Cause will not be remanded for additional findings where such additional findings would not affect the judgment entered. Shawver v. Shawver, 25 Idaho 70, 136 P. 436; South Boise Water Co. v. McDonald, 50 Idaho 409, 296 P. 591, 593; Parker v. Shell Oil Co., 29 Cal.2d 503, 175 P.2d 838, 844; Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okl. 603, 239 P.2d 778, 783. A co-tenant making alleged improvements on property must recover, if at all, on the basis of the enhanced value of the property, and not upon the basis of the alleged cost of the improvements.

Quinton v. Webb, 207 Okla. 133, 248 P.2d 586, 589 (1952); Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okla. 603, 239 P.2d 778, 782 (1952); In re Blackhawk's Estate, 195 Okla. 390, 158 P.2d 168 (Syllabus 1) (1945);

An action of equitable cognizance will not be set aside unless the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, and there is a presumption in favor of the trial court's findings. Reliable Life Insurance Co. of St. Louis v. Cook, 601 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1979); Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okla. 603, 239 P.2d 778 (1952). Additionally, the Commissioners contend that Hillcrest's claim exceeds the debt limitation provisions found in the Oklahoma Constitution, Article 10, Section 26, and 62 O.S. 1981 § 310.1[ 62-310.

After reviewing the evidence this Court cannot say that the finding of the trial court as to the property's market value was against the clear weight of the evidence. Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okla. 603, 239 P.2d 778 (1952). Appellant complains the trial court erred in refusing to consider as evidence a resale of the property twenty-five days after the property was sold in foreclosure for a price of $1,043,825.06.

We see no reason for further comment on the so-called "Dead Man's Statute" because an examination of the record reveals that there was other evidence sufficient to establish the alleged contract and the admission of the testimony, even though it may have been inadmissible, was harmless. Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okla. 603, 239 P.2d 778. In considering the enforcement of oral contracts to devise property we have many times held that the proof thereof must be so cogent, clear and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its terms and character. Robinson v. Haynes, 147 Okla. 95, 294 P. 803; Pancoast v. Eldridge, 134 Okla. 247, 273 P. 255; Clemons v. Clemons, 193 Okla. 412, 145 P.2d 928; Holt v. Alexander, 207 Okla. 140, 248 P.2d 228; Majors v. Majors, Okla., 263 P.2d 1012; Loflin v. Capps, Okla., 327 P.2d 443. The complete performance on the part of the one seeking to avail himself of the benefits of the oral contract takes the case out of the statute of frauds.

" A like rule with reference to witnessed written instruments generally, was reiterated in Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okla. 603, 239 P.2d 778. The writing in the case of Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 P. 1111, 50 L.R.A., N.S., 536, cited by plaintiffs, is altogether different from the instrument in this case and the holding there is not in point. Ernest Ned's testimony also indicates that Georgia John, an Indian woman who helped care for Elsie Ned when she was a child, was instrumental in getting John Ned to make his will in Elsie's favor, but we cannot say that such testimony, as against the statements in the will, including the testator's acknowledgment before a United States Commissioner, sufficiently established that Ned's execution of the will was involuntary to render the above rule inapplicable and the trial court's judgment contrary to law and clearly against the weight of the evidence.

This finding finds strong support in the recital in the 1967 contract for deed which was signed by Orel and which declared that the parties were "husband and wife." Cases holding such declarations to be competent evidence of marriage include Red Eagle v. Cannon, 201 Okl. 511, 208 P.2d 557 (1949); Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okl. 603, 239 P.2d 778 (1952); and Linsey v. Jefferson, 68 Okl. 156, 172 P. 641 (1918). Even though Ora later contradicted that declaration by the recital in the 1972 quit claim deed, her confirmation of marriage in the earlier deed is entitled to more weight than her denial in the later deed. Vann v. Vann, 186 Okl. 42, 96 P.2d 76, 78 (1939); 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 45, p. 907.