Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc.

13 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. Coleman Investments, Inc.

    993 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. La. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    Alexander v. Continental Motor Werks, Inc., 1996 WL 79403 (N.D.Ill. Feb.16, 1996) (citing Johnson v. Fleet Finance, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.Ga. 1992) and Brodo v. Bankers Trust Co., 847 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa. 1994)).Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, 932 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.Mass. 1996).Smith, 915 F. Supp. at 290.

  2. Walters v. Fast AC, LLC

    2:19-cv-70-JLB-NPM (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2023)

    The Court has reviewed both the credit application and the credit agreement and finds that whether Fast AC reasonably contemplated a repeated transaction is not apparent on the face of either of these documents. See, e.g., Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709-10 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of a TILA complaint against an assignee where court would need to โ€œresort to evidence or documents extraneous to the disclosure statementโ€ to determine whether there was a violation); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (assignee could not be liable for car dealer's alleged misrepresentations even where plaintiff alleged that assignee had knowledge of the dealer's practices because the violation was not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement); see also Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2000) (โ€œCongress intended actual knowledge independent of what could be discerned from the disclosure statement to be insufficient to trigger assignee liability under ยง 1641(a).โ€). Indeed, Plaintiff's arguments that the subject loan was closed-end rely solely on FTL's corporate representative testimony and not anything on the face of the credit application or credit agreement.

  3. Cenat v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

    930 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2013)   Cited 5 times
    Acknowledging that โ€œmany of the instances in TILA where disclosures are mentioned address situations at the inception of the creditor-debtor relationship,โ€ but holding that the term โ€œdisclosure statementโ€ can be construed to encompass postassignment disclosures, since ยง 1641(g) provides that โ€œ โ€˜[i]n addition to other disclosures required by this title,โ€™ whenever a mortgage loan is sold, transferred, or assigned, โ€˜the creditor that is the new owner or assigneeโ€™ must provide the obligor with contact informationโ€; that the term โ€œdisclosure statementโ€ is not defined in ยง 1641; and that by the 2009 amendments โ€œCongress then created a private right of action for violating th[e] new subsection [ (g) ], as well as for violating 1641(f).โ€

    Courts have held that a violation is apparent if it is โ€œobvious, evident, or manifest; ... open to view, plain, [or] patent.โ€ Holcomb v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 10โ€“81186โ€“CIV, 2011 WL 5080324 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 26, 2011) (quoting Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.Mass.1996) (internal citations omitted)). In contrast, a disclosure violation is not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when it is apparent โ€œonly by virtue of special knowledge, whether about the practices of other firms ... or its own practices.โ€

  4. Cenat v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

    CASE NO. 12-80663-CIV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2013)

    Courts have held that a violation is apparent if it is "obvious, evident, or manifest; ... open to view, plain, [or] patent." Holcomb v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 10-81186-CIV, 2011 WL 5080324 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011) (quoting Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, a disclosure violation is not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when it is apparent "only by virtue of special knowledge, whether about the practices of other firms ... or its own practices."

  5. Stevenson v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp.

    Civil Action No. 12-03334 (JAP) (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2012)

    Thus, while the possibility exists that Honda Universe's practices constituted a violation of TILA, no violation is apparent from the face of the disclosure statement and Defendant cannot be held liable. See Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc. et al., 932 F. Supp. 32, 35 (assignee could not be liable for car dealer's alleged misrepresentations even where plaintiff alleged that assignee had knowledge of the dealer's practices because the violation was not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement); Cemail v. Viking Dodge, Inc. et al., 982 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (dismissing TILA claim against assignees because they "could not have discerned from the documents" that the dealer misrepresented the finance charge by charging a higher price for credit purchases than cash purchases). See also Ramadan, 229 F.3d at 199 ("Congress intended actual knowledge independent of what could be discerned from the disclosure statement to be insufficient to trigger assignee liability under [TILA].").

  6. Akar v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n

    845 F. Supp. 2d 381 (D. Mass. 2012)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that where plaintiffs had alleged, among other things, that defendant-mortgagee had "failed to act in good faith by selling the Property to itself in the foreclosure for less than the fair market value[, t]he question whether the plaintiffs may be able to prevail on these claims should be determined after the parties have had an opportunity to engage in discovery"

    Thus, Wells Fargo, as an assignee of the loan from Pride to Akar, may be held liable for Pride's failure to make disclosures required by TILA, but only if such violations were โ€œapparent on the face of the disclosure statementโ€ or the assignment was involuntary. Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.Mass.1996). In the instant case, the plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to support Wells Fargo's liability as an assignee under TILA.

  7. Holcomb v. Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp.

    CASE NO. 10-81186-CIV-HURLEY/HOPKINS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011)   Cited 15 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Determining that vicarious-liability principals should not be applied to TILA provisions

    " 15 U.S.C. ยง 1641(a). Courts have held that a violation is apparent if it is "obvious, evident, or manifest; . . . open to view, plain, [or] patent." Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. Mass. 1996) (internal citations omitted); See e.g., Little, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (finding failure to disclose the date on which the rescission period would expire on a document entitled "Notice of Right to Cancel" to be a violation apparent on the face of the disclosure document). In contrast, a disclosure violation is not apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when it is apparent "only by virtue of special knowledge, whether about the practices of other firms . . . or its own practices."

  8. Wagner v. Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc.

    584 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Wis. 2008)   Cited 4 times

    See Evans at 672 (even if state law claims necessarily involved disputes as to TILA requirements, allowing federal jurisdiction in cases arising out of disclosures in installment contracts for purchasing cars would disturb the congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities). See also Pierce v. NovaStar Mortg., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1234 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (Washington law incorporates TILA disclosure requirements); In re Boganski, 322 B.R. 422, 428 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (noting that Nevada and Indiana state law incorporate by reference TILA disclosure requirements); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32, 34 (D. Mass. 1996) (Massachusetts law incorporates TILA standards). Finally, 28 U.S.C. ยง 1447(c) allows the Court to "require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal."

  9. Baldwin v. Laurel Ford

    32 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Miss. 1998)   Cited 34 times
    Holding "that the one-year period indicated in section 1640(e) is jurisdictional and cannot be extended on theory of equitable tolling"

    Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 1996 WL 447261 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 2, 1996) (Holderman, J.); Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 1996 WL 316975 (N.D.Ill. June 10, 1996) (Gettleman, J.).See, e.g., Brister v. All Star Chevrolet, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 1003, 1007-08 (E.D.La. 1997); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32 (D.Mass. 1996); Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan of Waukegan, 955 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (Kocoras, J.); McPhan v. Geo R. Gibson Chevrolet, 1996 WL 685449 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 25, 1996) (Nordberg, J.); Lindsey v. Ed Johnson Oldsmobile, 1996 WL 411336 (N.D.Ill. July 19, 1996) (Kocoras, J.); Bambilla v. Evanston Nissan, Inc., 1996 WL 284954 (N.D.Ill. May 21, 1996) (Leinenweber, J.).

  10. Brown v. Coleman Investments, Inc.

    993 F. Supp. 439 (M.D. La. 1998)   Cited 5 times
    Dismissing plaintiffs' RICO claims for failure to state with specificity the actions which furthered the alleged fraud

    See Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 218 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (Norgle, J.); El-Mohammed v. Old Orchard Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 1997 WL 106243 (N.D.Ill. Feb.10, 1997) (Holderman, J.); Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 1996 WL 447261 (N.D.Ill. Aug.2, 1996) (Holderman, J.); Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 1996 WL 316975 (N.D.Ill. June 10, 1996) (Gettleman, J.).See Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 112 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 1997); Ritter v. Durand Chevrolet, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 32 (D.Mass. 1996); Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan of Waukegan, 955 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (Kocoras, J.); McPhan v. Geo R. Gibson Chevrolet, 1996 WL 685449 (N.D.Ill. Nov.25, 1996) (Nordberg, J.); Lindsey v. Ed Johnson Oldsmobile, 1996 WL 411336 (N.D.Ill. July 19, 1996) (Kocoras, J.); Bambilla v. Evanston Nissan, Inc., 1996 WL 284954 (N.D.Ill. May 21, 1996) (Leinenweber, J.). In this case, Coleman Toyota did not merely fail to comply with the commentary due to its own honest, good faith mistake.