Opinion
Case No. 06-2044; 07-1084; 07-1272 (DRD).
March 26, 2008
Re: Violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1983; USC Constitutional Amendments 5, 8 and 14 Trial by Jury ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants, the Administration of Juvenile Institutions of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("AJI"); José Negrón Fernández, Administrator of the Juvenile Institutions ("Negrón"), and Rafael O. Malavé, Sub-Director of the Juvenile Institutions ("Malavé"), in Case No. 07-1084, Docket No. 45, and plaintiff Víctor Nieves-Vélez' opposition thereto (Docket No. 47).
Based upon the consolidation of the case of Víctor Nieves-Vélez, Case No. 07-1084 (RLA) with the instant case by Order of March 26, 2008 (Docket No. 52), the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Administration of Juvenile Institutions of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("AJI") is granted. See Opinion and Order of March 24, 2008 (Docket No. 50) entered in Case No. 06-2044. The dismissal with prejudice is granted only as to the AJI under the Eleventh Amendment, as only compensatory damages are requested for past violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and to defendants Negrón and Malavé in their official capacity. The case against the Commonwealth for damages as well as to the federal jurisdiction damages is also dismissed for the same reasons as set forth in our Order of March 24, 2008 (Docket No. 50), under the Eleventh Amendment, as held by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), and Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The Court stresses that since there is no federal grounds to sue the Commonwealth and/or the individual defendants in their official capacity, the only cause of action as to the Commonwealth and individual defendants in their personal capacity is a damages action under local law. Under Pennhurst, supra, the State, nor its officers in their official capacity, can be sued in federal court based exclusively on State law. Hence, the instant action remains as to plaintiffs' claims against defendants Negrón and Malavé in their individual capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Art. 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-103; 120-121:
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief. Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
. . .
The Eleventh Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at 6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given," Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415 U.S. at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the basis of that pendent claim. Id.
. . .
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as Greene, supra, [ Greene v. Louisville Interurban R. Co., 244 U.S. 499 (1917)], neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.FN31 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. [ See infra at page 100]. We now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours).
IT IS SO ORDERED.