Riggs v. Office of Personnel Management

5 Citing cases

  1. Grabis v. Office of Personnel Management

    424 F.3d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 10 times

    The result was to put him in the same financial position as if his removal had never occurred. If he had never been removed, however, he would not have received any of the discontinued service annuities he was paid during his temporary separation. See Day v. OPM, 873 F.2d 291, 293 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that "a retirement annuity cannot start until separation from service" and "separation from service [is] nullified by accepting retroactive reinstatement"); Riggs v. OPM, 709 F.2d 1486, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that "by express provision of 5 U.S.C. § 8345(b)," an "annuity cannot start until [the employee] separates from his civil service position"). Although the annuity payments Grabis received were proper when made, his retention of those payments after his retroactive reinstatement made him ineligible to receive them was improper.

  2. Day v. Office of Personnel Management

    873 F.2d 291 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 1 times
    Stating that "a retirement annuity cannot start until separation from service" and "separation from service [is] nullified by accepting retroactive reinstatement"

    Thus, the deduction of retirement payments received due to an unjustified separation from service is authorized and directed by law and petitioner's contention of an error of law is without merit. Riggs v. Office of Personnel Management, 709 F.2d 1486, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1983). What he seeks here by receiving full back pay and retention of the annuity payments is a windfall benefit.

  3. Richmond v. Office of Personnel Management

    862 F.2d 294 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 9 times
    Remanding respondent's case to the MSPB "with instructions to direct the agency to issue the withheld disability benefits to Mr. Richmond"

    Until today, we followed those Supreme Court cases. In Riggs v. Office of Personnel Management, 709 F.2d 1486, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1983), for example, we relied on Hansen and held that OPM's erroneous ruling, and Riggs' consequent failure to meet a statutory precondition to entitlement, did not estop the government from enforcing the precondition and denying Riggs benefits. The cases the court believes support its departure from precedent do not.

  4. Ellis v. United States

    711 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 34 times
    In Ellis v. United States, 711 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983), we held that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to award fees under the EAJA in a transitional case begun before the Court of Claims, which was subsequently carried over by statute to the Claims Court, and then decided by that court after October 1, 1982. Ellis left open the jurisdictional question for actions commenced on or after October 1, 1982.

    The Court of Claims rejected this recommendation and awarded appellant a full annuity from the date of his initial retirement. Id. at 1182; cf. Riggs v. Office of Personnel Management, 709 F.2d 1486, 1488-1489 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But the important point is that the Court of Claims did not consider the government's (and the trial judge's) position (on damages) to be indefensible. Indeed, the court noted "that a facially respectable argument . . . [could] be made" for treating appellant as a constructive reemployed annuitant, Ellis II, supra, 657 F.2d at 1180, and proceeded to decide the issue as a novel one of statutory construction.

  5. Matter of Succession of Sims

    464 So. 2d 991 (La. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 9 times
    In Sims, the former wife of Winston H. Sims, a federal employee, brought an action against the employee's succession and the employee's surviving spouse, seeking to recover her community property interest in the retirement plan from the surviving spouse's survivor annuity.

    Filing an application within certain time frames with the Office of Personnel Management and separation from "the service" or cessation of "pay" and meeting "age requirements" are prerequisites for "an annuity of an employee". 5 U.S.C.A. § 8345(b) and (i)(1); 5 C.F.R. § 831.501(a b); 5 C.F.R. § 831.701(a); Riggs v. Office of Personnel Management, 709 F.2d 1486 (C.A., Fed. Cir. 1983); Sonnabend v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 150, 146 Ct.Cl. 622 (1959). Substantial compliance with a statute and regulations requiring an application by an employee who meets age and service requirements can, in some instances, suffice.