Alexander v. Continental Motor Werks, Inc., 1996 WL 79403 (N.D.Ill. Feb.16, 1996) (citing Johnson v. Fleet Finance, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.Ga. 1992) and Brodo v. Bankers Trust Co., 847 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa. 1994)).Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, 932 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.Mass. 1996).Smith, 915 F. Supp. at 290.
The Court has reviewed both the credit application and the credit agreement and finds that whether Fast AC reasonably contemplated a repeated transaction is not apparent on the face of either of these documents. See, e.g., Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709-10 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of a TILA complaint against an assignee where court would need to โresort to evidence or documents extraneous to the disclosure statementโ to determine whether there was a violation); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (assignee could not be liable for car dealer's alleged misrepresentations even where plaintiff alleged that assignee had knowledge of the dealer's practices because the violation was not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement); see also Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2000) (โCongress intended actual knowledge independent of what could be discerned from the disclosure statement to be insufficient to trigger assignee liability under ยง 1641(a).โ). Indeed, Plaintiff's arguments that the subject loan was closed-end rely solely on FTL's corporate representative testimony and not anything on the face of the credit application or credit agreement.
Courts have held that a violation is apparent if it is โobvious, evident, or manifest; ... open to view, plain, [or] patent.โ Holcomb v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 10โ81186โCIV, 2011 WL 5080324 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 26, 2011) (quoting Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.Mass.1996) (internal citations omitted)). In contrast, a disclosure violation is not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when it is apparent โonly by virtue of special knowledge, whether about the practices of other firms ... or its own practices.โ
Courts have held that a violation is apparent if it is "obvious, evident, or manifest; ... open to view, plain, [or] patent." Holcomb v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 10-81186-CIV, 2011 WL 5080324 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011) (quoting Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, a disclosure violation is not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when it is apparent "only by virtue of special knowledge, whether about the practices of other firms ... or its own practices."
Thus, while the possibility exists that Honda Universe's practices constituted a violation of TILA, no violation is apparent from the face of the disclosure statement and Defendant cannot be held liable. See Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc. et al., 932 F. Supp. 32, 35 (assignee could not be liable for car dealer's alleged misrepresentations even where plaintiff alleged that assignee had knowledge of the dealer's practices because the violation was not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement); Cemail v. Viking Dodge, Inc. et al., 982 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (dismissing TILA claim against assignees because they "could not have discerned from the documents" that the dealer misrepresented the finance charge by charging a higher price for credit purchases than cash purchases). See also Ramadan, 229 F.3d at 199 ("Congress intended actual knowledge independent of what could be discerned from the disclosure statement to be insufficient to trigger assignee liability under [TILA].").
Thus, Wells Fargo, as an assignee of the loan from Pride to Akar, may be held liable for Pride's failure to make disclosures required by TILA, but only if such violations were โapparent on the face of the disclosure statementโ or the assignment was involuntary. Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.Mass.1996). In the instant case, the plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to support Wells Fargo's liability as an assignee under TILA.
" 15 U.S.C. ยง 1641(a). Courts have held that a violation is apparent if it is "obvious, evident, or manifest; . . . open to view, plain, [or] patent." Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (internal citations omitted); See e.g., Little, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (finding failure to disclose the date on which the rescission period would expire on a document entitled "Notice of Right to Cancel" to be a violation apparent on the face of the disclosure document). In contrast, a disclosure violation is not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when it is apparent "only by virtue of special knowledge, whether about the practices of other firms . . . or its own practices."
See Evans at 672 (even if state law claims necessarily involved disputes as to TILA requirements, allowing federal jurisdiction in cases arising out of disclosures in installment contracts for purchasing cars would disturb the congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities). See also Pierce v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1234 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (Washington law incorporates TILA disclosure requirements); In re Boganski, 322 B.R. 422, 428 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (noting that Nevada and Indiana state law incorporate by reference TILA disclosure requirements); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32, 34 (D. Mass. 1996) (Massachusetts law incorporates TILA standards). Finally, 28 U.S.C. ยง 1447(c) allows the Court to "require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal."
Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 1996 WL 447261 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 2, 1996) (Holderman, J.); Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 1996 WL 316975 (N.D.Ill. June 10, 1996) (Gettleman, J.).See, e.g., Brister v. All Star Chevrolet, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 1003, 1007-08 (E.D.La. 1997); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32 (D.Mass. 1996); Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan of Waukegan, 955 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (Kocoras, J.); McPhan v. Geo R. Gibson Chevrolet, 1996 WL 685449 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 25, 1996) (Nordberg, J.); Lindsey v. Ed Johnson Oldsmobile, 1996 WL 411336 (N.D.Ill. July 19, 1996) (Kocoras, J.); Bambilla v. Evanston Nissan, Inc., 1996 WL 284954 (N.D.Ill. May 21, 1996) (Leinenweber, J.).
See Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 218 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (Norgle, J.); El-Mohammed v. Old Orchard Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 1997 WL 106243 (N.D.Ill. Feb.10, 1997) (Holderman, J.); Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 1996 WL 447261 (N.D.Ill. Aug.2, 1996) (Holderman, J.); Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 1996 WL 316975 (N.D.Ill. June 10, 1996) (Gettleman, J.).See Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 112 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 1997); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32 (D.Mass. 1996); Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan of Waukegan, 955 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (Kocoras, J.); McPhan v. Geo R. Gibson Chevrolet, 1996 WL 685449 (N.D.Ill. Nov.25, 1996) (Nordberg, J.); Lindsey v. Ed Johnson Oldsmobile, 1996 WL 411336 (N.D.Ill. July 19, 1996) (Kocoras, J.); Bambilla v. Evanston Nissan, Inc., 1996 WL 284954 (N.D.Ill. May 21, 1996) (Leinenweber, J.). In this case, Coleman Toyota did not merely fail to comply with the commentary due to its own honest, good faith mistake.