Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG06258676
Lambden, J.
Tommy Larry Ritchey (Ritchey) was riding his motorcycle when he was hit and injured by a vehicle driven by John Moore. Moore was driving a stolen truck and was fleeing after being stopped by Deputy Sheriff Michelle Galindo (Galindo or Deputy Galindo). Ritchey and his wife (collectively, the Ritcheys) sued the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (sheriff’s office), Galindo, and others. They alleged negligence against Galindo and the sheriff’s office. They also claimed that the sheriff’s office was liable for improperly training Galindo and for Galindo’s negligence on the basis of respondeat superior.
His wife’s name is Sharleene Annette Ritchey.
The sheriff’s office was sued in its own name and as the County of Alameda.
Galindo and the sheriff’s office moved for summary judgment against the Ritcheys’ complaint, and the lower court granted their motion. The court found that the Ritcheys failed to establish that Galindo and the sheriff’s office owed a legal duty to the Ritcheys or that the duty was breached. Additionally, the court found that the Ritcheys failed to establish that any alleged negligence proximately caused any injury. The court also found that the Ritcheys failed to present any evidence to support the cause of action for improper training of Galindo. The Ritcheys appeal, and we affirm the lower court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2005, Moore was released from San Quentin after serving time for conviction of several felonies. For four uninterrupted days following his release from San Quentin, Moore ingested methamphetamines. Sometime between May 18 and May 22, 2005, Moore stole a Mustang convertible from a home in San Lorenzo.
During the early morning of May 22, 2005, Moore drove the Mustang to the residence of Alan D. MacLean (MacLean). He got into and started the engine of a Camaro parked at MacLean’s residence. MacLean heard the car’s engine and ran outside to investigate. He discovered Moore in the Camaro; the two men began fighting. Moore punched MacLean, knocking him to the ground. Moore got out of the Camaro, got into the Mustang, and sped away in the Mustang. MacLean’s wife was standing on the sidewalk in front of the house and MacLean told her to call the police, which she did. MacLean got into his truck and followed Moore.
At 7:37 a.m., Deputy Galindo was dispatched to MacLean’s residence to investigate the attempted theft of the Camaro. Galindo was advised that the vehicle involved was a red Mustang convertible and that the victim was chasing the suspect in a white truck. While driving to MacLean’s home, Galindo spotted the Mustang and followed it onto the freeway. She was wearing her uniform and driving a fully-marked sheriff’s office vehicle. After following the Mustang and observing the car drive erratically, Galindo turned on the red light on her vehicle to initiate a stop. Moore slowed the Mustang to a near stop in the far right traffic lane; Galindo stopped behind him. Galindo did not call for backup because she knew backup was already en route.
MacLean, who had been driving his truck adjacent to the Mustang, parked his truck just in front of the Mustang. According to Galindo, MacLean got out of the truck, approached the Mustang, and yelled to Galindo that Moore was the suspect who had tried to steal his car. MacLean reported that he did not leave his truck until he saw Moore running away on foot. It is undisputed that, once MacLean got out of the truck, he left the door to the truck open; he also left the keys in the ignition with the motor still running.
Galindo’s car was equipped with a loud speaker device, but she never used it and did not tell either MacLean or Moore to remain in the vehicles. Although the exact timing of what occurred is in dispute, the parties all agree that Moore got out of the Mustang and began to run away. Galindo chased Moore on foot.
Moore jumped into MacLean’s truck. MacLean ran to the open driver’s door of the truck and grabbed the gear shift. Galindo ran to the driver’s door and partially climbed into the cab of the truck. She attempted to pull Moore out of the truck and instructed him several times to get out of the truck. Moore did not respond to her commands. Moore pushed and hit MacLean and Galindo. Moore was able to put the truck into gear and move forward; Galindo and MacLean fell off the truck. Moore sped away. As Moore was speeding away, Galindo saw that the backup officer, Deputy Sheriff Mike Gallardo, had just arrived and was out of his vehicle. Gallardo and Galindo returned to their respective patrol vehicles and pursued Moore.
Galindo saw the truck in a residential area; the truck had gone over a curb and was on the side yard of a house. Galindo left her patrol vehicle and approached Moore, believing that he was going to flee on foot. Moore put the truck into reverse and then drove forward across the lawn of the house to the driveway. He struck two parked vehicles on his way through the driveway and sped away.
Two to three other deputies were broadcasting Moore’s route and pursuing him. Moore, who was driving on the wrong side of the road, sped through the intersection of Hesperian Boulevard and Grant Avenue. Ritchey was riding a motorcycle; the truck Moore was driving struck Ritchey head-on. One of Ritchey’s legs had to be amputated as a result of the accident.
Galindo and other officers captured Moore and arrested him. Moore admitted to having been under the continuous influence of methamphetamines for the four days immediately preceding his arrest; he stated that he had not slept for those four days. Additionally, Moore told the officers that he ingested a baggy of crystal methamphetamines as well as a baggy of heroin while being pursued by Galindo and the other deputies.
On September 16, 2005, Ritchey filed a timely claim to the County of Alameda for “traumatic amputation of leg above knee.” Ritchey’s wife filed a claim to the County for loss of consortium. The County of Alameda failed to act within 45 days and therefore the claims were deemed denied.
On March 6, 2006, the Ritcheys filed a lawsuit against the sheriff’s office, Galindo, and others. The complaint contained nine causes of action; only the seventh, eighth, and ninth were against Galindo and/or the sheriff’s office. In the eighth cause of action, the Ritcheys’ alleged negligence against Galindo and the sheriff’s office. The Ritcheys asserted that Galindo breached her duty of care by failing to order MacLean to remain in his truck, by failing to order him not to interact with Moore, and by failing to instruct him not to obstruct her in the performance of her duties. They further maintained that she owed a duty of care to refrain from attempting to pull Moore out of the truck until backup arrived and that she breached this duty by using physical force in an attempt to arrest Moore. The Ritcheys also claimed that, but for Galindo’s actions, Moore would not have been able to flee in MacLean’s truck and would not have been able to strike and injure Ritchey. The injury to Ritchey, according to the pleading, resulted in a loss of consortium to Ritchey’s wife.
In the eighth cause of action, the Ritcheys alleged negligent employment, training, and retention against the sheriff’s office. The Ritcheys maintained in their ninth cause of action that the sheriff’s office was liable on the basis of respondeat superior for Galindo’s negligence.
Galindo and the sheriff’s office filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued that they had no duty or special relationship to the Ritcheys. Additionally, they contended that there was no breach of a duty and that Galindo’s actions were not the proximate cause of MacLean’s injury. Finally, they argued that Galindo was entitled to absolute immunity under Government Code sections 820.4, 845, 845.8, subdivision (3), and 846, and Vehicle Code section 17004.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the Ritcheys submitted the declaration of their expert, retired Captain Robert N. Gale, a forensic scientist. Gale stated that he read the declaration and deposition testimony of Galindo, the police report prepared by Galindo, and the declaration of MacLean. After reviewing the reports prepared by Galindo, he stated that he believed Galindo was negligent. He declared: “Her report and deposition testimony clearly reveal that Deputy Galindo completely and improperly failed to order MacLean to remain in his truck and completely and improperly failed to order him to return to his truck and not involve himself in this incident once he exited his truck. Also in her report Deputy Galindo described her own negligent conduct in not preventing MacLean from exiting his truck and then rather than ordering him back to his truck actually becoming physically involved in this incident, as a direct result allowing suspect Moore to gain access to MacLean’s truck. Deputy Galindo further describes how her failure to exercise proper control over this incident she had to ‘assist’ MacLean in attempting to remove Moore from the vehicle that was left with the door open and the engine running.” Gale concluded that Galindo’s actions and failures to act “were grossly out of policy and ill advised, including but not limited to her allowing a citizen... to inappropriately and excitedly insert himself into a law enforcement situation which was at minimum a high risk vehicle stop with the potential of escalating into a life threatening confrontation with a suspected felony suspect.” He further commented that Galindo’s “failure to assert authority and control of this incident was totally out of policy and negligent.” He opined that her negligence allowed Moore, who was attempting to flee on foot, the opportunity to take the truck with the keys in the ignition and drive away, “once again in a reckless and dangerous manner.” Since Galindo did not issue the proper commands, Gale concluded that she either negligently disregarded her prior training or never had competent training.
Galindo and the sheriff’s office objected to Gale’s declaration. They argued that the declaration was inadmissible opinion evidence. Further, they objected that it was, among other things, inadmissible under Evidence Code section 720 because it lacked foundation as to Gale’s competency to express an expert opinion and because it was based on speculation.
On April 28, 2008, the trial court sustained the objections by Galindo and the sheriff’s office to Gale’s declaration, citing Evidence Code section 720. Additionally, it granted the motion for summary judgment by Galindo and the sheriff’s office. With regard to the seventh and ninth causes of action, the court found that the Ritcheys failed to establish with sufficient evidence the existence of a duty between Galindo and the Ritcheys or the breach of any duty. Additionally, the court determined that the Ritcheys did not establish proximate cause. Further, the court ruled that the Ritcheys failed to submit sufficient evidence to show that the statutory immunities did not bar their negligence claim. Finally, the court found that the Ritcheys failed to support their eighth cause of action with any evidence.
The Ritcheys filed a motion for reconsideration and asserted that the court must have “inadvertently failed to consider” Gale’s curriculum vitae. On June 4, 2008, at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the court stated that it did not “inadvertently fail to read the curriculum vitae” and confirmed that it had read it. The court added: “I went over it also with our legal research attorneys in regard to it. It doesn’t add anything to the reason that I issued the original ruling, very frankly.” The court denied the motion for reconsideration.
The Ritcheys filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860 (Aguilar).) We independently review the record and apply the same rules and standards as the trial court. (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925.) The trial court must grant the motion if “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that a cause of action lacks merit because one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) If the defendant fails to make this initial showing, it is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff’s opposing evidence, and the motion must be denied. However, if the moving papers make a prima facie showing that justifies a judgment in the defendant’s favor, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, at p. 849.)
In determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens, the court must “consider all of the evidence” and “all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom,” and “must view such evidence [citation] and such inferences [citations]... in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th. at pp. 844-845.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Id. at p. 850, fn. omitted.) Consequently, a defendant moving for summary judgment must “present evidence that would require... a trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not.” (Id. at p. 845.)
Although our review of a summary judgment motion is de novo, we review the trial court’s final rulings on evidentiary objections by applying an abuse of discretion standard. (Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694.) To demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the evidentiary objection to the expert declaration of Gale, the Ritcheys must demonstrate Gale should have been qualified as an expert, his testimony was admissible, and exclusion of his testimony was prejudicial. (Ibid.)
II. Negligence
In the trial court and on appeal, the Ritcheys assert that Galindo owed a duty of care to order MacLean to remain in his truck and to refrain from interacting with Moore and to tell Moore to stay in the Mustang. They further claim that Galindo owed a duty of care not to attempt to pull Moore from the truck until backup arrived. The Ritcheys contend that Galindo’s actions allowed Moore to flee in MacLean’s truck, rather than on foot, which resulted in the accident injuring Ritchey.
“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate [or legal] cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff’s injury.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.) “The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular factual situation is a question of law for the court to decide. [Citation.] However, the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury’s determination.” (Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 278.) Nevertheless, causation may be a question of law if on undisputed facts there can be no reasonable difference of opinion on causal nexus. (Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1687.)
Here, the trial court found that Galindo and the sheriff’s office did not have a legal duty to the Ritcheys. It is settled that police officers cannot be liable for deciding to pursue a vehicle as long as the pursuit is conducted in a reasonable fashion. (Reenders v. City of Ontario (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1050-1054, citing Draper v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 315, Pagels v. City & County of S.F. (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 152, 155-156, and Bratt v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 550, 554.) In Reenders, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether police officers employed by the City of Ontario owed a duty to an injured plaintiff to refrain from pursuing “a man who had reportedly been drinking and driving a motorcycle in a reckless and dangerous manner and who was suspected of assault with a deadly weapon as well as reckless driving and numerous other violations of the Vehicle Code.” (Reenders, at pp. 1053-1054.) The courtheld that police officers do not have a duty “to refrain from pursuing a lawbreaker who is already operating a vehicle on the public streets and thoroughfares in a reckless and dangerous manner.” (Id. at p. 1054.)
The Ritcheys maintain that Reenders v. City of Ontario, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d 1045 is inapplicable because they did not allege that Galindo was negligent in deciding to pursue Moore or in pursuing Moore. Thus, they do not dispute that Galindo owed them no duty in the actual pursuit of Moore. Rather, they contend that Galindo was negligent prior to the pursuit in failing to use the loudspeaker on her vehicle to command MacLean and Moore to remain in their vehicles and then in failing to tell them to return to their vehicles after they had left them. It is undisputed that Galindo’s vehicle was equipped with a loudspeaker, which she did not use. Additionally, the Ritcheys assert that she was negligent in physically attempting to stop Moore prior to receiving any backup help.
The Ritcheys contend that Sparks v. City of Compton (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 592 (Sparks) is controlling. In Sparks, the plaintiff sued the city and two police officers for negligence after the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was struck by a vehicle being pursued by the defendant police officer. (Id. at pp. 595-596.) Prior to the pursuit, the officers, driving an unmarked vehicle and not in uniform, collided with another vehicle. (Id. at p. 595.) The officers told the occupants of the other vehicle to drive more carefully. (Ibid.) A heated argument ensued and the police officers, without identifying themselves as officers, brandished their firearms. (Ibid.) The people in the other car became fearful and sped off in their car. (Ibid.) The officers chased the fleeing car, which crashed into the car driven by the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 596.)
The plaintiff in Sparks sued the officers for negligence and the defendants moved for summary judgment without submitting any evidence in support of the motion. The court treated the summary judgment like a judgment on the pleadings and concluded that “[a] fair construction of the pleadings shows alleged negligence prior to the time the pursuit began.” (Sparks, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 597.) The court held that the officers’ failure to identify themselves as officers while brandishing a weapon during the course of an altercation and their pursuit of the fleeing vehicle “created a situation foreseeably endangering other users of the highway.” (Id. at p. 598.)
Even if we were to presume that Galindo had some kind of duty to order MacLean and Moore to remain in the vehicles or to wait for backup before attempting to restrain Moore from leaving, under the facts presented in the summary judgment proceedings, the Ritcheys cannot raise a triable issue of fact regarding proximate cause. As already noted, the Ritcheys presented evidence that Galindo never told MacLean to remain in his truck, never told MacLean to return to his truck once he left it, and never commanded Moore to remain in the Mustang. However, they presented no evidence that oral commands would have prevented Moore from fleeing in the truck.
With regard to Galindo’s failure to order MacLean to remain in the truck––even if we presume that Galindo had time to order MacLean to remain in the truck––the record contains no evidence that such a command would have resulted in MacLean’s remaining in the truck. Galindo and the sheriff’s office, however, presented evidence supporting an inference that MacLean would not have listened to such an order. When asked at his deposition why he got into his truck and chased Moore, MacLean responded: “I did that in a state of rage. Several weeks before that my oldest son attending school in Phoenix, Arizona, had his vehicle stolen at gunpoint. I had to fly there and buy him another vehicle on a weekend, and I just couldn’t believe it was happening again, and I quite frankly lost my head.”
It is unclear from this record whether Galindo had time to utter a warning. Galindo stated that MacLean left his truck right after he parked it in front of the Mustang. She also reported that Moore “quickly exited the Mustang[,]” and that she left her “vehicle immediately to pursue Moore.” The Ritcheys, however, contend that Galindo had time to utter a command because Galindo testified that MacLean had the opportunity to yell to her that the Mustang was being driven by the suspect. Further, MacLean testified that he did not leave his truck until Moore left the Mustang and was being chased by Galindo.
MacLean’s deposition testimony showed that he had not calmed down while chasing Moore on the freeway. MacLean stated that when he was driving in the lane next to Moore he wanted “to just smash into him[.]” However, at the time that he felt like hitting the car Moore was driving, he noticed the patrol car with its red light activated behind the Mustang.
With regard to the question whether Moore would have obeyed any command from Galindo, Galindo and the sheriff’s office presented evidence that Moore would not have listened to an oral order by Galindo. For four days preceding the incident, Moore had been under the continuous influence of methamphetamines. Further, the record shows that Moore would not have followed a verbal command because he repeatedly ignored Galindo’s demands for him to get out of the truck. Not only did he not comply with these directives, but Moore hit Galindo and MacLean and pushed Galindo away.
Thus, Galindo and the sheriff’s office met their initial burden of providing evidence that any commands by Galindo to MacLean or Moore to remain or return to their respective vehicles would not have been heeded.
With regard to the Ritcheys’ complaint that Galindo should have waited for backup before physically attempting to stop Moore, the undisputed evidence in the record reveals that there was no causal connection between Galindo’s failure to wait and the injury to Ritchey. Deputy Gallardo stated that he responded to a call from dispatch to act as a backup for Galindo at 7:38 a.m. Galindo broadcast that she was following the Mustang on the freeway and she testified that she knew backup was coming. When Gallardo arrived, Moore was already attempting to flee in the truck and Galindo was attempting to stop his flight. If Galindo had waited for Gallardo’s arrival, Moore would have fled sooner. Thus, if Galindo had waited for Gallardo’s arrival, the outcome would have been the same: Moore would have fled and Gallardo and Galindo would have pursued him.
The Ritcheys argue that the present situation is similar to the one in Sparks, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d 592 . In Sparks, however, the defendants had submitted no evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment and therefore the burden never shifted to the plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing of causation. Indeed, the court did not even address the issue of causation, but merely held that the pleading stated a cause of action for negligence.
The Ritcheys stress that the issue of causation is a factual issue for the jury. They ignore, however, that, “[a]n issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by ‘speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.’ [Citation.] Further, an issue of fact is not raised by ‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions’ [citation], or mere possibilities [citation]. ‘Thus, while the court in determining a motion for summary judgment does not “try” the case, the court is bound to consider the competency of the evidence presented.’ [Citation.]” (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 196-197.)
In their reply brief, the Ritcheys argue that the evidence in support of causation is that “it is basic and fundamental that one must obey the lawful orders of a peace officer.” They have mistaken a rule or maxim for evidence. This statement is not evidence that either Moore or MacLean would have listened to Galindo’s commands. A statement not tied to any evidence does not give rise to an inference that either MacLean or Moore would have followed Galindo’s command. The Ritcheys must point to facts during the interactions between Galindo, Moore, and MacLean that would support an inference that they would have listened to her. They have not presented any prima facie evidence supporting such an inference.
Here, the Ritcheys simply presented no evidence of causation. The only evidence they submitted was the declaration of Gale, which the court ruled was inadmissible. In his declaration, Gale provided his opinion that he believed Galindo breached her duty of care, but the declaration was irrelevant as to the issue of causation. The declaration cited to no evidentiary facts regarding causation. Thus, the Ritcheys have not demonstrated that excluding Gale’s declaration was prejudicial and therefore they cannot establish that the court abused its discretion in disallowing this evidence. (See Carnes v. Superior Court, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 694 [must show exclusion of evidence was prejudicial to establish abuse of discretion in excluding evidence].)
Accordingly, we conclude that the Ritcheys have failed to raise an issue of fact as the element of proximate cause and therefore the trial court correctly granted summary adjudication against the their negligence cause of action against Galindo and the sheriff’s office.
We need not consider whether the claim of negligence is barred by the statutory immunities.
III. Improper Training of Galindo
The Ritcheys claim that the sheriff’s office is liable for its improper training of Galindo. The record, however, does not contain any evidence to support this claim.
The only evidence submitted in support of the Ritcheys’ claim that Galindo was improperly trained by the sheriff’s office is Gale’s declaration, which the lower court ruled inadmissible under Evidence Code section 720. Gale stated in his declaration that an officer would normally have experienced training scenarios similar to the incident involving Moore. He therefore concluded that Moore was either improperly trained or that she negligently disregarded everything she had been taught. The Ritcheys maintain that this declaration should have been admitted into evidence.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, the sheriff’s office submitted evidence that Galindo became a deputy sheriff in 1996. Prior to becoming a deputy sheriff, Galindo declared that she completed the requisite six-month training program at the sheriff’s office academy. From 1996 until 2001, she had various positions working housing units at the Santa Rita Jail. In 2002, she started working as a patrol officer. Galindo asserted that she was in a training program for 13 weeks and during that time various training officers accompanied her on patrol. She stated that she successfully completed her training and went on active duty as a solo patrol officer. Thus, the sheriff’s office presented evidence that Galindo successfully went through adequate training and the burden shifted to the Ritcheys to show that the training was deficient.
The Ritcheys cannot demonstrate that the refusal to admit Gale’s declaration into evidence prejudiced them because Gale’s declaration does not provide any evidence to support a claim that the sheriff’s office improperly trained Galindo. In his declaration, Gale does not state that he reviewed any evidence on the training given to the deputies in the sheriff’s office; nor did he review any document, testimony, or policy regarding the specific training given to Galindo. Gale merely surmises that Galindo must not have been properly trained or that she negligently disregarded or forgot what she was taught. His opinion is not based on any evidentiary facts.
An expert opinion “ ‘may not be based on assumptions of fact that are without evidentiary support or based on factors that are speculative or conjectural, for then the opinion has no evidentiary value and does not assist the trier of fact.’ ” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 529.) “Thus, in order ‘[t]o defeat summary adjudication, plaintiffs [cannot] rely on assertions that are “conclusionary, argumentative or based on conjecture and speculation,” but rather [are] required to “make an independent showing by a proper declaration or by reference to a deposition or another discovery product that there is sufficient proof of the matters alleged to raise a triable question of fact....” ’ ” (Id. at p. 530.)
The Ritcheys complain that a declaration does not have to provide detailed facts and they cite Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607, 608, and footnote 6 (Hanson) (expert’s declaration does not have to set forth in “excruciating detail the factual basis for the opinions stated therein”). Hanson involved a patient suing his surgeons for medical malpractice; he alleged that he had suffered nerve damage as a result of spinal cord surgery. The plaintiff submitted an expert’s declaration on duty and causation and the reviewing court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant surgeons because it found the declaration of the plaintiff’s expert was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to breach of duty and causation. (Id. at p. 606.) The reviewing court explained that “specific factual breaches of duty” were “clearly asserted[.]” (Id. at p. 607.) With respect to causation, the Hanson court noted that the expert declared, “ ‘the nerves were injured during the subject surgical procedure and most likely during the time the bleeding and dura leak occurred’; ‘the pre-operative, operative and post-operative care provided by defendants... to Mr. Hanson contributed to and was a substantial factor or cause in bringing about Mr. Hanson’s current injuries’; and the ‘post-operative care and treatment rendered to Mr. Hanson by defendants... was below the standard of care for, among other reasons, failing to diagnose epidural hematoma prior to discharge from hospital after initial surgery.’ ” (Id. at p. 606.) The appellate court noted that, although the declaration was somewhat “obtuse,” the plaintiff was entitled to all inferences, which included a reading of the declaration to state that the nerve damage suffered by the plaintiff during surgery was caused by the conduct of the defendants. (Id. at p. 607.)
The expert witness in Hanson examined the relevant documents and knew the actual procedures performed by the defendant surgeons and opined that these actual procedures resulted in nerve damage to the plaintiff. Here, Gale did not review any policies or any information regarding the training of Galindo or other sheriff deputies; nor did he point to a particular problem with the training given. Indeed, Gale’s declaration makes it clear that he did not know what training Galindo received as he simply opined that Galindo’s actions and statements showed that she either was improperly trained or ignored her training. Thus, Gale’s declaration provided no evidence to support the claim of improper training and the Ritcheys submitted no other evidence in support of this cause of action.
Accordingly, we conclude that the lower court correctly granted summary adjudication against the Ritcheys’ claim of improper training of Galindo.
IV. Respondeat Superior
The Ritcheys alleged that the sheriff’s office was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for Galindo’s negligence. Since we conclude that the lower court properly granted summary adjudication against the claim of negligence against Galindo, the sheriff’s office cannot be liable under the theory of respondeat superior.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Ritcheys are to pay the costs of appeal.
We concur Kline, P.J., Haerle, J.