Section 1 of that statute guaranteed full and equal accommodations to all persons. Section 2 provided that a denial of the rights secured by § 1 on the basis of race was a misdemeanor. See Riegler v Holiday Skating Rink, Inc, 393 Mich. 607; 227 N.W.2d 759 (1975). The statute originally was aimed at preventing the propagation of "separate but equal" public facilities.

The fifth count of plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleges a violation of Michigan's public accommodations law, MCL 750.146; MSA 28.343. The statute reflects the Legislature's special concern for eliminating discrimination based on race, creed or color. Riegler v Holiday Skating Rink, 393 Mich. 607, 610-611; 227 N.W.2d 759 (1975). The law provides that all persons within the state jurisdiction "shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of", among other facilities, "stores".

We hold that defendant's business is within the purview of that language. See Riegler v Holiday Skating Rink, Inc, 393 Mich. 607; 227 N.W.2d 759 (1975), and Magid v Oak Park Racquet Club Associates, Ltd, 84 Mich. App. 522; 269 N.W.2d 661 (1978) (assuming, without deciding, that tennis clubs were places of public accommodation within the meaning of §§ 146 and 147). We turn next to an analysis of whether a so-called "safety exception" should be read into the equal accommodations act so as to modify its facially absolute prohibition against discrimination on account of blindness.

Similarly, Michigan statutes enacted pursuant to Art. I § 2 also require some specifically designated form of discrimination. The case of Riegler v. Holiday Skating Rink, 393 Mich. 607, 227 N.W.2d 759 (1975) held that M.C.L.A, 750.146 and 750.148 should be read together so that the scope of prohibition is restricted to denials of equal accommodations based on race, creed or color. [ See also Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 (1890).PART 4