Opinion
Cause No. 1:02-CV-198
October 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
On June 11, 2002, Plaintiff in this case, Carolyn Rinearson ("Rinearson") filed a complaint against Greyhound Lines, Inc ("Greyhound") seeking damages arising from a bus crash that occurred on October 3, 2001. Rinearson was a passenger on the bus, owned and operated by Greyhound, and as a result, she was injured. Rinearson alleges that the bus crash and the resulting injuries to her were caused by the negligence of Greyhound. She is seeking money damages for medical expenses, lost income, pain, suffering, and emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life's activities. On July 25, 2002, Greyhound filed a Motion to Transfer Venue from the Northern District of Indiana to the Eastern District of Tennessee, Winchester Division. Greyhound filed a Supplemental Designation in Support of the Motion to Transfer on August 13, 2002, and a Second Supplemental Designation in Support of Motion to Transfer on September 4, 2002. Rinearson responded to Greyhound's Motion to Transfer Venue on September 17, 2002. Greyhound's final reply was received on October 1, 2002.
For the reasons set forth herein, Greyhound's Motion to Transfer Venue will be GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2001, a Greyhound bus was traveling eastbound on Interstate 24 in Coffee County, Tennessee when a passenger on the bus, one Damir Igric, attacked the driver of the bus causing it to crash. The Greyhound bus originated in Ohio, traveling to Chicago, Illinois before heading south towards Atlanta, Georgia. Thirty-seven (37) passengers, including Rinearson, were on board when the crash occurred.
Greyhound seeks to have this case transferred to the Eastern District of Tennessee arguing that Tennessee is a more convenient forum because it is closer to the crash site as well as the majority of the evidence and witnesses. In addition, Greyhound argues that judicial efficiency will be best served with the transfer because four (4) cases, all arising from the October 3, 2001 Greyhound bus crash, have been consolidated in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Rinearson contends that Greyhound has failed to meet their burden of showing that the relevant factors weigh strongly in favor of the transfer, and therefore, the case should remain in the Northern District of Indiana.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." This Court must first determine in which venues the present complaint "might have been brought." Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2002) provides, "[v]enue is proper in a district in which all of the plaintiffs reside, all the defendants reside or in which the claim arose." Therefore, venue would be proper in either the Northern District of Indiana, where Rinearson resides, and in the Eastern District of Tennessee, where the claim arose due to the bus crash.
Having determined that Rinearson's complaint could have been brought in the Eastern District of Tennessee, this Court must weight the relevant factors to determine if transfer is proper. Upon acting on a motion to transfer venue, a District Judge has broad discretion, but in "exercising this discretion he is limited in his consideration to the three factors specifically mentioned in § 1404(a), and he may not properly be governed in his decision by any other factor or consideration." Chicago, Rock Island Pacific R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1955). Greyhound, as the movant has the burden of establishing that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient. Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219-20 (7th Cir. 1986).
DISCUSSION
I. Convenience of Parties
In considering these three factors the court should bear in mind that in filing an action the plaintiff is permitted to choose any proper forum and that the plaintiff's choice should not be set aside lightly. Dairy Indus. Supply Ass'n v. La Buy, 207 F.2d 554, 558. However, this factor has "minimal value where none of the conduct complained of occurred in the forum selected" by Rinearson. Igoe, 796 F.2d at 304.
Plaintiff states that she is of limited means and alleges that the transfer of this case to the Eastern District of Tennessee may bar her from pursuing her claim due to the financial hardship involved in litigating her case in a distant forum. This Court understands that traveling to Tennessee will cause the Plaintiff to incur travel expenses. However, consolidating her case with the others already located in the Eastern District of Tennessee will provide economic efficiencies in the discovery process. In addition, the potential cost of transporting non-party witnesses, who predominantly reside in Tennessee, to the Northern District of Indiana far out weighs the travel costs the Plaintiff will incur if her case is transferred. Greyhound has four (4) consolidated cases, all arising from the same bus crash, pending in the Eastern District of Tennessee. The majority of non-party witnesses as well as the majority of the physical evidence is also in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Therefore, the convenience of the parties weighs in favor of Greyhound and in the transfer of Rinearson's claim to the Eastern District of Tennessee.
II. Convenience of Witnesses
"The disruption of witnesses is a factor to be considered when analyzing convenience." Kendall U.S.A., Inc. Central Printing Co., 666 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (N.D.Ind. 1987). "Whenever possible a court should facilitate the `live' presence of material nonparty witnesses." Id. Greyhound states that the passengers on the bus reside in eleven (11) different states and at least one (1) foreign country, with the majority of the passengers, fourteen (14), residing in Georgia, Tennessee or Alabama. Greyhound argues that it is more likely to have witnesses testify live from this majority witness pool if Rinearson's case is transferred. Rinearson points out that approximately eleven (11) of the passengers on the bus reside in or near the Northern District of Indiana in southern Wisconsin, Chicago, southern Michigan, and northern Ohio. Rinearson argues that these witnesses could provide the same testimony as the witnesses residing in or near the Eastern District of Tennessee. Therefore, the convenience as to the witnesses that were passengers on the bus when it crashed does not favor either party.
However, the majority, if not all, of the non-party (e.g. non-passenger) witnesses reside in Tennessee. Local, state, and federal authorities based in Tennessee investigated the bus accident and these investigators, along with their testimonies, will play a key role in determining Greyhound's liability in this case. Consolidating the present case with the cases already pending in the Eastern District Tennessee will avoid the unnecessary costs and inefficiencies of having the non-party witnesses testify at multiple depositions and at multiple trials. Therefore, the convenience of the witnesses weighs in favor of Greyhound.
III. Interests of Justice
The final factor is the "interests of justice" which implies conditions that are "in furtherance of the administration of justice" and it has been held that this factor "should be given paramount consideration." Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1955). The United States Supreme Court held "[t]o permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent." Cont'l Grain Co. v. The Barge FBL-585 and Fed. Barge Lines, Inc., 364 U.S. 19, 26, 80 S.Ct. 1470, 1474 (1960). Four (4) other passengers on the bus have brought similar claims against Greyhound that are now pending in the Eastern District of Tennessee. All four (4) of these cases as well as the present case pose the same determinative issue: whether Greyhound is liable for the bus crash. The interests of justice favors the consolidation of these claims into one trial so that one uniform ruling on Greyhound's liability can be reached. See Kendall, 666 F. Supp. at 1269. Another consideration is the burden placed upon the jury pool. "Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843 (1947). Transferring Rearson's case to the Eastern District Tennessee and consolidating it with the four (4) other case already pending there will avoid "the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent." Cont'l Grain Co., 364 U.S. at 26. Therefore, the interests of justice weighs in favor of Greyhound.
Surls v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (E.D. Tennessee Cause No. 01-CV-107) filed on November 1, 2001; Ivy v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (E.D. Tennessee Cause No. 02-CV-27) filed on April 19, 2 002; Adams v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (N.D.Ohio. Cause No. 1:02-CV-1253) which was transferred to Eastern District of Tennessee on August 20, 2002; and Dibenedetto v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (M.D. Florida Cause No. 6:02-CV-703-ORL-22JGG) which was transferred to Eastern District of Tennessee on July 31, 2002.
Having determined that all three factors that this Court must consider in deciding a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) weigh in favor of Greyhound, Greyhound has established that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient. Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219-20. Consequently, Greyhound's Motion to Transfer Venue will be GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Having weighed the appropriate factors, the court concludes that transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is clearly appropriate. Accordingly, the Clerk of this court is ORDERED to TRANSFER this matter to the Winchester Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.