mother was apparently contending she had a TRO against the minors' father entered in her marital dissolution action.
Mother testified she had enrolled in a parenting class, which would begin on July 12, 2010. She had been in counseling with Dr. Lee, with whom she discussed her relationship with boyfriend and minors. She had obtained an apartment in San Diego. She enrolled in an online university; she planned to obtain a degree within three years.
Mother testified she was not currently dating anyone and was not planning on doing so. Mother testified the social worker never informed her during their initial interview that mother was required to undergo counseling or maintain the restraining order in order to prevent removal of minors; rather, she maintained the social worker told her she was closing the case. Mother conceded she had not completed a domestic violence course.
DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION
Mother contends insufficient evidence was adduced below to substantiate the allegation that minors were at substantial risk of serious physical harm. We disagree.
"At the jurisdictional hearing, the court determines whether the minor falls within any of the categories specified in section 300. [Citation.] '"The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child . . . comes under the juvenile court's jurisdiction."' [Citation.] On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court's findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]" (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.)
"The statutory definition [of section 300, subdivision (b)] consists of three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) 'serious physical harm or illness' to the minor, or a 'substantial risk' of such harm or illness." (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) "'While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the [child] to the defined risk of harm.' [Citation.] 'Thus[,] previous acts[,] standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394.)
Here, the department adduced sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that minors were at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The department established at least some evidence of pervasive domestic violence between mother and boyfriend during the past two years, most of which took place directly in the presence of minors. S.R.E. reported that the police had been to their prior residence on four occasions, apparently due to incidents of domestic violence; each time they offered to take boyfriend to jail, but mother refused. The evidence established that boyfriend had been arrested at least twice for acts of domestic violence against mother. Boyfriend had also apparently been charged with domestic violence against his ex-wife. A social worker testified that mother informed her that she and boyfriend had been involved in a number of acts of domestic violence occurring over the past few years. The triggering event of the department's involvement in the instant case was the culmination of two weeks of escalating violence. Thus, the evidence amply supported a determination that mother was not simply the victim of a single act of domestic violence, but a chronic victim of pervasive abuse that occurred over the course of years.
Indeed, the department adduced ample evidence that the violence involved major disturbances to the entire household. In her application for the TRO, mother wrote boyfriend had "cornered me, threw a towel in my face, punched a hole in the wall, kicked a door in, threw my personal property down the stairs, blocked me from leaving and said 'make me' when I asked him to let me alone . . . . He stomped on my glasses [and] broke our banister railing. He also threw my keys at me. . . ." Mother reported boyfriend "'destroyed stuff and punched walls.'" He pushed mother down, causing her to sprain her ankle and kicked-in her bedroom door, all while minors watched. S.L.E. reported boyfriend was "punching walls and destroying things." She reported boyfriend kicked doors and broke things. On one occasion boyfriend broke a glass on the floor and mother left the broken glass on the floor for several days; S.L.E. stepped on the glass. S.R.E. reported witnessing acts of domestic violence between mother and boyfriend during which he broke things, kicked a hole in the wall, kicked down the door to her mother's room, smashed her mother's eyeglasses, and broke a family picture. S.L.E. later reported boyfriend "'punched the wall, broke the stairs, broke the coffee table. He completely destroyed the place.'" Thus, boyfriend left the home in such a condition that it was likely minors could be injured by the remaining detritus of his fits. Indeed, S.L.E. reportedly stepped on broken glass resulting from one of boyfriend's tantrums.
Moreover, the evidence established that minors and mother feared for minors' safety should boyfriend continue to be involved with mother. Mother herself reported she moved out of the home "'for the safety of [her] children.'" S.R.E. reported she did not feel safe living with mother when boyfriend was around. S.L.E., likewise, did not feel safe living with mother when boyfriend was present. Since mother and minors felt there was a threat to minors' physical well being, the juvenile court's similar determination was well supported.
Finally, the department adduced substantial evidence that mother might continue her relationship with boyfriend such that she would continue to expose minors to the violent conditions discussed above if they were returned to her custody. Mother lied to the social worker that the TRO had been dismissed. Mother's testimony, that she believed the TRO had been dismissed because she attempted to have it dismissed, but the court inadvertently dismissed it in the wrong case, is patently incredible. The social worker checked the minute order for the case in which the TRO had issued; it reflected mother had requested that the TRO be dismissed, but that the court had denied the request. Thus, not only had mother permitted both herself and minors to continue to be in the presence of boyfriend unlawfully, but she lied about the circumstances of that contact. This fact alone clearly supports the juvenile court's determination that mother's testimony was not credible: "In terms of evidence that [mother] broke up with her boyfriend . . . that may or may not be true. I didn't find mother's testimony to be compelling. . . . I felt that she was catering her testimony to what she believed the Court needed to hear."
Abundant evidence established mother continued to have contact with boyfriend, and that she would likely do so in the future. Mother initially minimized the domestic violence and the danger it posed to minors. She had failed to remove boyfriend from her life despite the numerous past incidents of domestic violence. Despite the pendency of the juvenile dependency proceedings, mother had the restraining order against boyfriend dismissed, conceded having continued contact with him, had a cell phone with boyfriend's name and voice on its voicemail, and stated she had engaged in concurrent individual counseling with boyfriend regarding their history of domestic violence. The logical conclusion extracted from these facts is that mother continued to be involved with boyfriend romantically. Indeed, on March 23, 2010, the minors' father reported minors were upset when they found out that mother was still involved with boyfriend.
Although mother testified she had not been involved in a relationship with boyfriend since minors were first taken from her custody in February 2010, Dr. Lee testified that he believed she ceased her romantic involvement with boyfriend only in April or May 2010. Likewise, on June 23, 2010, maternal grandfather testified that mother stopped seeing boyfriend in only the last six or eight weeks, putting the end of their relationship, at earliest, in late April 2010. In fact, mother later contradicted her testimony that her relationship with boyfriend ended immediately after the children were taken from her custody, when she testified it ended only after she was successful in dismissing the restraining order, i.e., on April 5, 2010. Thus, substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that mother was still involved or likely to become involved with boyfriend again; hence, a return of custody of minors to mother would place them at substantial risk of physical harm: "[U]ntil mother figures out why it is that she would stay with [boyfriend], and why she would seek to have the restraining order lifted, and why she would bring him back into the lives of her children once [the department] has become involved . . . I find that danger to the children is imminent and that they cannot be safely returned to their mother. . . ."
B. DISPOSITION
Section 361 provides that a child "may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . . [¶] . . . [that t]here is . . . a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor [or would be] if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody.'" (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169-170 (Basilio T.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227.) "'When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value—to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] When applying the substantial evidence test, however, we bear in mind the heightened burden of proof. [Citation.] 'Under this burden of proof, "evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; see also Basilio T., at p. 170; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529.)
Here, as discussed above, we believe the department adduced sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding, even under the heightened standard of proof applicable to removal of minors from mother's custody. The evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates mother was the victim of pervasive abuse that occurred for over a year, in which boyfriend would also "destroy" the home by throwing objects, resulting in broken debris left scattered about the house. Mother was less than forthcoming about her continued involvement with boyfriend, supporting the court's inherent determination that it was likely she continued to be or would, at some point in the future, become involved with boyfriend again. If minors were returned to her custody, this would put them at substantial risk of harm from flying objects or stepping on or tripping over broken items.
Mother cites a number of cases for the proposition that the circumstances in this case were simply not egregious enough to support removal. She contends the domestic violence in this case was not sufficiently pervasive or harmful, and that minors themselves were never actually physically harmed. We agree that the cases discussed by mother demonstrate more flagrant behavior by the batterer, and that the minors in at least some of those cases were actually physically harmed. Nonetheless, we believe the facts adduced in this case were sufficient to support removal.
In Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 155, the department had 12 prior referrals regarding the minors, who had previously been made dependents of the court due to violent confrontations between the mother and the father. (Id. at p. 162, fn. 3.) The triggering incident of the case concerned two separate events in which the father threatened the mother with a knife, and another in which he struck her and forced her out of the home. (Id. at p. 160.) The father was arrested. The mother had a change of heart; she refused to press charges and the father was released. One of the minors reported that his parents engaged in violent, physical fights on a nightly basis. (Ibid.)The juvenile court removed the minors from the parents' custody finding that they were at substantial risk of physical harm. (Id. at p. 163.)
The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's removal order holding, "a minor can be removed from a parent's custody only in extreme cases of parental abuse or neglect. This is simply not such an extreme case to warrant removal." (Basilio T., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.) The court noted, "it is significant that neither incident directly affected either minor physically, i.e., the adults were fighting with each other and not directing their anger at the minors or abusing them. In fact, no evidence whatsoever was presented that the minors were harmed physically during the incidents that led to this proceeding." (Ibid.)The court held the juvenile court failed to consider less drastic measures than removal, and contradicted the juvenile court's reliance on the parents' failure to participate in counseling and programs as a rationale for removal; the court found the lack of evidence the minors had ever been hurt was, in-and-of itself, enough to invalidate the removal order. (Id. at pp. 171-172.) Basilio T. is distinguishable in that it involved removal of the minors from both the parents, whereas here, the juvenile court placed minors with their father. Moreover, we simply disagree that evidence must be adduced that minors were injured to support a finding they were at substantial risk of physical harm.
We find In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183 (Heather A.)more persuasive. There, the minors' stepmother was hospitalized with a head fracture resulting from physical abuse by the father. (Id. at p. 187, fn. 3.) The department adduced evidence that the stepmother had repeatedly been physically abused and threatened by the father, occasionally in the presence of the minors. (Id. at p. 187-188.) One of the minors had incurred a cut finger and foot from a vase broken during one of the altercations. (Id. at p. 194, fn. 9.) The juvenile court removed the minors from the father's custody, finding that domestic violence impacted the minors "even if they are not the ones being physically stricken by the abuser, because they see and hear the violence and the screaming." (Id. at p. 192.)
The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's removal order, holding that simply being in the vicinity of domestic violence in which objects were thrown posed substantial risk of harm to the minors. (Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.) Moreover, the expert witnesses' testimony regarding "secondary abuse," "the effect on children of occurrences of abuse in their environment which are not directed specifically at them," supported removal. (Id. at pp. 186, 194-195.) "It is clear to this court that domestic violence in the same household where children are living is neglect; it is a failure to protect [the minors] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it. Such neglect causes the risk." (Id. at p. 194.) Although one of the minors had been slightly injured as a result of the domestic violence, that fact was neither dispositive nor requisite to upholding the removal order; rather, the real threat of harm to the minors from the incidents was itself determinative.
We agree with Heather A. Here, minors were in a substantially similar predicament; indeed, S.L.E. had stepped on broken glass resulting from one of the altercations. Although she testified she did not incur any injury from the incident, the possibility of an injury occurring in the future was confirmed by the mere fact that she easily could have been. (Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 194, fn. 9.) Mother's boyfriend threw things, kicked-in doors, punched holes in walls, and destroyed the house. This exposed minors to myriad ways in which they could be injured. Moreover, "[an individual] who repeatedly beats the mother in the presence of the child may well expose the child to emotional trauma and therefore, 'fail to protect' the child." (See In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 398.) Mother failed to take any domestic violence courses and had yet to attend parenting classes. Thus, she had no real demonstrable insight into the precarious situation in which she had placed her children. The juvenile court's removal order was supported by sufficient evidence that minors were at substantial risk of physical harm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RICHLI
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.