Opinion
CIVIL NO. 06-1197(JAG).
January 29, 2007
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS: Raúl S. Mariani-Franco representing Marisela Rodríguez-Rivas, Mariani Franco Law Office, San Juan, PR, Raúl S. Mariani-Franco representing Carlos Francisco Ortiz-Torres, Mariani Franco Law Office, San Juan, PR.
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS: Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, Harold A. Frye-Maldonado and Iris Alicia Martínez-Juarbe representing Police Department of Puerto Rico, P.R. Dept. of Justice — Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Marisela Rodríguez Rivas ("Mrs. Rodriguez") is an officer of the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") assigned to the Police station in the town of Maunabo, Puerto Rico. Mrs. Rodríguez alleges that, while working in the Maunabo Police station she was the subject of harassment, discrimination and retaliation proffered by fellow police officers and co-defendants Martin Rivas Sepúlveda ("Sgt. Rivas"), Benjamín Santiago ("Lt. Cor. Santiago") and Carlos Rodríguez Torres ("Lt. Rodríguez Torres"). All of the co-defendants are of higher rank and are in charge of supervising Mrs. Rodríguez.
According to Mrs. Rodríguez, Sgt. Rivas sexually harassed her on several occasions beginning on May 21, 2003. In 2003, Mrs. Rodríguez allegedly filed an administrative sexual harassment claim against Sgt. Rivas at the PRPD headquarters located in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Notwithstanding the complaint, Mrs. Rodríguez contends that she continued to work with Sgt. Rivas, who constantly harassed her for several months until he was transferred to the Yabucoa station. However, on November 15, 2004, Lt. Cor. Santiago reassigned Sgt. Rivas back to the Maunabo police station.
Afterwards, Mrs. Rodríguez claims that she suffered from continued retaliation and harassment by Sgt. Rivas and by Lt. Rodríguez Torres, who was angry at Mrs. Rodríguez for not asking him for help prior to filing a claim at the PRPD headquarters. As a result, on March 1, 2005, Mrs. Rodríguez filed charges of discrimination against the PRPD at the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Department of Labor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("UAD"). The PRPD never answered the complaint, nor appeared at the administrative proceedings. Consequently, on November 25, 2005, the UAD issued a Right to Sue Letter.
On February 22, 2006, Mrs. Rodríguez, Carlos Francisco Ortiz Torres and the conjugal partnership composed by both (jointly, "Plaintiffs") filed the present complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., alleging that Mrs. Rodríguez was the subject of unlawful employment practices based on her sex. (Docket No. 1). Moreover, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, plaintiffs invoked supplemental jurisdiction over several state law claims. Id. Plaintiffs seek prospective relief, compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees.
On August 2, 2006, the PRPD ("Defendant") moved to dismiss all claims against it under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), because Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing the Title VII complaint. Defendant argues that those claims that occurred within the three hundred days prior to the filing of the administrative complaint in the UAD were timely filed. Title VII gives a claimant 300 days to file a complaint after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Thus, according to Defendant, those claims that correspond to events, which occurred before May 4, 2004 are time barred. In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Title VII because the acts alleged by Plaintiffs do not establish a hostile work environment. (Docket No. 11).
Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss rejecting Defendant's allegations that the sexual discrimination claims are time barred. Plaintiffs make reference to the complaint and state that in it, they clearly allege that Mrs. Rodriguez was the subject of sexual discrimination and retaliation during the months of November 2004, December 2004 and January 2005, which are within the three hundred day time period required by Title VII. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that all of the alleged acts of discrimination and retaliation are part of a continuous systemic and serial violation, which constitutes an exception to the three hundred day period rule. Finally, Plaintiffs also reject Defendant's allegation that there was no hostile work environment. Plaintiffs contend that the PRPD permitted the continuous acts of harassment and retaliation, which affected the health and emotional stability of Mrs. Rodríguez. (Docket No. 17).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 1995). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Beléndez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Goolev v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988).
DISCUSSION
A. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This language is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment," which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatory, hostile or abusive environment. Id. (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978). Title VII is violated "when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
Title VII does not encompass conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. Likewise, an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive is beyond Title VII's purview. Id. However, the "sufficiently severe or pervasive" element is one of several factors that a plaintiff must establish in order to show a hostile work environment.Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must prove the following factors to be successful in a hostile work environment claim:
(1) that she (or he) is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established. Id.
An environment that is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances such as: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. This standard takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. Id. at 21. Thus, there is no Title VII violation if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive and the conduct does not actually alter the conditions of the victim's employment. Id. at 22.
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. Id. A discriminatory and abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can violate Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality if it detracts employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keeps them from advancing in their careers." Id.
According to the allegations in the Complaint, while working in the Maunabo police station from 2003 to 2005, Plaintiff was the subject of multiple acts of sexual harassment and retaliation. The alleged conduct could be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment that negatively affects Plaintiffs' psychological and physical well being. Therefore, Defendant failed to prove beyond doubt that Plaintiffs cannot set forth any set of facts in support of their hostile work environment claim.
B. Title VII Statute of Limitations
Section 2000e-5 of Title VII states in pertinent part that a charge "shall be filed" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," or within 300 days if "the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with [an authorized] State or local agency." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Therefore, a claimant who seeks to recover for an asserted violation of Title VII, first must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC, or alternatively, with an appropriate state or local agency, within the prescribed time limits. Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1999). Title VII charge filing requirement is a prerequisite to the commencement of a suit.McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Id.
The EEOC must conduct an investigation to decide the validity of the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC determines that there is a valid claim, it may file in a Federal Court a complaint on behalf of the complainant or issue a right to sue letter, which allows the complainant to initiate a private Title VII suit in Federal Court. See U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-(f)(1); see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104-105 n. 12 (1979).
Plaintiffs satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the UAD on March 1, 2005 and by receiving and acting upon the UAD's statutory notice of the right to sue. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleges that Mrs. Rodríguez suffered from continuous acts of sexual discrimination and retaliation in the year 2003 and in the months of November 2004, December 2004 and January 2005. The acts that occurred in 2004 and 2005 are within the three hundred day time period. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that those acts that occurred in 2003 are part of a continuous systemic and serial violation and thus would fall within the time period required by Title VII. Consequently, Defendant failed to prove that Plaintiffs' complaint is time barred.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.