“ ‘The decision as to the setting aside of a default in answering is generally left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, the exercise of which will generally not be disturbed if there is support in the record therefor’ ” ( Rios v. Starrett City, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 418, 418, 818 N.Y.S.2d 526, quoting Calderon v. 163 Ocean Tenants Corp., 27 A.D.3d 410, 410, 811 N.Y.S.2d 428). Pursuant to CPLR 317, a defendant is entitled to vacatur of a default judgment if it is established that the defendant did not receive personal notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense ( seeCPLR 317; Rios v. Starrett City, Inc., 31 A.D.3d at 418, 818 N.Y.S.2d 526).
ORDERED that the order dated January 18, 2018, is affirmed, with costs. " CPLR 317 provides, generally, that a defendant is entitled to vacatur of a default judgment if it is established that he did not receive personal notice of the summons in time to defend and that he has a meritorious defense" ( Stein v. Matarasso & Co., 143 A.D.2d 825, 826, 533 N.Y.S.2d 126 ; seeRios v. Starrett City, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 418, 418, 818 N.Y.S.2d 526 ). "It is also well established that service on a corporation through delivery of process to the Secretary of State is not ‘personal delivery’ to the corporation or to an agent designated under CPLR 318" ( Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 501 N.Y.S.2d 8, 492 N.E.2d 116 ; seeSolomon Abrahams, P.C. v. Peddlers Pond Holding Corp., 125 A.D.2d 355, 356, 509 N.Y.S.2d 78 ).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment entered March 28, 2006 is granted. The Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 317 because he established that he did not receive notice of the summons in time to defend the action ( see CPLR 317; Franklin v 172 Aububon Corp., 32 AD3d 454; Rios v Starrett City, Inc., 31 AD3d 418), and he has a potentially meritorious defense ( see Heelan Realty Dev. Corp. v Ocskasy, 27 AD3d 620, 621; R.R. Ragette, Inc. v D'Incecco, 17 AD3d 436, 437; see also Marinoff v Natty Realty Corp., 17 AD3d 412, 413). The defendant's remaining contentions are not properly before this Court as they were not raised in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 317 ( see CPLR 317; Franklin v 172 Aububon Corp., 32 AD3d 454, 455; Rios v Starrett City, Inc., 31 AD3d 418; New York Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d 968). The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion to punish the defendant for contempt.
Nevertheless, CPLR 317 "permits a defendant who has been 'served with a summons other than by personal delivery" to seek relief from a default upon a showing that it did not receive actual notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense'" (Franklin v 172 Aububon Corp., supra, 32 AD3d 454, 455, quoting from, CPLR 317 see generally, Eugene Di Lorenzo v. Button Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141-142 [1986]; Wassertheil v. Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d 753; Rockland Bakery, Inc. v B.M. Baking Co., Inc., 83 AD3d 1080; Fleisher v Kaba, 78 AD3d 1118, 1119; Cohen v Michelle Tenants Corp., 63 AD3d 1097, 1098; Franklin v. 172 Aububon Corp., supra, 32 AD3d 454, 455; Rios v. Starrett City, Inc., 31 AD3d 418). "A defendant moving for vacatur of a default under CPLR 317 need not establish a reasonable excuse for the delay in answering or appearing" (Franklin v. 172 Aububon Corp., supra, 32 AD3d at 454 see, Wassertheil v. Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d 753; Clover M. Barrett, P.C v. Gordon, 90 AD3d 973).