Opinion
05-28-1886
RIENZLE and others v. BARKER and another.
Potter & Nixon, for complainants. James R. Hoagland, for defendants.
Objections to answer for insufficiency.
A bill was filed to disclose fraud between father-in-law and son-in-law, charging that lands were conveyed to the latter for the purpose of defrauding creditors, and without consideration. Answer simply denies the charges.
Potter & Nixon, for complainants.
James R. Hoagland, for defendants.
BIRD, V. C. The bill shows that complainants obtained a final decree in this court against Riely, one of the defendants, upon which execution was issued, and a levy made upon two tracts of land which had been conveyed by Riely to the other defendant, Barker, the son-in-law of Riely. The answer admits that these allegations may be true, but asserts that the defendants have no knowledge of said matters except from the bill of complaint, and says the complainants are left to make proof thereof. I think this is insufficient. If bills in equity may be answered in this summary and evasive manner, then farewell to every effort to compel the defendant to speak from his conscience; farewell to all efforts at discovery; farewell to all efforts to oblige defendants to disclose, not only what they know, from original sources or self-knowledge, but from other sources, as by information from others, or to disclose beliefs. Beliefs are often of the highest importance,—the main source or spring of human action. How significant these observations are in cases like this I Creditors are seeking to disclose an alleged fraud perpetrated by father-in-law and son-in-law. Is it not of chief importance for them to know, to the fullest extent, what knowledge, what information, and what belief each of the actors have in respect to every fact alleged in this bill? The information or belief may be slight, indeed; yet if, in such case, the defendant has any, however slight, it may be enough to fasten upon him the gravest responsibilities, or to limit the issues or the extent of the inquiries. I think the chancellor has pronounced judgment in such case in Reed v. Cumberland Ins. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 146, 153, 154; Story, Eq. Pl. § 854.
The bill charges that the debtor conveyed his lands to his son-in-law for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and without any consideration. The answer simply denies these statements. Such answer comes very far short of the rule. What was the transaction that was free from all fraud? The facts will show whether it was for a valuable consideration and bona fide or not. The bill in such case can only be answered by the defendants' showing both hands.
As to objections to paragraphs 7 and 8, I will remark that if the first five paragraphs be fully answered, then the answer to 7 and 8 will be complete enough as an answer and as a defense as far as is necessary. These observations do not apply, of course, to so much of the language of these paragraphs as is deemed impertinent. The answer would impeach or qualify the decree of this court obtained in a cause in which the present answering defendant was a party, and had every chance to be heard. That decree is the foundation of this suit. For the defendantin this suit, who was also defendant in that, to intimate that such decree was or is in any manner unjust, is clearly impertinent.
The objector points out other defects in the answer. They are radical, and cannot be disregarded.
All of the objections are entertained. The defendants must pay costs. They will be required to answer fully.