Riojas v. Grant Cty. Pub. Utility Dist

27 Citing cases

  1. Fairbrook v. King

    134 Wn. App. 1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)

    Thus, though a rear-end collision is prima facie evidence of the following driver's negligence, that prima facie showing is overcome by evidence that some emergency or unusual condition not caused or contributed to by the following driver caused the collision, which makes the liability of the following driver a jury question. Vanderhoff v. Fitzgerald, 72 Wn.2d 103, 106, 431 P.2d 969 (1967); Riojas v. Grant County PUD, 117 Wn. App. 694, 701, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1006 (2004). Vanderhoff, 72 Wn.2d at 105.

  2. Adgar v. Dinsmore

    530 P.3d 236 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 37 " ‘Whether an act may be considered a superseding cause sufficient to relieve a defendant of liability depends on whether the intervening act can reasonably be foreseen by the defendant; only intervening acts which are not reasonably foreseeable are deemed superseding causes.’ "Albertson v. State , 191 Wash. App. 284, 297, 361 P.3d 808 (2015) (quoting Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist ., 117 Wash. App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003) ). "Reasonable foreseeability does not require that the precise manner or sequence of events in which a plaintiff is harmed be foreseeable." Albertson , 191 Wash. App. at 297, 361 P.3d 808.

  3. Albertson v. State

    361 P.3d 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 17 times
    In Albertson, the trial court erred in instructing on superseding cause because the harm suffered was the same and, therefore, was foreseeable as a matter of law.

    An act generally is a proximate cause of an injury if it produces the injury. Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist.,117 Wash.App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003). However, if a new, independent intervening act breaks the chain of causation, it supersedes the defendant's original act and is no longer the proximate cause of the injury.

  4. Ford Motor Credit v. Brenneman

    No. 44773-8-II (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 1, 2014)

    They attach to their appellate brief a notice of a class action settlement reached with Volvo concerning failing transmissions, but that document was not before the trial court and may not be considered on appeal. Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist, 117 Wn.App. 694, 696 n.l, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1006 (2004); RAP 9.12.

  5. Puget Sound Elec. Workers Health Trust & Vacation Plan v. Barlow

    No. 65740-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2012)

    Section 449 of the Restatement states: Id. at 241 (citing Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wn.App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003)).Id. (citing Riojas, 117 Wn.App. at 697).

  6. Travis v. Bohannon

    128 Wn. App. 231 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    We view the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wn. App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1006 (2004). The nonmoving party here is Ms. Travis.

  7. State v. Howell

    126 Wn. App. 1056 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)

    Roggenkamp, 115 Wn. App. at 945-46 (citations omitted). In order to supersede defendant's acts, the intervening events must be `so highly extraordinary or unexpected that [they] can be said to fall without the realm of reasonable foreseeability as a matter of law. If the acts . . . are within the ambit of the hazards covered by the duty imposed upon the defendant, they are foreseeable and do not supersede the defendant's negligence.' Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wn. App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Roggenkamp the driver was speeding in the passing lane, locked his brakes, and collided with a vehicle making a left turn onto the roadway in front of him.

  8. Phibbs v. Odell

    No. 22143-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2004)

    The following driver rule asserts that if two vehicles are traveling in the same direction, the primary duty of avoiding a collision rests with the following driver. Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wn. App. 694, 698, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003), review denied No. 743894 (Wash. Mar. 2, 2004). Unless an emergency or unusual condition is present, the driver of the following vehicle is negligent if he collides with the vehicle in front of him.

  9. Martini v. State

    121 Wn. App. 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 18 times
    Noting the Washington State Commercial Driver's Guide advises truckers to use emergency flashers when driving very slowly or stopped

    According to Division One, it does not apply when a car is not following a truck, the truck is already stopped in the roadway, and the car hits the truck. RCW 46.61.145(1); see also Felder v. City of Tacoma, 68 Wn.2d 726, 728, 415 P.2d 496 (1966); Miller v. Cody, 41. Wn.2d 775, 778, 252 P.2d 303 (1953); Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wn. App. 694, 698, 72 P.3d 1093 (2003); Rhoades v. DeRosier, 14 Wn. App. 946, 949, 546 P.2d 930 (1976).Riojas, 117 Wn. App. at 698; see also Felder, 68 Wn.2d at 728; Miller, 41 Wn.2d at 778; Rhoades, 14 Wn. App. at 949; Ryan v. Westgard, 12 Wn. App. 500, 505, 530 P.2d 687 (1975).

  10. Olympic Air, Inc. v. Helicopter Tech. Co.

    No. C17-1257-RSL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2022)

    Riojas v. Grant Cty. Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wn.App. 694, 699 (2003) (quoting Smith v. Acme Paving Co., 16 Wn.App. 389, 396 (1976)); cf. RCW Ch. 4.22 (Washington's comparative fault regime). “Whether an act may be considered a superseding cause sufficient to relieve a defendant of liability depends on whether the intervening act can reasonably be foreseen by the defendant; only intervening acts which are not reasonably foreseeable are deemed superseding causes.