Rivers v. Brown

16 Citing cases

  1. South Ga. Medical v. Washington

    269 Ga. 366 (Ga. 1998)   Cited 15 times
    In South Ga. Med. Center v. Washington, 269 Ga. 366 (497 S.E.2d 793) (1998), the Supreme Court reversed this Court, held the trial court had authority to grant the hospital's motion for sanctions, and remanded the case to this Court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.

    "An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum, and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated."Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 52 ( 36 S.E.2d 429) (1945) (quoting 21 CJS 314, § 190-b). The issue of SGMC's entitlement to sanctions was at least "incidentally involved" in SGMC I and served as the basis for ordering a remand, rather than an outright reversal. It follows that the statements in SGMC I were not dicta, but the law of the case.

  2. Ayers v. Young

    80 S.E.2d 801 (Ga. 1954)   Cited 10 times

    To support this statement, Judge Russell relied upon the decision in Martin v. Bartow Iron Works, supra. See also Linder v. Wimberly, 158 Ga. 285, 290 ( 123 S.E. 129); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49 ( 36 S.E.2d 429); Carusos v. Briarcliff, Inc., 76 Ga. App. 346 ( 45 S.E.2d 802). In the present case, the motion to strike was no less general because it was aimed at only one of the separate and distinct matters set up in the defendant's answer.

  3. Taylor v. Cook

    64 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. 1951)

    These claims alone remain in the petition, but they are sufficient to prevent its dismissal. See Herring v. Smith, 141 Ga. 825 ( 82 S.E. 132); Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491 ( 34 S.E.2d 692); Peoples Loan Co. v. Allen, 199 Ga. 537 ( 34 S.E.2d 811); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49 ( 36 S.E.2d 429). 3. Since the foregoing reversal is in favor of the plaintiff Taylor and against the defendant Cook only, it does not affect the judgment in favor of Obie L. Cook Printing Equipment Company. There being no evidence in this record to show that the judgment on the cross-action is unsupported, it must be affirmed.

  4. Davis v. Wight

    63 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. 1951)   Cited 6 times

    This being true, our former ruling is not controlling as the law of the case. See Sanderlin v. Sanderlin, 27 Ga. 334; Dixon v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 187 Ga. 660 ( 1 S.E.2d 732); Smoot v. Alexander, 192 Ga. 684 ( 16 S.E.2d 544); Rackley v. Miller, 200 Ga. 717 ( 38 S.E.2d 404); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 52 ( 36 S.E.2d 429), and the cases there cited. 2. "Where there is no conflict in the evidence, and that introduced, with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, the court may direct the jury to find for' the party entitled thereto."

  5. Reardon v. Bland

    58 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. 1950)   Cited 12 times

    " See also Haupt v. Horovitz, 31 Ga. App. 203 ( 120 S.E. 425); Bank of Oglethorpe v. Brooks, 33 Ga. App. 84 ( 125 S.E. 600). While we have held in the preceding division of the opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to all of the relief sought, the trial court erred in sustaining a general demurrer to the petition as a whole, since it did state a cause of action for some of the relief prayed for. Calbeck v. Herrington, 169 Ga. 869 ( 152 S.E. 53); Davis v. Garden Hills Corp., 172 Ga. 311 ( 157 S.E. 472); Roberts v. Roberts, 174 Ga. 645 ( 163 S.E. 735); Wrenn v. Montgomery, 186 Ga. 618 ( 198 S.E. 700); Poole v. Arnold, 187 Ga. 734, 742 ( 2 S.E.2d 83); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 51 ( 36 S.E.2d 429); Board of Education of Paulding County v. Gray, 203 Ga. 583, 585 ( 47 S.E.2d 508); Wellborn v. Johnson, 204 Ga. 389, 394 ( 50 S.E.2d 16). 6. The assignment of error complaining of the judgment dissolving the temporary restraining order previously granted presents no question for determination by this court.

  6. Griffin v. Driver

    46 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. 1948)

    The plaintiffs in error are precluded from maintaining the present action by the former judgment as the law of the case. Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49 ( 36 S.E.2d 429), and authorities cited. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Bell, J., absent on account of illness, and Wyatt, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

  7. Conner v. Wright

    41 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 1947)   Cited 3 times

    This ruling became the law of the case. Sanderlin v. Sanderlin, 27 Ga. 334; Allen v. Schweigert, 113 Ga. 69 ( 38 S.E. 397); W. A. R. Co. v. Third Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 125 Ga. 489 ( 54 S.E. 621); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49 ( 36 S.E.2d 429). It follows that the trial court properly sustained the demurrers to the petition as amended. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

  8. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Everett

    A11A0951 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2011)

    See Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 397 ( 658 SE2d 567) (2008) (The language in the cases relied upon by the appellant "was obiter dicta lacking the force of an adjudication because it was a statement in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand.") (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 52 ( 36 SE2d 429) (1945) ("An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum, and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.") (citation omitted.) See South Georgia Medical Ctr. v. Washington, 269 Ga. 366, 367 (1) ( 497 S.E.2d 793) (1998).

  9. Kiser v. Morris

    274 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    This was a clear and precise pronouncement of the law of this state, and can not be shunted aside or disregarded as being obiter. See Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 519 (3) ( 167 S.E.2d 697); Dooly v. Gates, 194 Ga. 787, 793 ( 22 S.E.2d 730); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 52 ( 36 S.E.2d 429); Vann v. American Credit Co., 115 Ga. App. 559 (2) ( 155 S.E.2d 459)."

  10. Jett v. Norris

    211 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 6 times

    Recently this court, in McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678, 679 ( 200 S.E.2d 491), held that a dog is a domestic animal. 6. This court, in the recent case of Caldwell v. Gregory, 120 Ga. App. 536 at page 541 ( 171 S.E.2d 571), clearly and distinctly held that where a dog roams loose in the neighborhood and at a place where he did not rightfully belong and inflicts mischief, the owner of the dog is liable whether the owner had prior knowledge of the propensities of the dog for inflicting such mischief or not. This holding is not obiter dictum but is a vital part of the case, laying down one of the principles of law on which the case is decided. For authority see Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 519 ( 167 S.E.2d 697); Dooly v. Gates, 194 Ga. 787, 788 ( 22 S.E.2d 730); Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 52 ( 36 S.E.2d 429); Vann v. American Credit Co., 115 Ga. App. 559 (2) ( 155 S.E.2d 459). This case has not been overruled or set aside, and is authority for the position taken in the case sub judice. 7. We recognize that the Court of Appeals, in the case of Connell v. Bland, 122 Ga. App. 507, 610 ( 177 S.E.2d 833), held that dogs have the right to use the public streets, and the owner is not liable for mischief inflicted unless he has previous knowledge of the propensity of the dog for inflicting such damage.