Opinion
Docket No. HDSP-136912
May 30, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO DISMISS
This is a summary process action based on serious nuisance pursuant to § 21-80 (b) (2). A Notice of Termination of Rental Agreement for Failure to Comply with Obligations was served on December 13, 2005. A Notice to Quit for violation of park rules was served on January 25, 2006. The plaintiff filed the eviction action on March 24, 2006.
NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF RENTAL AGREEMENT
FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS To: Ernest Kelly 2 Montauk Road East Hartford, CT 06118
Dated: December 9, 2005
Your are hereby notified that you have failed to comply with the rental agreement and the adopted rules and regulations concerning your use and occupancy of the premises located at 2 Montauk Road, East Hartford, Connecticut, which provide as follows:
1. Compliance with motor vehicle speed limits;
2. Restrictions on ownership and keeping of pets;
3. Rules relating to the curbing of pets;
4. Use of excessively loud and profane language;
5. Tethering of pets outside your home; and
6. Parking motor vehicle on street overnight.
Over the course of the past several months, you and/or individuals residing with you upon the premises have violated each of the aforementioned rules and regulations on numerous occasions.
Your rental agreement shall terminate on January 16, 2006 unless each of the violations listed above are remedied within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of this Notice.
Dated at East Hartford, Connecticut this 9th day of December, 2005.
RIVERMEAD, INC.
By: Christopher R. Stone
NOTICE TO QUIT
To: Ernest Kelly and Jane Doe 2 Montauk Road East Hartford, CT 06118
The Landlord, Rivermead, Inc., hereby gives you notice that you are to quit possession or occupancy of the dwelling unit/lot now occupied by you at 2 Montauk Road, East Hartford, Connecticut. You are to quit possession on or before February 3, 2006 for violation of park rules.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT ALL MONIES RECEIVED AFTER THIS DATE BY THE LANDLORD WILL BE ACCEPTED AS USE AND OCCUPANCY, ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND COSTS ONLY, AND NOT AS RENT, WITHOUT WAIVING ANY RIGHTS TO PROCEED WITH AN EVICTION.
Dated at East Hartford, Connecticut this 23rd day of January, 2006.
RIVERMEAD, INC.
By: Christopher R. Stone CHADWICK STONE, LLP 111 Founders Plaza, Suite 1403 East Hartford, CT 06108 Tel (860) 610-4500 Juris No. 406688
The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint based on serious nuisance on the following grounds:
(1) Plaintiff's Notice to Quit is defective;
(2) Plaintiff's Written Notice is defective;
(3) Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts or activities on the part of Defendant's "constitution [sic] a serious nuisance."
The plaintiff objects on the grounds that the notices are sufficiently specific and comply with the requirements of state law.
DISCUSSION
The defendant is a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home. A summary process action may be initiated against a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home pursuant to § 21-80 (b) based on one or more of the following grounds: (1) nonpayment of rent, utility charges or service charges; (2) material noncompliance; (3) failure of a resident to agree to a proposed rental increase; (4) change in land use; and (5) serious nuisance. Except where otherwise provided, the plaintiff must give at least sixty days' written notice, and state the reasons for such termination. § 21-80 (b) (3) (B).
In this case, the plaintiff seeks to evict the defendant-resident based on serious nuisance under § 21-80 (b) (2). The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts or activities to constitute serious nuisance. An issue of statutory construction arises as to whether the language of § 21-80 (b) (2) applies to the facts of this case. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply (emphasis added). . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . "(Emphasis added.) (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 277 Conn. 398, 405, 891 A.2d 959 (2006).
"Statutes should be read so as to harmonize with each other, and not to conflict with each other. . . . We must presume that the legislature intended the two statutes to be read together and to be construed, wherever possible, to avoid conflict between them." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Furhman v. Dept. of Transportation, 33 Conn. App. 775, 778, 638 A.2d 1091 (1994).
In accordance with § 1-2z, the analysis begins with the text of General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (2) which provides in relevant part:
"An owner may not maintain a summary process action under subparagraph (B), (C) or (D) of subdivision (1) of this subsection, except a summary process action based upon conduct which constitutes a serious nuisance or a violation of subdivision (9) of subsection (b) of section 21-82, prior to delivering a written notice to the resident specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the resident or payment of damages by the resident to the owner and such breach is not so remedied within twenty-one days, the rental agreement shall terminate except that (i) if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and the resident adequately remedies the breach within said twenty-one-day period, the rental agreement shall not terminate, or (ii) if substantially the same act or omission for which notice was given recurs within six months, the owner may terminate the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive." (Emphasis added.)
The pretermination notice required under § 21-80 (b) (2) must specify "the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice." § 21-80 (b) (2). General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (2) provides for an exception to the sixty day written notice requirement.
A pretermination notice in a summary process action is intended to provide a resident with notice of the breach and to allow the resident an opportunity to cure the breach in order to avoid eviction. See KAPA Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn. Sup. 274, 278 (1979) ("The legislative purpose of the statute is manifest on its face. It is to discourage and foreclose evictions against `first offenders.' . . . Upon remedy of the breach by the tenant within the statutory time framework, the rental agreement remains in effect. The statutory right to this remedy is available to tenants under both written and oral leases. The condition precedent to a remedy of the breach by the tenant is the receipt of a `written notice . . . specifying the acts or omissions.'"); Marrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 104, 497 A.2d 67 (1985) (The Appellate Court adopted the holding of the court in KAPA Associates.). In Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143-145, 520 A.2d 173 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the sufficiency of pretermination notices. "In order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly. . . . Strict construction does not, however, require ritualistic compliance with statutory or regulatory mandates. . . . As we have held in other contexts, in which regulatory and constitutional rights were also implicated; . . . not every deviation from the strict requirements of either statutes or regulations warrants dismissal of an action for summary process. When good cause for termination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices of termination have been sent in strict compliance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded from pursuing summary eviction proceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the notices that he has sent. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 143-145.
In this case, the pretermination notice dated December 9, 2005, specified the following acts or omissions constituting the breach:
1. Compliance with motor vehicle speed limits;
2. Restrictions on ownership and keeping of pets;
3. Rules relating to the curbing of pets;
4. Use of excessively loud and profane language;
5. Tethering of pets outside your home; and
6. Parking motor vehicle on street overnight.
The plaintiff alleges in the eviction complaint that these acts or omissions constitute a "serious nuisance" pursuant to § 21-80 (b) (2). The language of § 21-80 (b) (2) provides in relevant part: "For the purposes of this subdivision, "serious nuisance" means (A) inflicting bodily harm upon another resident or the owner or threatening to inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the harm and under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat will be carried out, (B) substantial and wilful destruction of part of the premises, (C) conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other residents or the owner, or (D) using the premises for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs. If the owner elects to evict based upon an allegation, pursuant to subdivision (8) of subsection (b) of section 21-82, that the resident failed to require other persons on the premises with the resident's consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not constitute a serious nuisance, and the resident claims to have had no knowledge of such conduct, then, if the owner establishes that the premises have been used for the illegal sale of drugs, the burden shall be on the resident to show that the resident had no knowledge of the creation of the serious nuisance." (Emphasis added.)
The pretermination notice served on December 13, 2005, provided the defendant with twenty-one days to remedy the breach before a termination date of January 16, 2006. The notice specified that the tenancy would "terminate upon a date not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice" as required by § 21-80 (b) (2). The notice to quit served on January 25, 2006, provided for a quit date of February 3, 2006. The summary process action based on serious nuisance was not filed until March 24, 2006.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
When "[t]he giving of a sufficient notice is a condition precedent to bringing action. . . . The inquiry always is: Does the notice reasonably protect the interests of the defendant under the particular circumstances of the case?" (Citations omitted.) Schapp v. Meriden, 139 Conn. 254, 256, 93 A.2d 152 (1952). The Supreme Court held in Jefferson Garden Associates, that, in a summary process action, "[i]n order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . ." Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 143.
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court finds that the pretermination notice and notice to quit were sufficient and complied with General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (2). The notices sufficiently apprised the defendant of the information needed to protect against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. The alleged "acts or omissions constituting the breach" may constitute a serious nuisance in terms of "conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other residents or the owner." § 21-80 (b) (2). "When good cause for termination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices of termination have been sent in strict compliance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded from pursuing summary eviction proceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the notices that he has sent. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 202 Conn. 143-145.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.