Opinion
2014-11-14
Donna RITCHIE, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Thomas Ritchie, Jr., an infant, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CHURCHVILLE–CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT and Aaron Twigg, as an Employee of Churchville–Chili Central School District, Defendants–Respondents.
Trevett Cristo Salzer & Andolina P.C., Rochester (Valerie L. Barbic of counsel), for Plaintiff–Appellant. Osborn, Reed & Burke, LLP, Rochester (Aimee Lafever Koch of Counsel), for Defendants–Respondents.
Trevett Cristo Salzer & Andolina P.C., Rochester (Valerie L. Barbic of counsel), for Plaintiff–Appellant. Osborn, Reed & Burke, LLP, Rochester (Aimee Lafever Koch of Counsel), for Defendants–Respondents.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, VALENTINO AND DeJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries sustained by her infant son when he was struck by a motor vehicle. Shortly before the accident, plaintiff's son, a student in defendant Churchville–Chili Central School District was dropped off across the street from a lacrosse team fundraiser, in which he and his mother planned on participating. Plaintiff directed her son to “stay there” with the other team members in order to direct vehicles into the parking area for the fundraiser while she went across the street to assist with serving food. A teammate told plaintiff's son to confirm his attendance by going to check in with a coach. Plaintiff's son crossed the street to do so and was struck by a passing vehicle.
Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint contending, inter alia, that they owed no duty of care to plaintiff's son because he was not in their custody or control when the accident occurred. We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted the motion.
As a preliminary matter, we reject plaintiff's contention that defendants' motion for summary judgment was premature ( see Resetarits Constr. Corp. v. Elizabeth Pierce Olmstead, M.D. Center for the Visually Impaired [Appeal No. 2], 118 A.D.3d 1454, 1455–1456, 988 N.Y.S.2d 797). With respect to the merits of the case, it is well settled that “[t]he duty of a school district to its students is strictly limited by time and space and exists only so long as a student is in its care and custody” (Harker v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 241 A.D.2d 937, 938, 661 N.Y.S.2d 332 [internal quotation marks omitted], lv. denied90 N.Y.2d 811, 666 N.Y.S.2d 100, 688 N.E.2d 1382, rearg. denied91 N.Y.2d 957, 671 N.Y.S.2d 718, 694 N.E.2d 887; see Dalton v. Memminger, 67 A.D.3d 1350, 1350–1351, 889 N.Y.S.2d 785; Norton v. Canandaigua City Sch. Dist., 208 A.D.2d 282, 285, 624 N.Y.S.2d 695, lv. denied85 N.Y.2d 812, 631 N.Y.S.2d 289, 655 N.E.2d 402, rearg. denied86 N.Y.2d 839, 634 N.Y.S.2d 447, 658 N.E.2d 225; see also Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 560, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d 849). We reject plaintiff's contention that defendants owed plaintiff's son a duty of care under the circumstances here. When plaintiff dropped off her son and told him to “stay there,” she made a parental decision to keep her son across the street because she was concerned about him “crossing over” given that there was “lots of traffic” in the intersection where the accident occurred. Thus, plaintiff had not relinquished control of her son, and defendants had not yet gained the physical custody or control of him that is a prerequisite to imposing a legal duty on them ( see e.g. Norton, 208 A.D.2d at 287, 624 N.Y.S.2d 695; see also Ramo v. Serrano, 301 A.D.2d 640, 641, 754 N.Y.S.2d 336; Silver v. Cooper, 199 A.D.2d 255, 256, 604 N.Y.S.2d 968, lv. denied83 N.Y.2d 753, 612 N.Y.S.2d 107, 634 N.E.2d 603). The fact that plaintiff's son disobeyed plaintiff's directive and crossed the street does not change that legal result.
We reject plaintiff's further contention that defendants owed plaintiff's son a duty because the defendants placed plaintiff's son in a “for[e]seeably dangerous setting that the [defendants] had a hand in creating.” Because the child was never in the physical custody or control of the defendants, however, the defendants were “never in a position to ... release [plaintiff's son] into a hazardous setting” (Williams v. Weatherstone, 23 N.Y.3d 384, 401, 991 N.Y.S.2d 779, 15 N.E.3d 792).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.