Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc.

8 Citing cases

  1. Biggers v. Accelecare Wound Ctrs., Inc.

    Civil No. 3:10-cv-0128 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2015)

    Id. (finding the defendant's efforts to enforce a non-competition agreement to be without impropriety and properly motivated by a desire to protect its competitive interest). See also, Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find improper motive where the defendant's actions were letters notifying the plaintiff that he was in violation of his non-competition agreement). Additionally, there is no evidence that Defendant was motivated by a desire to harm Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Defendant attempted to carry out the Agreement in bad faith by enforcing it even though Defendant did not believe the Agreement was properly executed or valid.

  2. McClaran v. Plastic Industries

    97 F.3d 347 (9th Cir. 1996)   Cited 62 times
    Holding that a "jury's award of damages may be stricken where an assumption necessary to support that award is wholly speculative"

    So if the plaintiff has to prove malice, then the plaintiff has to prove lack of justification. . . . [B]ut it is clear, under the law, that this is an intentional tort and the plaintiff must prove, must offer some evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant intended to procure a breach of contract and that the defendant took some action which brought about the breach of the contract. 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) (quoting trial court judge). Neither the trial judge nor appellate court cited to any legal authority for this definition of malice.

  3. Kansas Bankers Surety Co. v. Bahr Consultants, Inc.

    69 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1999)   Cited 8 times
    Applying the circuit's commercial advertising or promotion precedents to statements in a consultant's work product

    In Tennessee, "legal malice simply means a willful violation of a known right, and as some of the cases have very actively said in a legal sense, malice is nothing more than the absence of justification." Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) (quoting the trial court with approval). While the court agrees with KBS that Riggs sets forth the correct standard for legal malice in Tennessee, the court disagrees with KBS that Riggs lends support for the adoption of the standard of legal malice — as opposed to constitutional malice — in a disparagement case. The quoted language in Riggs relates only to the level of scienter required in an action for wrongfully procuring a breach of contract.

  4. Leemis v. Russell

    No. W1999-00352-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 24, 2000)   Cited 2 times

    See Polk andSullivan, Inc. v. United Cities Gas Co., 783 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. 1989); Shahrdar v. Global Hous., Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994); Campbell v. Matlock, 749 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-50-109 (1995). The statutory cause of action, which is found at section 47-50-109 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, is different from the common law cause of action in that it provides for an award of treble damages upon a clear showing that the defendant induced or procured the breach of contract.

  5. Cambio v. Reardon

    234 F. App'x 331 (6th Cir. 2007)   Cited 28 times
    Rejecting defendant's argument that the punitive damages award was excessive because the statutory penalty would be approximately half of the $5 million punitive damages award, reasoning that defendants were aware that the plaintiffs could opt to pursue punitive damages under Tennessee common law instead of statutory damages

    As it stands, the Tennessee courts continue to respect the dichotomy between factual malice and legal malice and hold that legal malice remains an element of a tortious interference claim. See, e.g., Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) (approving trial court's conclusion that tortious interference requires "legal malice," which "simply means a wilful violation of a known right"); see also Prime Co. v. Wilkinson Snowden, Inc., No. W2003-00696-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 2218574, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 30, 2004) (reversing the trial court because it used the factual definition of malice rather than the legal definition); Crye-Leike Realtors, Inc. v. WDM, Inc., No. 02A01-9711-CH-00287, 1998 WL 651623, at *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 24, 1998) ("In [the procurement of breach of contract] context, malice is the wilful violation of a known right.") (internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, a jury reasonably could conclude that the companies willfully violated Reardon's rights under the agreement.

  6. Bandy v. Roberts

    1:19-cv-164 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2022)

    “Legal malice simply means a willful violation of a known right, and as some of the cases have very actively said in a legal sense, malice is nothing more than the absence of justification.” Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (cleaned up). The Court has found by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the Third Loan was indeed a loan, not a sale, (2) Bandy still had time to pay back the loan, (3) Roberts deliberately recorded the quitclaim deed to take the Acreage without justification, knowing he was not yet entitled to it but believing Bandy would inevitably default on the loan, (4) Roberts directed Najjar to prepare an amendment to Bandy's land-sale contract with the Odinets substituting Roberts as the seller so that the sale could not close without him (Doc. 61, at 12023; Ex. 8; Ex. 35, at 19-20), and (5) Roberts refused to show up to the closing, knowing it would fail without his presence so that Bandy could not pay back the loan and Roberts could take the entire Acreage for the mere $31,000 disbursement.

  7. Williams-Sonoma Direct, Inc. v. Arhaus, LLC

    No. 2:14-cv-02727-JPM-tmp (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    In this context, malicious intent "simply means a willful violation of a known right . . . ." Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have the right to bring claims of tortious interference with contract against Arhaus and Stover.

  8. Fulmer v. MPW Industrial Services, Inc.

    Case No. 3:04-0879 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 8, 2006)

    Acting out a desire to protect one's competitive interest does not "extend beyond the bounds of doing business in a freely competitive economy." See Trau-Med of America, Inc., 71 S.W.3d at 700; Riggs v. Royal Beauty Supply, 879 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) (finding that a defendant's efforts to enforce a non-compete agreement against its former employee did not reveal an improper motive). Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant was operating under an improper motive.