Estrada v. State, Tex.Crim.App. 422 S.W.2d 453 [1968], and Riley v. State, Tex.Crim.App. 406 S.W.2d 438 [1966]. Cline, 463 S.W.2d at 444-45.
(e) a staggered gait:Dickey v. State, 552 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Casey v. State, 414 S.W.2d 657 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967); Riley v. State, 406 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.Cr.App. 1966); Evans v. State, 402 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Cr.App. 1966); Hooker, supra; Lacy v. State, 374 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Cr.App. 1963); and (f) the odor of alcohol on the breath:
Aside from general objections, we construe the objections to the documentary evidence to be essentially these: (1) That the evidence was insufficient to show that appellant was the same person convicted in the former cases; (2) That the convictions were too remote; and (3) That they were void because it was not shown that appellant had counsel when he plead guilty. (1) The evidence of the number of his driver's license, and such a certificate from the Department of Public Safety as was admitted in the case at bar, was held sufficient prima facie proof of appellant's identity in Rice v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 367, 292 S.W.2d 114; Riley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 406 S.W.2d 438. (2) Article 37.07, Sec. 3, V.A.C.P., authorizes proof of the criminal record of an accused after a verdict of guilty. There is no limitation as to remoteness.
Further, any error which may have existed was cured by the court's instruction to the jury that they were not to consider any statements of the court. Estrada v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 453, and Riley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 406 S.W.2d 438. The seventh and eighth grounds of error are overruled.