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Rivera v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Jan 6, 1994
200 A.D.2d 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

Summary

In Rivera v. City of New York (200 A.D.2d 379 [1st Dept 1994]), the First Department assumed, without deciding, that a statement to an emergency medical services technician by “the comatose patient's niece that plaintiff had used crack cocaine the night before” would “not qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was under no duty to provide the information” (see id.)

Summary of this case from Rosati v. Brigham Park Co–Operative Apartments, Sec No.2, Inc.

Opinion

January 6, 1994

Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Helen Freedman, J.).


In an action for medical malpractice alleging, inter alia, misdiagnosis of the condition that led to plaintiff's cerebral aneurysm, plaintiff claims error in allowing the emergency medical services technician to testify that when he arrived at the scene, he was told by the comatose plaintiff's niece that plaintiff had used crack cocaine the night before. Similar evidence had already been admitted without objection through the testimony of several witnesses. Even if the medical technician's testimony did not qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was under no duty to provide the information (see, Matter of Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 122-123), it was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but for the purpose of showing the technician's state of mind with respect to plaintiff's condition, and thus was not hearsay at all (see, People v. Salko, 47 N.Y.2d 230, 239). Nor was such testimony prejudicial and irrelevant evidence of past drug abuse, since, based upon expert testimony concerning the impact of cocaine use on incrementally-induced conditions such as plaintiff's, the testimony was pertinent to diagnosis and treatment (see, e.g., Campbell v. Manhattan Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 81 A.D.2d 529). Moreover, since plaintiff's counsel both commented upon and elicited related matters, she cannot now be heard to complain.

Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Kupferman and Rubin, JJ.


Summaries of

Rivera v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Jan 6, 1994
200 A.D.2d 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

In Rivera v. City of New York (200 A.D.2d 379 [1st Dept 1994]), the First Department assumed, without deciding, that a statement to an emergency medical services technician by “the comatose patient's niece that plaintiff had used crack cocaine the night before” would “not qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was under no duty to provide the information” (see id.)

Summary of this case from Rosati v. Brigham Park Co–Operative Apartments, Sec No.2, Inc.
Case details for

Rivera v. City of New York

Case Details

Full title:GLORIA M. RIVERA, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: Jan 6, 1994

Citations

200 A.D.2d 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
606 N.Y.S.2d 193

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