Since our decision in Massaline, we have emphasized that the mailbox rule announced therein is one of appellate procedure in the context of habeas corpus petitions for certificates of probable cause in this Court, not a rule of general application. In Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 268 ( 626 SE2d 116) (2006), we stated: Massaline, however, by its explicit terms applies only in the narrow context of habeas corpus appeals to permit a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal to be deemed filed on the date delivered to prison authorities.
The Georgia Supreme Court's concern for pro se prisoners seeking habeas relief does not extend to pro se prisoners seeking non habeas relief. As the court stated in Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 626 S.E.2d 116, 117 (2006), "the mailbox rule established in Massaline does not exempt a pro se prisoner from complying with the statutory requirements to file a timely notice in any non habeas criminal or civil filing." See, e.g., Mingledorff v. Stokely, 223 Ga.App. 183, 477 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1996) (rejecting the mailbox rule in the context of a negligence action brought by a prisoner proceeding pro se).
Young v. Climatrol Se. Distrib. Corp. , 237 Ga. 53, 54, 226 S.E.2d 737 (1976). Although we have reiterated this view, we have done so inconsistently. Compare Bd. of Comm'rs of Atkinson Cty. v. Guthrie , 273 Ga. 1, 2 (1), 537 S.E.2d 329 (2000) (" OCGA § 5–6–48(b) lists three grounds for an appellate court to dismiss an appeal.") (emphasis supplied), with Riley v. State , 280 Ga. 267, 268, 626 S.E.2d 116 (2006) (trial court did not err in granting the State's motion to dismiss notice of appeal as untimely under the statutory authority in OCGA § 5–6–48 (b) (1) ), Grant v. Gaines , 265 Ga. 159, 159, 454 S.E.2d 481 (1995) (trial judge was authorized to dismiss unauthorized notice of appeal), and Jones v. Singleton , 253 Ga. 41, 42 (1), 316 S.E.2d 154 (1984) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of two notices of appeal where the underlying order was interlocutory and the case was not certified for immediate review under OCGA § 5–6–34 (b) ). Those four statutory reasons were:
Noting that the appellant was entitled to a direct appeal from the trial court's entry of an interlocutory injunction, this Court found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the appeal, "even assuming, arguendo, that a trial court has the authority under OCGA § 5-6-48 to dismiss an appeal. . . ." See also Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267 ( 626 SE2d 116) (2006), in which we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a notice of appeal as untimely and included a parenthetical reference to the assumption in Seig that the trial court has authority under OCGA § 5-6-48 to dismiss an appeal. The case at bar is a prime example of how muddy the waters can become when we stray from the statutory path. If the trial court had not dismissed the appeal in November 2006 by using a ground statutorily reserved to the appellate courts, the appeal would have been docketed in the Court of Appeals which, in all likelihood, would have dismissed the direct appeal for failure to follow the procedure for obtaining interlocutory review.
To the extent Jackson argued that the "mailbox" rule enunciated in Massaline v. Williams, 274 Ga. 552, 554 ( 554 SE2d 720) (2001), applied to render his notice of appeal as having been timely filed when he delivered it to the prison mailroom, his argument is unavailing. "The `mailbox' rule . . . applies only in the context of habeas corpus proceedings. Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 268 ( 626 SE2d 116) (2006)." (Punctuation omitted.)
To the extent that Price may have mailed a timely notice of appeal, which was not delivered to the trial court for some reason not attributable to Price, we note that the prisoner litigant "mailbox rule" would not protect his right to appeal, as it does not apply to any nonhabeas criminal or civil filings. Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 267-268 ( 626 SE2d 116) (2006). 2.
According to Lewis, because that timely notice of appeal was lost in the mail, he never had the opportunity to have appellate review of the November orders, and the trial court should have granted his motion for an out-of-time appeal. The "mailbox" rule, however, applies only in the context of habeas corpus proceedings. Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 268 ( 626 SE2d 116) (2006). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal on that basis.
The mailbox rule in Massaline applies only to habeas petitions, however, not to direct appeals, and "does not exempt a pro se prisoner from complying with the statutory requirements to file a timely notice of appeal in any non-habeas criminal or civil filing." Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 268 ( 626 SE2d 116) (2006). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying McCroskey's motion for an out-of-time appeal.
October 2, 2006.Reported below: 280 Ga. 267, 626 S. E. 2d 116.Certiorari Denied.
Petitioner claims he mailed his certiorari petition on September 5th, but Georgia does not apply the prison-mailbox rule to direct appeals. See Riley v. State , 280 Ga. 267, 268, 626 S.E.2d 116 (2006). Thus, the petition was not considered filed until it was received by the clerk on September 7, 2006.