Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-03-028 WLW.
Submitted: February 8, 2006.
Decided: March 6, 2006.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Reargument and/or Reconsideration. Denied.
Scott E. Chambers, Esquire of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Plaintiffs.
David C. Malatesta, Jr., Esquire of Kent McBride, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; attorneys for Defendant Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company.
ORDER
Defendant, Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company, filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Reargument asserting that this Court overlooked the fact that the owner of the vehicle, Sherri Williams ("Williams"), was known and was named as a defendant in the original complaint. Also, they allege that Plaintiffs were not "legally entitled to recover" against Williams because this Court granted her motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs argue that they did not know that Williams was in fact the owner of the vehicle until after the statute of limitations had expired. They also contend that Williams was dismissed from this suit by a Partial Stipulation of Dismissal.
The salient facts are as follows: On July 12, 2002, Plaintiffs were stopped at a red light. A van rear-ended the car directly behind Plaintiffs propelling that car into the back of Plaintiffs' vehicle. The driver of the vehicle stopped only long enough to see if there was any damage and then left the scene of the accident. She never identified herself. Plaintiffs did, however, manage to get a partial license plate number. Based on that information, Plaintiffs believed Carl Jenkins ("Jenkins") to be the owner of the van and Williams to be the operator. As a result, Plaintiffs named both Jenkins and Williams as defendants. After the expiration of the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs learned that Williams was, in fact, the owner of the vehicle. However, she had given the van to Ron Jackson ("Jackson") to make minor repairs. Jackson then allowed his girlfriend, Gina Bell ("Bell") to drive the van. In light of this information, all parties agreed to dismiss Williams as a defendant in September of 2004.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Reargument and/or Reconsideration is denied.
Standard of Review
This Court has clearly established that "reargument will usually be denied unless it is shown that the Court `overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision.'" Additionally, "[t]he Delaware Supreme Court has also stated that motions for reargument should not be used merely to `rehash the arguments already decided by the court.'"
State v. Trump, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 285, at *2.
Id.
Discussion
Defendant's first contention is that this Court improperly overlooked the fact that Plaintiffs knew the identity of the owner of the vehicle and, as a result, the vehicle was not a "hit-and-run" vehicle pursuant to Mohl v. Doe. In Mohl, the Court granted the defendant insurance company's motion for summary judgment, determining that: (1) plaintiff was not entitled to maintain an action against a fictional defendant, so there was no claim based upon the driver's negligence and (2) plaintiff's vehicle was not an "uninsured vehicle" because the car was covered by a liability insurance policy at the time of the accident, the insurance policy's liability coverage satisfied the requirements of Delaware's financial responsibility law and the vehicle did not meet the definition of a "hit-and-run" vehicle because the owner was known.However, the case sub judice is clearly distinguishable from Mohl. In Mohl, the plaintiff was the owner of the "hit-and-run" vehicle. It was the only vehicle involved in the accident. Obviously, the owner of the vehicle was known. Here, Williams was named as a defendant, but Plaintiffs did not know Williams was the owner until August, after the statute of limitations had run. In fact, Plaintiffs believed Jenkins to be the owner and Williams to be the operator. Additionally, the driver, Bell, had the responsibility to provide her name, address, the vehicle's registration number and proof of her driving privileges pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 4202(a). Further, "the phrase hit-and-run is the commonly accepted description of an incident involving a car accident where the driver flees the scene." Here, the driver fled the scene when she left without providing her name, address, the van's registration number and proof of her driving privileges. Plaintiffs should not be penalized for observing a partial license plate number and attempting to ascertain the identities of the vehicle's owner and operator. The policy of Delaware is "to protect the insured injured by unknown tortfeasors." In the case sub judice, I find that the owner was unknown until after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, Mohl is inapposite and the vehicle that caused Plaintiffs' injuries was a "hit-and-run" vehicle.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Abramowicz, 386 A.2d 670 (Del. 1978).
Leffler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 299, at *12-13.
Defendant's second argument is that Plaintiffs were not "legally entitled to recover" against Williams pursuant to Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Nacchia because this Court granted Williams' Motion to Dismiss. In Nacchia, the Supreme Court held that because the plaintiffs had already settled with the underinsured motorist and executed a release that provided for a "full and complete settlement," they were no longer "`legally entitled to recover'" against their insurance carrier. However, Defendant overlooked the fact that Williams was not the uninsured tortfeasor. In this case, the uninsured tortfeasors were Jackson and Bell. As discussed in my previous Order, Plaintiffs did nothing improper to terminate their right to recover from Jackson and Bell. They certainly did not expressly release Jackson and Bell from liability. Therefore, Nacchia is inapposite.
628 A.2d 48 (Del. 1993).
Id. at 52-53.
More important, Williams was never, nor could she ever have been, an uninsured tortfeasor for the purposes of this case. In Finkbiner v. Mullins, this Court stated:
532 A.2d 609, 615 (Del.Super. 1987).
As a general rule and in the absence of any statute imposing liability, mere ownership of a motor vehicle at the time of an accident caused by the negligent operation of another will not subject the owner to liability for the results of such negligence. To render the owner liable, there must be some duty on the part of the owner to the plaintiff, a failure to perform such duty and resulting injuries. Liability of the owner for the negligence of another person in driving his vehicle, therefore, is usually based on the owner's supposed control over the driver at the time of the accident.
Thus, the Court held that absent affirmative evidence of a master-servant or agency relationship, personal jurisdiction cannot be established over a nonresident owner of a vehicle. Williams and Bell were not in a master-servant or principal-agent relationship . In fact, Bell did not even have Williams' consent to drive the vehicle. Therefore, Williams was not amenable to process under 10 Del. C. § 3112. Because there was no valid claim against Williams, she was never an uninsured tortfeasor and, consequently, Plaintiffs did not have to be "legally entitled to recover" against her.
Id. at 617.
Defendant made a third argument, claiming that Leffler did not apply in this case because Plaintiffs learned the identity of the owner and filed suit against her. Based on the discussion above, suit was never properly filed against Williams, nor could a valid cause of action have been filed against her because this Court lacked jurisdiction over her. Consequently, Defendant's third argument fails. In fact, Leffler was applied to Jackson and Bell as uninsured tortfeasors, not Williams, in this Court's previous Order. Thus, that analysis still stands.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Reargument and/or Reargument is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.