Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 14-0275
04-21-2015
H. LORRAINE RIENDEAU; LEONARD A. RIENDEAU, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. THOMAS, THOMAS & MARKSON, P.C.; BENJAMIN C. THOMAS; MONIQUE A. SIMPSON; KIMBERLY A. BAXTER; AND CHARLES H. HOUSTON, III, Defendants/Appellees.
COUNSEL H. Lorraine Riendeau and Leonard A. Riendeau, Yuma Plaintiffs/Appellants In Propria Persona Zanon Law Offices, Phoenix By Daniel A. Zanon Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400CV201001521
The Honorable Lawrence C. Kenworthy, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL H. Lorraine Riendeau and Leonard A. Riendeau, Yuma
Plaintiffs/Appellants In Propria Persona
Zanon Law Offices, Phoenix
By Daniel A. Zanon
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Randall M. Howe joined. DOWNIE, Judge:
¶1 Lorraine Riendeau ("Wife") and Leonard Riendeau ("Husband") (collectively, "Appellants") appeal from the denial of their motion for reconsideration. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Our factual recitation relies, in part, on earlier appellate decisions. See Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 CA-CV 09-0202, 1 CA-CV 09-0203, 2010 WL 711200 (Ariz. App. Feb. 25, 2010) (mem. decision), and Riendeau v. Thomas, Thomas & Markson, P.C., No. 1 CA-CV 11-0719, 2012 WL 4566598 (Ariz. App. Oct. 2, 2012) (mem. decision).
¶2 In 2006, Appellants sued Wal-Mart for personal injuries Wife allegedly sustained at a Wal-Mart store. Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 CA-CV 09-0202, 1 CA-CV 09-0203, 2010 WL 711200, at *1, ¶ 2 (Ariz. App. Feb. 25, 2010) (mem. decision) ("Riendeau I"). Appellees represented Wal-Mart. The case was subject to compulsory arbitration, and the assigned arbitrator awarded Wife $3000 but denied Husband's claims. Id. Appellants appealed to the superior court. Id. at ¶ 3.
¶3 The superior court entered summary judgment against Husband. Id. Wife moved for sanctions based on alleged disclosure violations. Id. at ¶ 5. The court denied her motion, and Wife later refused to participate in further proceedings, including the trial. Id. at ¶ 8. The superior court dismissed her claims for failure to prosecute and awarded Wal-Mart attorneys' fees ("2009 Judgment"). Id. This Court affirmed the 2009 Judgment in Riendeau I.
¶4 After the mandate issued in Riendeau I, Appellants sued Appellees, alleging fraud in connection with the disclosure violations that Wife had asserted in Riendeau I. Riendeau v. Thomas, Thomas & Markson, P.C., 1 CA-CV 11-0719, 2012 WL 4566598, at *1, ¶ 5 (Ariz. App. Oct. 2, 2012) (mem. decision) ("Riendeau II"). The superior court granted Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling: (1) the alleged fraud did not injure Appellants; and (2) collateral estoppel barred Appellants' claims. Id. at ¶ 6. This Court affirmed and awarded attorneys' fees to Appellees, finding the appeal to be "without merit." Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
¶5 Pursuant to the mandate in Riendeau II, the superior court entered a judgment against Appellants for the costs and attorneys' fees that this Court had awarded ("2013 Judgment"). Appellants moved to set aside the 2013 Judgment, but the superior court denied their motion in a signed order filed December 16, 2013. On January 13, 2014, Appellants filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and Demand of Proof of Jurisdiction." Among other things, Appellants argued the 2009 and 2013 judgments were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion by signed order filed January 28, 2014. On February 25, 2014, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the January 28, 2014 order.
DISCUSSION
¶6 This Court has an independent duty to examine its own jurisdiction. See Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 226, 902 P.2d 830, 832 (App. 1995). Not all orders issued after final judgment are appealable. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(2) (jurisdiction over "special orders" issued after judgment); Williams v. Williams, 228 Ariz. 160, 168, ¶ 11, 264 P.3d 870, 874 (App. 2011). To be appealable, a special order after judgment must raise different issues than those that could have been raised by appealing the underlying judgment. Arvizu, 183 Ariz. at 226-27, 902 P.2d at 832-33. Applying these legal tenets to the facts here, we conclude that the only issue properly before us is Appellants' challenge to the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction.
¶7 Appellants did not timely appeal the 2013 Judgment or the order denying their motion to set aside the 2013 Judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(e) (motion for reconsideration is not a time-extending motion); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Vagnozzi, 132 Ariz. 219, 221-22, 644 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (1982) (to be a tolling motion, a motion must refer to appropriate rule and describe grounds set forth in that rule; alternatively, if trial court specifically treats a motion as one under the tolling rules, it is considered a tolling motion). But even if the motion for reconsideration were a time-extending motion, the 2013 Judgment merely implemented the Riendeau II mandate, ordering Appellants to pay the costs and fees that this Court had awarded. The superior court had no authority to ignore or alter this Court's mandate. See Francis v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 192 Ariz. 269, 271, ¶ 10, 963 P.2d 1092, 1094 (App. 1998) (superior court is bound by decisions of court of appeals). Even if the 2013 Judgment had been timely appealed, it would not enable Appellants to re-litigate the majority of the substantive claims set forth in their opening brief.
¶8 Subject matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, was raised in Appellants' motion for reconsideration, and it may be challenged at any time. See Health for Life Brands, Inc. v. Powley, 203 Ariz. 536, 538, ¶¶ 11-12, 57 P.3d 726, 728 (App. 2002). "Subject matter jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine a general class of cases to which a particular proceeding belongs." State ex rel. Milstead v. Melvin, 140 Ariz. 402, 404, 682 P.2d 407, 409 (1984).
¶9 The superior court clearly had jurisdiction to hear and decide the arbitration appeal and to issue the underlying judgments and orders. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14 (vesting superior court with original jurisdiction in "cases in which the demand or value of property in controversy amounts to one thousand dollars or more"); A.R.S. § 12-133(H) (parties may appeal arbitration awards to superior court). Appellants conflate the concept of subject matter jurisdiction with allegedly erroneous legal rulings. See Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230, 235, 619 P.2d 739, 744 (1980) ("[V]oid is not synonymous with wrong or erroneous."); In re Adoption of Hadtrath, 121 Ariz. 606, 609-10, 592 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (1979) ("An allegation of fraud does not attack the court's jurisdiction to decide a case. . . . [A] judgment obtained by fraud is not void but merely voidable.").
¶10 We affirm the order denying Appellants' motion for reconsideration.
¶11 Appellees seek an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1) and ARCAP 25, arguing this appeal is frivolous. An appeal is frivolous or made without substantial justification when the claim "constitutes harassment, is groundless and is not made in good faith." Reynolds v. Reynolds, 231 Ariz. 313, 318, ¶ 16, 294 P.3d 151, 156 (App. 2013).
¶12 Appellants present no meritorious legal claims and seek to litigate issues that are not properly before us and that have been decided against them repeatedly in prior proceedings. Appellants have grossly expanded the legal proceedings that commenced in 2006, unduly burdening opposing parties and the judicial system in the process. We therefore award Appellees their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.