Opinion
SC 164081 COA 352197
03-10-2023
KEVIN J. RIEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENDALL W. RIEMAN, Defendant-Appellee
Tuscola CC: 19-030597-CK
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice, Brian K. Zahra, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
ORDER
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 18, 2021 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals finding that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of frauds. The alleged oral agreement purports only to address profits from sale proceeds generated from real estate transactions, as opposed to creating or transferring an interest in the real estate itself. Price v Nellist, 316 Mich. 418, 422 (1947). We REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether a question of fact exists as to whether the parties had a post-2015 sale oral agreement. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
VIVIANO, J. (dissenting).
I would deny leave to appeal in this case. Although plaintiff alleged that he was involved in an ongoing business venture with defendant, he provided no evidence that the venture engaged in any new business activities subsequent to 2015, when he and his then-wife deeded their interest in the Tuscola County property to defendant and his wife. In addition, plaintiff provided no evidence to support his allegation that an oral agreement was entered after the 2015 sale or that he continued to provide strategic planning and legal services for the parties' business venture. Instead, Paragraph 11 of his affidavit makes it clear that as part of the 2015 transfer agreement, he believed he had retained an interest in the property subsequent to the 2015 transfer (either by entitlement to one-half of any subsequent sale proceeds or by executing a new deed reflecting his interest), despite the clear terms of the warranty deed and purchase agreement. I agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiff's claim that his oral agreement-and not the parties' duly executed written documents-reflected the true nature of the parties' agreement is barred by the statute of frauds.
ZAHRA, J., joins the statement of VIVIANO, J.