Summary
In Ritter v. Industrial Commission, 44 Colo. App. 32, 615 P.2d 40 (1980), the court construed the predecessor to § 8-43-406(2) to mean that the limit on lump sums for PTD benefits should be calculated by including previous awards of lump sums for PPD benefits. At the relevant time, the statute provided "the aggregate of all lump sums granted to a claimant who has been found and declared by the director to be permanently and totally disabled, shall not exceed eighteen thousand six hundred twenty-three dollars and fifty cents.
Summary of this case from In re Holm, W.C. NoOpinion
No. 79CA0626
Decided January 24, 1980. Rehearing denied March 6, 1980.
In workmen's compensation case, claimant sought review of an order of the Industrial Commission denying him the full amount of his request for a lump sum payment.
Affirmed
1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION — Aggregate — Lump Sum Payments — To Be Considered — Determination — Maximum Payment Due — Permanent Partial Disability — Deduction — Partial Disability Payments — Proper. Under clear and unambiguous provision of statute, the aggregate of all lump sum payments are to be considered in determining whether maximum allowable amount payable as workmen's compensation benefits for permanent total disability have been paid; thus, industrial commission properly deducted previous lump sum payments for permanent partial disability in arriving at total amount due claimant for permanent total disability.
Review of Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado
Paul J. McSwigan, for petitioner.
James A. May, Francis L. Bury, R. S. Ferguson, for respondents State Compensation Insurance Fund and S. S. Kresge Company.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Attorney General, Ann Sayvetz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Industrial Commission of Colorado.
In this workmen's compensation case, the claimant, Gene James Ritter, seeks review of an order of the Industrial Commission denying him the full amount of his request for a lump sum payment. The applicable statute is C.R.S. 1963, § 81-13-3(2) (1969 Perm. Supp.) (subsequently amended, see § 8-52-103(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.)). See Eight Thousand West Corp. v. Stewart, 37 Colo. App. 372, 546 P.2d 1281 (1976). The only issue presented is whether the Commission's interpretation of the statute was correct. We affirm.
The essential facts are not disputed. Claimant sustained an accidental injury on April 23, 1971, and received temporary disability benefits until March of 1976, when he was awarded a permanent partial disability of six percent as a working unit. At that time the balance of his compensation was reduced to a lump sum in the amount of $4,002.68. In June of 1976 the insurer admitted liability for maximum permanent partial disability, and the Commission approved claimant's request for payment of lump sum compensation in the amount of $8,944.87, which represented the outstanding balance owing to the claimant. Subsequently, an admission for permanent total disability was filed, and claimant applied for a lump sum settlement of $18,623.50 as the "statutory amount" owing to him as a lump sum on the award of permanent total disability. The Commission granted this request up to the amount of $5,675.95, with appropriate reduced monthly payments, thus bringing the total of claimant's three lump sum payments to $18,623.50.
C.R.S. 1963, § 81-13-3(1) (now § 8-52-103(1), C.R.S. 1973), confers discretionary power on the Commission to order payment "of all or any part of the compensation awarded in a lump sum." Subsection (2), as amended in 1969, specifies the maximum lump sum which may be awarded:
"The aggregate of all lump sums granted to a claimant who has been found and declared by the director to be permanently and totally disabled, shall not exceed eighteen thousand six hundred twenty-three dollars and fifty cents." (emphasis supplied)
Claimant contends here, as he did before the Commission, that the statute unambiguously provides for a maximum lump sum payment for permanent total disability benefits only and that his prior lump sum payments for permanent partial disability benefits should not have been deducted in calculating the statutory maximum. We find no merit in this contention.
[1] Where the meaning of a statutory provision is clear and no absurdity is involved, the language is not subject to construction. American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Claimant in re Death of Butler, 188 Colo. 116, 532 P.2d 951 (1975); Diamond Industries v. Claimants in re Death of Crouse, 41 Colo. App. 541, 589 P.2d 1383 (1978). The emphasized portion of the statute requires that the aggregate of all lump sum payments be considered in determining the limitation. In addition, the provisions for lump sum compensation are included in the "general provisions" portion of the statute and not in the article on "accident benefits." Hence, the Commission's interpretation of the statute was correct.
Order affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ENOCH and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.