Opinion
8:23-cv-01107-SAL-JDA
02-20-2024
Kenneth Rivera, a/k/a Kenneth D. Rivera, a/k/a Kenneth Rivera, a/k/a Syncere Shabazz, Plaintiff, v. Dennis Patterson, D.H.O; Stacey Richardson, Inmate Classification; Mr. Freddriks, Associate Warden; Ms. Jackson, I.C.C.; Ms. Bryan, I.C.C.; Ms. Green, I.C.C.; Jessica Salley, RHU Coordinator, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 24.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, asserting that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. [Doc. 1-1 at 3-8.] Defendants removed the action to this Court on March 20, 2023. [Doc. 1.] On June 12, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 24.] The next day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 25.] Plaintiff's response in opposition was entered on the docket on June 23, 2023 [Doc. 27], and additional attachments to Plaintiff's response were entered on the docket on July 5, 2023 [Doc. 36]. The motion is ripe for review.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 at 3-8.]
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections “SCDC”). [Doc. 1-1 at 3 ¶ 1.] At the time he filed his Complaint, he was housed at the Broad River Correctional Institution (“BRCI”) [id.], but he has since moved to the Lieber Correctional Institution (“LCI”) [Doc. 42]. He contends that, on August 11, 2022, he was escorted from his cell to Defendant Ms. Bryan's office in classification. [Doc. 1-1 at 5 ¶ 7.] While Plaintiff was in Bryan's office, Lieutenant Ward photographed Plaintiff's tattoos. [Id. at 5 ¶ 8.] Thereafter, he was informed that he was being recommended for security detention (“SD”) without being given 48-hours notice per SCDC policy. [Id. at 5 ¶ 9.] Defendant Associate Warden Freddricks and Defendant Ms. Jackson informed Plaintiff that the inmate classification committee recommended S.D. based on Plaintiff's “record in 2006 and allegations that he[ was] causing injury to staff and inmates.” [Id. at 5 ¶ 10.] Plaintiff contested these allegations and asked for evidence to support the allegations. [Id. at 5 ¶ 11.] Freddricks stated, “‘We don't need evidence, you're going on S.D. and that's final,'” and Bryan and Defendant Ms. Green “nodded their heads in agreement.” [Id. at 6 ¶¶ 12-13.] After the S.D. hearing, Jackson handed Plaintiff a form indicating that the inmate classification committee recommended that he be placed in SD. [Id. at 6 ¶ 14.] On August 12, 2022, Plaintiff was taken to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). [Id. at 6 ¶ 15.] Defendant Deputy Director of Operations Dennis Patterson and Defendant RHU Coordinator Jessica Salley “signed off on the S.D. status.” [Id. at 6 ¶ 16.]
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. [Id. at 7 ¶ 20.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration his constitutional rights were violated, a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to release Plaintiff from S.D. status, compensatory damages in the amount of $20,000 against each Defendant, punitive damages in the amount of $20,000 against each Defendant, a jury trial, and costs. [Id. at 8 ¶¶ 22-27.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's confinement in RHU does not implicate a protected liberty interest; even if a liberty interest exists, Plaintiff has received sufficient due process in the form of an initial classification hearing and subsequent reviews; relief in the form of release from RHU is not available under § 1983; and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. [Doc. 24-1 at 5-12.] As discussed below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his confinement in RHU implicates a protected liberty interest.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “To state a procedural due process violation [under the Fourteenth Amendment], a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Because “the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995), “to demonstrate a liberty interest meriting procedural due process protection, a prisoner must show (1) denial of an interest that can arise either from the Constitution itself or from state laws or policies, and that (2) this denial imposed on him an atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “Whether confinement conditions are atypical and substantially harsh in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life is a necessarily . . . fact specific comparative exercise.” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2015), as amended (July 7, 2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that, to determine whether conditions impose an atypical and significant hardship, courts should consider “three factors: (1) the magnitude of confinement restrictions; (2) whether the administrative segregation is for an indefinite period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral consequences on the inmate's sentence.” Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence sufficient to support a due process claim. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to forecast admissible evidence showing that his S.D. classification and placement in RHU impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Indeed, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence or allegations regarding the environment in general population or in RHU such that the Court could meaningfully determine the magnitude of his confinement restrictions. Incumaa, 791 F.3d at 527 (“[G]eneral population is the baseline for atypicality for inmates who are sentenced to confinement in the general prison population and have been transferred to security detention while serving their sentence.”). With respect to the period of administrative segregation, the record establishes that, when Plaintiff signed his Complaint on October 25, 2022 [Doc. 1-1 at 8], he had been in RHU for two-and-one-half months and that his classification was reviewed at least every 90 days [Docs. 24-2 at 3 ¶ 5 (Patterson's averment that, before Plaintiff filed his Complaint, the RHU classification committee conducted reviews on August 25, 2022, September 14, 2022, and December 1,2022), 9-11 (RHU review records); 27-2 at 5 (RHU classification review record, signed by Salley on August 25, 2022, and noting that the next scheduled review would be November 22, 2022), 6 (RHU classification committee review record, indicating that the committee conducted a regularly scheduled 90-day review of Plaintiff's status on April 18, 2023), 7 (same for review on December 1, 2022)]. Finally, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any evidence or allegations regarding the impact his S.D. classification and placement in RHU have on his sentence. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the conditions of RHU imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Instead, in his Complaint and response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff focuses more on the circumstances that led to and continued his S.D. classification and placement in RHU, as opposed to the conditions in RHU. [See Docs. 1-1 at 3-8; 27-1; 27-4.]
These records demonstrate that Plaintiff remained in RHU because the inmate classification committee determined that he posed a risk of injury to the staff and inmate population [Doc. 24-2 at 9, 10] and because of pending disciplinary charges in the previous six months [Id. at 11].
Because the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this basis, the Court declines to address Defendants' remaining arguments.
Although Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated SCDC institutional policy in placing him in S.D. status and in RHU [Docs. 1-1 at 5 ¶ 9 (alleging Plaintiff was not provided 48-hour notice in violation of SCDC policy before his classification hearing); 27-1 at 2 (“Plaintiff was never given a 48 hour notice about this S.D. custody hearing per SCDC policy/procedure Op-21.04 Inmate Classification Plan Section 31.7.1.”), 3 (asserting that “Defendants placed Plaintiff . . . on [SD] status without him being convicted of a level one offense” in violation of SCDC policy)], these allegations do not support a due process claim, see, e.g., Joyner v. Patterson, No. 0:13-cv-2675-DCN-PJG, 2014 WL 897121, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2014) (“Section 1983 provides relief from a violation of federal constitutional rights, not from a violation of prison-created policies or procedures.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2014 WL 3909531 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2014), aff'd, 597 Fed.Appx. 748 (4th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. SCDC, No. 3:06-cv-2062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (“[T]he failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”); Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (explaining that § 1983 “guarantees a person's constitutional rights against violation by state actors” but does not provide any relief against violations of SCDC rules and policies).
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 24] be GRANTED.
The Court notes that Plaintiff has also filed a request for entry of default, apparently asserting that Defendants are in default because they never filed a reply to Plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. [Docs. 38; 38-1; see also Doc. 40.] However, as Defendants argue [Doc. 39 at 2], they are not in default for failing to file a reply to their motion for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a) (stating that an entry of default should be entered “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against a plaintiff's complaint) (emphasis added). Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on March 26, 2023. [Doc. 9.]
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.