If that's what Congress had wanted, it would have made family membership an enumerated category—instead, family membership is sometimes, but not always, a particularized social group. See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that "family membership may constitute membership in a 'particular social group' " (emphasis added)). The dissent faults us for noting that family membership is not necessarily a particularized social group.
1. The BIA did not err in concluding that the particular social group ("PSG") of "the family of a threatened individual in Mexico" lacked social distinction.See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014) (requiring alleged PSG be "socially distinct within the society in question"); see also Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015). Petitioners contend the BIA erred in not characterizing their PSG as "[f]amily of Raymundo Cabrera-Solis."
Moreover, we have rejected any argument that "a family can constitute a particular social group only when the alleged persecution on that ground is intertwined with one of the other four grounds enumerated in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A)." Id. at 1188; see also Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, although not a model of clarity, we agree with the BIA that Hernandez-Ramos based his claim for asylum and withholding on his membership in a protected social group consisting of individuals "who have family members in Mexico who have been targeted by Los Zetas.
"The 'social distinction' prong of the analysis 'refers to social recognition.' " Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015)).
4. Finally, the BIA legally erred by failing to consider whether Petitioner established prima facie eligibility for relief due to his membership in the particular social group of his family. See, e.g., Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the petitioner had sufficiently raised the issue of his family as a particular social group to the BIA and that "[t]he BIA did not address this social group claim-a failure that constitutes error and requires remand"). Petitioner's evidence arguably suggests that his fear arises from membership in the family.
A particular social group may also consist of people "who share a common, immutable characteristic, including innate qualities such as sex, color, or kinship ties." Rios v. Lynch , 807 F.3d 1123, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). The BIA reasoned that Kaur's membership in a particular social group or other protected characteristic would not "be a reason, or at least one central reason, for the harm she fears."
Lisama argues that the IJ failed to consider his claim of persecution on account of membership in his family group. Persecution on account of "membership in a particular social group" is persecution on account of a protected ground, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c), and "the family remains the quintessential particular social group," Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). But a nexus is not established simply because a family group exists and its members experience harm; for there to be a nexus between the persecution and a protected ground, the family group membership itself must constitute a reason motivating the persecution.
2. Family is "the quintessential particular social group." Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). The group identified by Arriaza-Pacheco includes only his grandparents' descendants (his sister, cousin, aunt, uncles and himself), and is easily defined with sufficient particularity to create a cognizable social group.
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008)); see also Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding relevant "[e]vidence such as country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like" to establish "distinct" group exists). Padilla's reliance on Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2015), is unavailing. In Rios, we merely recognized that "family" could be the basis of a particular social group and it was error to not even consider it. 807 F.3d at 1128.
Substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Mendez-Galdamez failed "to establish that [local gang members] targeted the applicant because he was a member of his family." While family membership can be a cognizable particular social group, see Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015), Mendez-Galdamez failed to show that he suffered the gang's harms and threats "on account of [his] familial relationship." Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Rios, 807 F.3d at 1128); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) ("because of the alien's ... membership in a particular social group") (emphasis added).