River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp.

16 Citing cases

  1. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp.

    51 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 1958)   Cited 25 times
    In River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corporation, 51 N.J. Super. 447, 144 A.2d 180 (1958), the court held that a special act and a previous general act were in pari materia, so that a special act would be interpreted as granting to one person what the general act had granted to others.

    The $20,000 consideration called for by chapter 386 was thereafter paid to the State, and a quadrant of the map and a description of the lands here involved filed with the Secretary of State. The original map and description are reproduced in the Chancery Division opinion appearing in 45 N.J. Super. 445, at page 451. The description refers to lands lying under the tide waters of the Delaware River in Stockton Township, Camden County, "granted" to the United Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company and New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company by act of the Legislature, approved March 31, 1869, i.e., c. 386, and continues:

  2. Microbilt Corp. v. Certain Underwriters At Lloyds, London

    Civil Action 20-12734 (FLW) (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2021)

    (“It is well-settled that where no time is fixed for the performance of a contract, by implication a reasonable time was intended.”); River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J.Super. 445, 464 (Ch. Div. 1957), aff'd 51 N.J.Super. 447 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd 29 N.J. 239 (1959); see also Glazer v. Klughaupt, 116 N.J.L. 507, 510 (1936) (“What constitutes ‘reasonable time' is generally a question peculiarly within the province of a jury unless, upon all the evidence, only one inference may fairly be drawn.”).

  3. Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Tug & Barge Urban Renewal Corp.

    228 N.J. Super. 88 (Law Div. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    Thus JCRA's argument that the Legislature nevertheless intended to create a lesser estate runs directly counter to a steady current of history in New Jersey and elsewhere favoring the creation of absolute fee simple estates and the construing of conveyancing language to that end. Furthermore, JCRA's construction is inconsistent with the opinions of the various courts in River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445 (Ch.Div. 1957), 51 N.J. Super. 447 (App.Div. 1958), aff'd. 29 N.J. 239 (1959).

  4. Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella

    51 N.J. 352 (N.J. 1968)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that littoral owner can gain property through accretion even if accretion is caused by artificial means

    That law has been extensively set forth below ( 92 N.J. Super., at p. 57) as well as in earlier opinions by our courts. See Stevens v.Paterson and Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532 ( E. A. 1870); Ocean City Association v. Shriver, 64 N.J.L. 550 ( E. A. 1900); Bailey v. Driscoll, 34 N.J. Super. 228, 246 ( App.Div.), reversed, 19 N.J. 363 (1955); Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 596 ( App. Div.), certification denied, 24 N.J. 546 (1957); River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445, 453 ( Ch. Div. 1957), affirmed, 51 N.J. Super. 447 ( App. Div. 1958), affirmed, 29 N.J. 239 (1959). See also 1 Waters and Water Rights § 40, p. 245 et seq.

  5. Burke v. Donlon

    DOCKET NO. A-3802-15T2 (App. Div. Aug. 11, 2017)

    Since the parties did not agree on a specific time, the law infers, as Judge Dumont found, the contract will be performed within a reasonable amount of time. River Dev. Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445, 464 (Ch. Div. 1957), aff'd, 51 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div. 1958), aff'd 29 N.J. 239 (1959).

  6. Kilarjian v. Vastola

    379 N.J. Super. 277 (Ch. Div. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    It is well-settled that where no time is fixed for the performance of a contract, by implication a reasonable time was intended. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J.Super. 445, 464, 133 A.2d 373 (Ch.Div. 1957). This principle is applicable to contracts to purchase realty.

  7. Range v. McLarty

    246 N.J. Super. 196 (Law Div. 1990)   Cited 3 times
    Holding UCJF had direct right to reimbursement for PIP benefits paid to passenger in uninsured automobile from tortfeasor, a commercial-vehicle owner

    Normally, the Legislature shall be ". . . deemed to have adopted the construction placed . . ." on a statute by judicial decision. Cox v. Hruza, 54 N.J. Super. 54, 61, 148 A.2d 193 (App.Div. 1959); River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp. 45 N.J. Super. 445, 458, 133 A.2d 373 (Ch.Div. 1957). It is thus reasonable to infer that by the amendment of 1990, the Legislature intended that the same rights which Buoni had established in favor of insurance carriers would be extended to governmental agencies — in this case, UCJF. Wilson v. Unsatisfied Claim Judgment Fund Bd., supra, and Sotomayor, supra, establish the rule that a passenger in an uninsured motor vehicle who is not protected by the family coverage to which reference has been made, is entitled to PIP benefits against UCJF, despite the availability of recovery against an insured third party.

  8. Mazzeo v. Kartman

    234 N.J. Super. 223 (App. Div. 1989)   Cited 19 times
    In Mazzeo v. Kartman, supra, 234 N.J. Super. at 229-232, 560 A.2d 733, we held that the rule against perpetuities applies to rights of first refusal but that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence to survive defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal.

    This is the New Jersey rule. Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v. Housing Auth., supra, 674 F.2d at 1007; see Guaclides v. Kruse, supra, 67 N.J. Super. at 354-356; cf. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445, 464 (Ch.Div. 1957), aff'd 51 N.J. Super. 447 (App.Div. 1958), aff'd 29 N.J. 239 (1959) (where no time is fixed for the performance of a contract, the law implies that a reasonable time was intended). Other jurisdictions follow this rule as well.

  9. Becker v. Sunrise at Elkridge

    226 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 1988)   Cited 13 times

    It is well-settled that where no time is fixed for the performance of a contract, by implication a reasonable time was intended. River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445, 464 (Ch.Div. 1957), aff'd 51 N.J. Super. 447 (App.Div. 195 8), aff'd 29 N.J. 239 (1959). This principle is applicable to contracts to purchase realty.

  10. Schultz v. Topakyan

    193 N.J. Super. 550 (App. Div. 1984)   Cited 10 times

    We hold that in the absence of a specific written provision for notice the buyers fulfilled the contingency when they received a commitment within the 60 days and in a reasonable time notified the sellers that a mortgage commitment had been obtained. See River Development Corp. v. Liberty Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 445, 464 (Ch.Div. 1957), aff'd 51 N.J. Super. 447 (App.Div. 1958), aff'd 29 N.J. 239 (1959). Because notice was given within three days, reasonableness was beyond legal dispute.