Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-485-L
May 29, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, filed March 19, 2002; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed March 19, 2002; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 4, 2003, Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record, filed May 12, 2003, and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend. For the reasons herein stated, the court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Remand; grants Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend; denies without prejudice Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record; and defers ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment until after Plaintiff files an amended complaint.
Plaintiff did not file a separate motion to amend but in her response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), she requested that she be granted leave to amend her complaint to assert claims under ERISA for wrongful discharge and denial of benefits.
I. Procedural and Factual Background
Denise Riley ("Plaintiff" or "Riley") is a former employee of Dr. Pepper Bottling Company of Texas ("Defendant" or "Dr. Pepper"). On October 12, 2001, Plaintiff sustained a back injury while operating a photocopy machine at work. On October 15, 2001, Plaintiff saw Dr. Katherine H. Smith ("Dr. Smith"), a company-approved physician under Dr. Pepper's Occupational Accident Plan, ("the Plan" or "Defendant's plan"). According to Dr. Smith's assessment, Plaintiff had suffered "thoracic strain" or a strained back. Plaintiff also consulted and sought treatment from other physicians for her injury. Plaintiff made a claim for benefits under Dr. Pepper's plan for the expenses she incurred related to treatment of the back injury, which was denied by Defendant. On February 25, 2002, Plaintiff brought this action against Dr. Pepper in the 162nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, asserting claims for breach of contract, Deceptive Trade Practices ("DTPA') violations, common law fraud, promissory estoppel, economic coercion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On March 8, 2002, Defendant filed its Notice of Removal and removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. On March 19, 2002, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, contending that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In its response, Defendant argued that all of Plaintiffs state law claims relate to Defendant's Plan; that Defendant's Plan qualifies as an employee welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"); and that Plaintiffs claims were therefore preempted by ERISA under the complete preemption doctrine. Plaintiff filed a reply, rearguing her position. Alternatively, she requested that she be allowed to amend her complaint if the court concluded that her claims were preempted. On March 19, 2002, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiffs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and on April 4, 2003, it filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a response to both of Defendant's motions and also moved for leave to supplement the record. Now before the court are Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, and Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record.
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Defendant contends that removal was proper, because Plaintiffs state law claims, which relate to the company's employee benefit plan, are preempted by ERISA. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that her state law claims are not preempted by ERISA but instead arise under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act ("TWCA") and are not removable. The court must therefore determine whether Dr. Pepper's plan is an ERISA plan subject to federal preemption. If Dr. Pepper's Occupational Accident Plan is an ERISA plan, the court has jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs only remedies are those provided by ERISA. In other words, her state law causes of action are preempted or barred. If, on the other hand, Dr. Pepper's plan does not qualify as an ERISA plan, then ERISA does not apply, and the court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law causes of action. With this in mind, the court sets forth the applicable law and reviews Defendant's plan as well as Plaintiffs state law claims.
The rights, regulations and remedies created by ERISA "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may . . . relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). This language is "deliberately expansive," and is designed to make the regulation of employee benefit plans an exclusively federal concern. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987). An employee benefit plan is defined as "any plan, fund or program" established or maintained by an employer or employee organization to provide participants and their beneficiaries with "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment." 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1). If the benefit plan at issue is determined to be an ERISA plan, and the claim alleged relates to the employee's status as the beneficiary of the plan, then the claim falls within the federal court's jurisdiction and is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b). Hernandez v. Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., 282 F.3d 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987) (holding causes of action falling within ERISA's enforcement provisions, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132, are removable under complete preemption doctrine). A state law "relates to" a benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges state law claims for breach of contract, DTPA violations, common law fraud, promissory estoppel, economic coercion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims are all directly connected to and based on Dr. Pepper's denial of Plaintiffs claim for benefits under Dr. Pepper's plan. Moreover, except for Plaintiffs economic coercion claim, all of the claims are analogous to those raised and found to have been preempted by ERISA in previous Fifth Circuit decisions. See Hernandez, 282 F.3d at 362 n. 3; Hogan v. Draft Foods, 969, F.2d 142, 144-145 (5th Cir. 1992). The court therefore determines that all of Plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by ERISA if Dr. Pepper's plan constitutes an ERISA plan for which no exception to preemption applies. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's plan is not an ERISA plan, because some of its provisions are similar to provisions of the TWCA.
Section 1003(b)(3) exempts from ERISA coverage any employee benefit plan that is "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws." 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (b)(3). This exception, however, only applies to plans which are both separately administered and maintained solely to comply with state law. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 107-108 (1983). In Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit held that the plan of a nonsubscribing employer under the TWCA was not maintained solely for the purpose of complying with Texas workers' compensation laws, because no Texas law required employers to provide workers' compensation insurance, either by subscribing to the state plan or offering an equivalent alternative. Hernandez, 282 F.3d at 363. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the exemption in § 1003(b) was designed to allow states to control their workers' compensation schemes, it should not apply where a `state voluntarily cedes control over certain plans by allowing employers to exist outside of the workers' compensation system.'" Id. at 364. Like the employer in Hernandez, Dr. Pepper is a nonsubscriber, and it elected to adopt its own occupational injury plan to provide benefits resulting from work related injuries. Its plan is therefore an ERISA plan, and Plaintiffs state law claims are preempted.
Plaintiff requests that her claims for economic coercion and intentional infliction of emotional distress be remanded in the event the court determines that her other claims are preempted, because she maintains that her claims for economic coercion and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not related to her claim for benefits under Dr. Pepper's plan. The court disagrees. First, the cases cited by Plaintiff for the proposition that certain state claims are not preempted by ERISA, even where the employer is a nonsubscriber and has an occupational injury plan, are distinguishable in that they dealt with claims of negligence. Plaintiff has not asserted a claim of negligence. Second, the court has already determined that all of Plaintiffs claims, including those for economic coercion and intentional infliction of emotional distress, are related to her claim for benefits under Defendant's plan. Finally, even if the court had determined that these particular claims were not related, the court would have supplemental jurisdiction over the non-related claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). See Hernandez, 282 F.3d at 362 n. 3. The court therefore determines that Plaintiffs claims are preempted by ERISA and that remand of those claims is inappropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is denied. III. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to amend her complaint to assert claims under ERISA for wrongful discharge and denial of benefits if the court denied her motion to remand. The court does not believe that Defendant will be prejudiced if Plaintiff is permitted to amend her complaint to add the ERISA claims since these claims are based on the same or similar facts already pleaded by Plaintiff in support of her state law claims, and Defendant will be given an opportunity to supplement its summary judgment motion and motion to dismiss. Plaintiff may therefore amend her complaint; however, the amendment shall be limited to claims under ERISA for wrongful discharge and denial of benefits as requested in Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend is granted as herein provided.
Local Civil Rule 15.1 requires a party who moves for leave to file an amended pleading to attach a copy of the proposed pleading as an exhibit to the motion. The rule also instructs the party to submit with the motion for leave an original and a second copy of the proposed pleading. As Plaintiff did not submit an original and a second copy of the proposed complaint as required by Local Civil Rul 15. 1, there is no pleading to direct the clerk to file. Plaintiff shall therefore file her amended complaint by June 9, 2003. IV. Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement
Plaintiff also moved for leave to file a motion to supplement the summary judgment record. The evidence she seeks to supplement the record with appears to be related to her wrongful discharge claim; however, as this claim has not been officially raised in a pleading, the court determines that the motion to supplement is premature. Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record is therefore denied without prejudice. IV. Conclusion
For the reasons herein stated, the court determines that Plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by ERISA and remand is inappropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is denied; Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend is granted; and Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record is denied without prejudice. The court defers ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment until after Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint and additional materials are filed as a result of the amended complaint. Defendant may supplement its motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, as necessary, to address Plaintiffs new claims, and the parties may file a response and reply in accordance with the local rules and this court's rules.
In light of the court's ruling, it will by separate order vacate the trial date set for July, the pretrial conference, and the pretrial filing deadlines. The trial will be reset to allow the parties to present the additional briefing and provide the court sufficient time to rule on the pending motions. Other than the pretrial deadlines herein mentioned, no other deadlines set forth in the court's Scheduling Order of September 12, 2002 will be changed.