We believe it is that of Linda. There was an indication in the record that she planned to marry her paramour and in his order the learned trial judge stated that in the event she did not do so, and if the relationship continued as in the past, he would not hesitate to reconsider the question of custody. If she has in fact married, or alternatively, broken off the illicit affair, custody will be governed by the rule of Nye, as set forth in Jarrett, and of Rippon v. Rippon (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70, also commented upon in Jarrett. On the other hand, if no change has taken place, Jarrett must prevail.

Moral fitness of the mother could properly be questioned but could not outweigh all other evidence of the mother's fitness to raise the child. Hollon, 784 So.2d at 950, citing Roberson v. Roberson, 370 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979) ("a mother will not be denied custody for every act of indiscretion or immorality," especially where no detrimental effect on the welfare of the child has been shown); Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill.App.3d 465, 21, Ill.Dec. 135, 381 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1978) ("indulgence in moral indiscretions alone is not grounds for a change of custody where the children are leading a normal life"). ¶ 9.

Therefore, it should have been apparent to the trial court that, although appellant had engaged in immoral or illegal conduct in the past, that conduct was not expected to continue in the future. • 4 We find this case to be similar to Rippon v. Rippon (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70, which was expressly approved of by the supreme court in Jarrett. ( Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.)

This decision is consistent with those courts' decisions. Jarrett v. Jarrett (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 932, 382 N.E.2d 12; Rippon v. Rippon (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70.) In the Jarrett opinion the court pointed out that:

This view of custody arrangements is comparable to that employed in other states in similar fact situations. Cheek, 431 So.2d at 1145 n. 4 (citing Roberson v. Roberson, 370 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Ala. Civ.App. 1979) ("a mother will not be denied custody for every act of indiscretion or immorality", especially where no detrimental effect on the welfare of the child has been shown); Rippon v. Rippon, 381 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) ("indulgence in moral indiscretions alone is not grounds for a change of custody where the children are leading a normal life")). ¶ 27.

Our view of custody modifications articulated above is comparable to that employed in others states in similar fact situations. See, e.g., Roberson v. Roberson, 370 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) ("a mother will not be denied custody for every act of indiscretion or immorality", especially where no detrimental effect on the welfare of the child has been shown); Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 21 Ill.Dec. 135, 381 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1978) ("indulgence in moral indiscretions alone is not grounds for a change of custody where the children are leading a normal life").Cheek, 431 So.2d at 1145, fn. 4.

Our view of custody modifications articulated above is comparable to that employed in other states in similar fact situations. See, e.g., Roberson v. Roberson, 370 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) ("a mother will not be denied custody for every act of indiscretion or immorality", especially where no detrimental effect on the welfare of the child has been shown); Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 21 Ill.Dec. 135, 381 N.E.2d 70, 73 (1978) ("indulgence in moral indiscretions alone is not grounds for a change of custody where the children are leading a normal life"). In the final analysis, we are faced with a divorce decree entered in 1978 which awarded primary custody to the mother based upon a joint, sworn representation to the court that "the parties feel that the best interest of said child would be that the mother have the primary custody".

The courts of Illinois have repeatedly held that a permanent custody order is a "final judgment" as to circumstances existing at the time it was rendered. Hofmann v. Poston, 77 Ill. App.3d 689, 396 N.E.2d 576 (1979); Herron v. Herron, 74 Ill. App.3d 748, 393 N.E.2d 1153 (1979); Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App.3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978); Dunning v. Dunning, 14 Ill. App.2d 242, 144 N.E.2d 535 (1957); Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952). Whether a custody order is temporary or permanent and final must be determined according to the substance, not the form, of the order.

Thus the moral values which Jacqueline currently represents to her children, and those which she may be expected to portray to them in the future, contravene statutorily declared standards of conduct and endanger the children's moral development. Jacqueline argues, however, that three recent cases — Burris v. Burris (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 503, In re Marriage of Farris (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 1042, and Rippon v. Rippon (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 465 — indicate that the moral indiscretion of a parent is not sufficient ground for denial of custody. In Rippon the mother who had committed the indiscretion planned to marry her paramour and there was no indication of future misconduct.

A year prior, a mother who committed the same “moral indiscretion” of living with her boyfriend was allowed to retain custody of her children because she and the boyfriend said they intended to marry as soon as her second divorce became final. Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill.App.3d 465, 21 Ill.Dec. 135, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978). This was “a normal life” for the children.