Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1528-12T2
07-31-2014
Oliver T. Rigney, Jr., appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondents Planned Lifestyle Services, Inc. and The Cooper Health System have not submitted briefs.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Harris and Fasciale. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 326,447. Oliver T. Rigney, Jr., appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondents Planned Lifestyle Services, Inc. and The Cooper Health System have not submitted briefs. PER CURIAM
Oliver T. Rigney, Jr., appeals from an October 22, 2012 final agency decision by the Board of Review (the "Board") upholding an Appeal Tribunal's determination that Rigney was liable to return an overpayment of Emergency Unemployment Compensation Benefits ("EUC08 benefits"). We affirm.
Defendant The Cooper Health System employed Rigney full-time until February 2010, when it terminated Rigney's employment due to lack of work. Rigney applied for regular unemployment benefits on February 21, 2010. From May 2010 to July 2010, he worked part-time for defendant Planned Lifestyle Services, which is located in Pennsylvania. He testified that he left this job because he was placed on unpaid suspension and because he was working many more hours than he had agreed to work, which interfered with his search for full-time employment. Rigney exhausted his regular unemployment benefits, then he collected EUC08 benefits until February 12, 2011.
In March 2011, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (the "Department") sent Rigney a Request for Refund of Unemployment Benefits indicating he was liable for $9671 in overpaid benefits, essentially because he had been eligible to file a regular unemployment claim in Pennsylvania as of October 3, 2010, and was therefore disqualified from recovering EUC08 benefits from that date. Rigney appealed to the Appeal Tribunal. In May 2011, the Appeal Tribunal determined that Rigney did not become ineligible for EUC08 benefits until February 20, 2011 and therefore was not liable for any overpayment.
In June 2011, the Department sent Rigney a notice of determination stating that Rigney had been disqualified from receiving benefits starting on July 11, 2010 because he left his position with Planned Lifestyle Services voluntarily and without good cause attributable to such work. The attached refund requests indicated that Rigney was liable for benefits he received between July 17, 2010 and October 2, 2010.
Rigney appealed to the Board, which determined that additional testimony was necessary. The Board then remanded the matter for a hearing to resolve all issues, including whether Rigney had good cause to quit the part-time job. On February 6, 2012, the Appeal Tribunal determined that Rigney left the part-time job both because the extra hours interfered with his job search and because the employer was going to put him on an unpaid suspension pending an investigation into a work-related matter. The Appeal Tribunal concluded that (1) Rigney's leaving the part-time job did not disqualify him from receiving regular unemployment benefits; (2) Rigney was eligible to apply for unemployment benefits in Pennsylvania starting on October 3, 2010; (3) Rigney was therefore ineligible to receive EUC08 benefits in New Jersey from October 9, 2010 through February 12, 2011; and (4) Rigney was liable for a refund of $9671 for weeks ending between October 9, 2010 and February 12, 2011.
Rigney again appealed to the Board, which remanded the matter for a supplemental hearing to obtain additional testimony regarding the "circumstances surrounding [Rigney's] separation from work." On July 30, 2012, the Appeal Tribunal issued a decision making substantially the same findings that it made in its February 6, 2012 decision. Rigney appealed to the Board, which affirmed the decision.
On appeal to us, Rigney argues that the Board should have granted him a waiver of recovery and partially reduced his benefits by the amount of wages he earned for part-time work rather than disqualifying him from receiving EUC08 benefits entirely. We disagree.
Our review of an agency's final decision is limited. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). We "defer to an agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field," Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992), and uphold its decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record," In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). In particular, when "'reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder would reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Futterman v. Bd. of Review, 421 N.J. Super. 281, 287 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997)).
After considering Rigney's arguments and the controlling law, we conclude that the Board's decision upholding the Appeal Tribunal's determination was reasonable, and we see no basis for disturbing it. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appeal Tribunal in its July 30, 2012 decision adopted by the Board. We add the following brief comments.
The Appeal Tribunal properly considered Rigney's claim by applying the applicable law. Albert Nixon, a claims examiner in the Collateral Claims Office in the Department, testified that Rigney met the monetary requirements to file a regular claim for unemployment benefits in Pennsylvania. The Tribunal found this testimony to be credible and determined that Rigney was ineligible for benefits under the EUC08 program because he had a regular claim for benefits in Pennsylvania.
Rigney argues that he was entitled to a waiver under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2 and that the Appeal Tribunal granted him a waiver in its May 2011 decision, but later rescinded the waiver. The Appeal Tribunal did not grant such a waiver in its decision, and the record does not reveal that Rigney ever requested a waiver. Therefore, we conclude that the Board's affirmance of the Appeal Tribunal's decision, which was consistent with the controlling statutes and regulations, was not arbitrary and is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
Affirmed
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF APPELLATE DIVIDION