We review de novo a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Newton Covenant Church v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 956 F.3d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 2020) ; see also Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) ("In conducting this review, we accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.") (quotation omitted). As part of this review, we consider the complaint's well-pleaded allegations and "documents sufficiently referred to" therein.
Although the Hadleys do not address this in their briefing, even if any Section 1983 claims arose there, it would not impact the operative limitations period. See Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that Rhode Island's three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs Section 1983 claims).
Furthermore, even were these claims wrongly split, the Court would conclude that the equities weigh against dismissal on these grounds since there was no prejudice to the Beach Club and CLF is here a "private attorney[ ] general standing the in government's shoes" to enforce a public interest. Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2017).In accordance with the Court's oral ruling, ECF No. 31, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 17, as to count II since the complaint adequately states a claim under RCRA for "contributing to ... disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."
"The court must take all of the pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true," Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2014), and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017). "Barring ‘narrow exceptions,’ courts tasked with this feat usually consider only the complaint, documents attached to it, and documents expressly incorporated into it."
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must "accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor." Riggs v. Curran, 863 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Guadalupe–Báez v. Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 2016) ). However, "to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ... a complaint must contain factual allegations that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true ....’ "
The fact that deportation may result from a conviction is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. See United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.3d 6 (4th Cir. 1988). Deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal conviction because it arises through the efforts of an arm of government over which the trial court has no control and which is not part of the underlying criminal proceeding.