Opinion
Case No. 03-4111-RDR
March 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action to review a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security regarding plaintiff's entitlement to disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, and defendant have briefed the relevant issues and the court is now prepared to rule.
I.
Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits on June 7, 2001, and an application for SSI benefits on August 16, 2001. She alleged that her disability began on May 9, 2000. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Two hearings were ultimately conducted by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on plaintiff's applications. On September 11, 2002, the ALJ determined in a written opinion that plaintiff was not entitled to disability or SSI benefits. On May 27, 2003, the Appeals Council of the SSA denied plaintiff's request for review. Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
II.
This court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the records contain substantial evidence to support the findings, and to determine whether the correct legal standards were applied.Castellano v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Soliz v. Chater, 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the court cannot weigh the evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the Commissioner, but we have the duty to carefully consider the entire record and make our determination on the record as a whole. Dollar v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1987).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant is disabled. Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1988). If a claimant is determined to be disabled or not disabled at any step, the evaluation process ends there.Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir. 1989). The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; then it shifts to the Commissioner. Id.
III.
Plaintiff was born on September 4, 1957. She is a college graduate. She has previously worked at Boeing Aircraft as a grinder and material processor. She last worked at Boeing on May 9, 2000.
On July 28, 1997, plaintiff was seen by James L. Gluck, M.D. She complained primarily of pain in the volar aspect of both distal forearms into the hand and extending up through the forearm and arms and up towards her shoulder. She told Dr. Gluck that she was presently working at Boeing Aircraft as a grinder. She said that the work was very difficult because of the pain. The physical examination by Dr. Gluck revealed the following:
Exam of both upper extremities shows no swelling. There is full range of motion. There is tenderness through the forearm, especially through the volar distal forearm and the carpal tunnel. Tinel's testing causes a feeling of numbness locally and then proximally into the volar distal forearm but not distally. Carpal tunnel compression causes pain. There is some mild paresthesias into her fingers. Overall, the exam is significant for tenderness and pain but not so much in terms of neurologic symptoms of numbness and paresthesias.
Dr. Gluck diagnosed (1) bilateral upper extremity cumulative trauma disorder with overuse tendonitis/myositis and (2) mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. He did not believe that she would be able to continue the work activity that she was presently doing. He, however, did not believe that anything could be done medically. He recommended that she discontinue her work as a grinder and limit repetitive activities and the use of vibratory tools.
Plaintiff was next examined by Lynn D. Ketchum, M.D., on October 31, 1997. He noted that plaintiff indicated she began suffering pain in both hands in 1991. At that time, a diagnosis of mild carpal tunnel syndrome was made. She was treated with splints and steroid injections. Dr. Ketchum examined her and determined that she was suffering from bilateral mild carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome with attendant weakness. He recommended that she continue with her job with certain modifications and that she have permanent restrictions of no overhead work, no repetitive gripping, and no repetitive use of vibratory tools.
On July 14, 2000, plaintiff was examined by Daniel D. Zimmerman, M.D. Plaintiff complained primarily of pain and discomfort in her upper extremities. Dr. Zimmerman considered plaintiff's previous medical history, including the examinations by Drs. Gluck and Ketchum. Dr. Zimmerman conducted a thorough examination of plaintiff. Plaintiff reported pain at the site of firm palpation of the carpal canals. The Tinel's test caused "jolting" pain that radiated up the forearm toward the elbow level on the right and left sides. Phalen's test caused pain affecting the palmar surfaces of the wrists on the right and left sides. Dr. Zimmerman noted no thenar, hypothenar, or interosseous muscle atrophy or tenderness on palpation on the right or left sides. Dr. Zimmerman also had x-rays taken of her hands. The x-rays showed preservation of the carpal joints, metacarpals and phalanges on both hands. Neither hand showed any osteoarthritic change. Dr. Zimmerman found that plaintiff had permanent partial impairment of the right and left upper extremities due to permanent residuals of carpal tunnel syndromes and overuse syndromes. He further determined that plaintiff's condition was stable and did not require any further diagnostic or therapeutic intervention. He found that plaintiff was capable of lifting ten pounds on an occasional basis and five pounds on a frequent basis. He determined that she should avoid frequent flexion, extension, twisting, torquing, pushing, pulling, hammering and reaching activities with the upper extremities. He believed that such activities would increase the pain and discomfort affecting plaintiff's hands, wrists and fingers bilaterally. He recommended that her pain could be treated with Advil or Relafen. He also suggested heat treatment in the form of hot baths.
Plaintiff was seen and treated by Terry Summerhouse, D.O. from March 10, 2000 to June 25, 2001. She first saw Dr. Summerhouse on March 10, 2000 with a complaint of stomach pain and bladder problems. An ultrasound of her gallbladder was performed but nothing significant was discovered. Dr. Summerhouse diagnosed plaintiff's problem as a hiatal hernia and gastritis. Over the next few months, he continued to see and treat her. On May 25, 2001, Dr. Summerhouse noted that she had "multiple problems" and was unable to determine "her biggest complaint." He noted that she continued to complain of severe pain with carpal tunnel, incontinence, and lack of energy. In June 2001, plaintiff again complained of stomach problems, but noted that Prevacid helped.
On July 17, 2001, plaintiff was seen by Niranjan Baxi, M.D., for a consultative examination. During the examination, plaintiff complained of back pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, shortness or breath and fatigue. Dr. Baxi found no grip strength in either hand, but also noted minimal effort by the plaintiff. Dr. Baxi indicated that plaintiff made no effort to do range of motion examination of the lumbar spine. He found the range of motion in all other joints was normal without redness, effusion, or active inflammation. He further noted that plaintiff had no difficulty in getting on and off the examining table. No pulmonary tests were performed because plaintiff refused to do them. Dr. Baxi found nothing clinically to support plaintiff's claims of shortness of breath and fatigue. Dr. Baxi also found little to support plaintiff's complaints of pain because of her refusal to fully cooperate during the examination.
On June 11, 2002, another consultative examination was performed. This was performed by Steven B. Jenkins, D.O. Plaintiff came to the examination with Mason Williams, her "social security representative." Dr. Jenkins stated that plaintiff refused to fill out an examination questionnaire because she said she was in "too much pain." She further refused to remove her shoes so that her height and weight could be obtained. Finally, she refused to put on an examination gown. Dr. Jenkins noted that her "representative" interrupted numerous times during the examination. He stated that plaintiff and her representative were uncooperative and argumentative during the examination. Plaintiff related that she had a history or carpal tunnel syndrome. She stated that she had been treated with injections, but that she had had no surgeries. She told Dr. Jenkins that her pain was the equivalent of a ten on a scale of one to ten, with ten being excruciating pain. She indicated that she could not cook, clean or vacuum. After answering some additional questions, plaintiff and her representative terminated the examination and left Dr. Jenkins' office. The examination was not completed.
At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff testified that her claim for disability benefits was based upon pain from carpal tunnel syndrome. She noted that she also suffered back pain, but she believed that it was associated with the pain from her carpal tunnel condition. She indicated that she had the ability to walk only about 50 to 100 feet, to stand for about five minutes, and to sit for only 10 to 15 minutes. She stated that she experiences pain when she goes beyond any of the aforementioned periods. She is unable to do housework, cooking or shopping. She does some reading, watches some television and does some visiting.
Plaintiff said that "everything" aggravates the pain in her wrists, hands and arms. Over the years, she has taken several medications for pain, but she is presently using only non-prescription medications. She has not had any surgery for her condition because she does not believe that surgery would help. She also noted that she has trouble sleeping because of the pain.
Michael Wiseman, a vocational expert, testified that plaintiff's past relevant work as a grinder and material processor was medium, semi-skilled work. Mr. Wiseman indicated that her present residual functional capacity as set forth by the ALJ would not allow her to do her prior work. He stated, however, that plaintiff could perform certain sedentary, semi-skilled jobs with her skills. He determined that plaintiff could perform multiple jobs, including telephone solicitor, telephone answering operator, assignment clerk and credit card clerk. He further indicated these jobs exist in substantial numbers in the regional and national economies.
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff did not suffer from a listed impairment, but that she did have a severe impairment. He found that plaintiff's testimony concerning her limitations was not totally credible. He decided that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity for a range of sedentary activities with lifting or carrying limitations of tens pounds; no overhead work; no climbing; no vibration tools; no repetitive grasping; and avoidance of frequent flexion, twisting, torquing, extension, pushing, pulling, and repetitive or extended periods of use of the upper extremities. He determined that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, but that she did have transferrable skills. He found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to do a significant range of sedentary work. He concluded that plaintiff's exertional limitations prevented a full range of sedentary work, but determined, based upon the medical-vocational grids, that she could perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ decided this case at step five and concluded that plaintiff was not disabled.
IV.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. She asserts that the ALJ (1) did not follow the appropriate legal standards; (2) did not properly consider her reaching restrictions with her upper extremities; and (3) did not adequately consider Dr. Summerhouse's walking restrictions. She argues that the ALJ would have found her disabled if he had properly considered these matters. She further notes in support of her position that the State of Kansas has found her "totally disabled."
The court has undertaken a thorough review of the medical evidence and determined that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff does suffer from some physical impairments, but we are not persuaded that she is disabled by them. The ALJ carefully examined the medical reports and considered the relevant portions of them. None of the doctors that examined plaintiff suggested that she was disabled. Rather, most of the doctors indicated only that any work performed by plaintiff would have to include certain limitations. The ALJ considered these limitations in determining that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform certain jobs. The court notes the walking restriction indicated by Dr. Summerhouse, but as correctly pointed out by the government, this restriction is not supported by objective medical evidence in the record.
The court also finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the credibility of plaintiff. In evaluating the credibility of a claimant, an ALJ must consider and weigh a number of factors in combination. See Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1988). The court recognizes that the ALJ is "`optimally positioned to observe and assess witness credibility.'" Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Casias v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)). Therefore, the court may overturn such a credibility determination only when there is a conspicuous absence of credible evidence to support it. See Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992). The court finds that the ALJ's credibility determination of plaintiff's testimony was properly linked to substantial evidence in the record.
Finally, the court notes that the determination of disability by the State of Kansas is not binding on the Commissioner. See Musqrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1992). The court is confident that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the denial of disability and supplemental benefits. Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings be hereby denied. The court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Judgment shall be entered for defendant and against the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.