Opinion
Civil Action 20-200E
10-12-2023
THEODORE RIDGEWAY, Plaintiff, v. DR. LETIZIO; DANIEL STROUP, PA; SUPERINTENDENT CLARK; and MS. WEBB, Unit Manager, Defendants.
Susan Paradise Baxter District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ECF NO. 101
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Theodore Ridgeway brings this counseled prisoner civil rights action arising out allegations that he suffered injuries from falling down the stairs after prison officials failed to assign him to a bottom tier cell while he needed crutches. ECF No. 6.
Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Dr. Letizio and Daniel Stroup (“Stroup”) (collectively, the “Medical Defendants”). ECF No. 101. For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part the Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
Plaintiffs claims arise out of his incarceration at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). During the relevant time, he was assigned to a cell on the top tier of the housing unit. ECF No. 100 ¶ 119.
On July 6, 2018, Plaintiff sought medical attention from Stroup for pain and swelling in his foot. Id. ¶ 107. Plaintiff reported this had happened before, and it “waxes and wanes,” but he currently could not walk on his foot. Id. ¶ 8. Stroup prescribed Motrin and counseled Plaintiff on drinking water. He also ordered blood work to determine if Plaintiff had gout and scheduled a follow-up visit in one week. Id. ¶¶ 8, 107; ECF No. 100-3 at 84.
On July 11, 2018, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Caruso regarding his inflamed and painful toe. Id. ¶ 9. According to his medical records, Dr. Caruso noted that Plaintiff was using crutches to walk. Id. Medical staff instructed Plaintiff on how to use the crutches and adjusted the height for him. Id.
The record does not reflect when Plaintiff was issued the crutches. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Stroup informed him that he would issue crutches after Plaintiff had his blood work on July 6, 2018, and that he received his crutches from medical on that day. ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 3-4.
Later that day, Plaintiff fell down the stairs. Id. ¶ 110. He was evaluated and treated for injuries after the fall. Dr. Letizio ordered Plaintiffs transfer to the hospital emergency room for treatment. Id. ¶ 10.
In the Joint Statement of Material Facts, the parties have detailed medical records related to Plaintiff s medical care before and after this fall. Because Plaintiff only opposes summary judgment as to any claim arising out of the Medical Defendants' failure to provide him with a bottom tier housing assignment in light of his foot symptoms and use of crutches, the Court does not include facts regarding Plaintiffs post-fall medical care or any medical care unrelated to the incident at issue.
According to Dr. Letizio, while others contribute to the decision of whether an inmate is assigned to a top or bottom tier cell, medical staff has a say, and ultimately “leads the way,” in making this decision. ECF No. 100-3 at 5. He also testified that inmates with certain conditions, including those unable to walk or using crutches, should be assigned to a bottom tier cell. Id.; ECF No. 100 ¶¶ 113, 115.
Plaintiffs cellmate, Michael Carr, testified that Plaintiff told him he was trying to request a bottom tier cell assignment. ECF No. 100 ¶ 121. Despite his medical issues, Plaintiff was not reassigned to a lower tier cell before his fall.
2. Legal Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights. He also brings claims for negligence, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (‘TIED”). ECF No. 6 at 4; id ¶¶ 29-30, 41, 59, 69, 73-75; ECF No. 103 at 3.
Plaintiff prepared and filed his Complaint before he obtained counsel. While certain of Plaintiff's claims were not clearly pleaded as separate legal claims, the Medical Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has sufficiently asserted the four claims listed above. ECF No. 102 at 3 (identifying pending claims); see also ECF No. 47 at 4 (Report and Recommendation discussing Plaintiffs claims as pleaded at motion to dismiss stage).
3. Procedural History
Plaintiff lodged his Complaint in this action on July 16, 2020, without submitting a filing fee or Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”). ECF No. 1. After the Court issued a Deficiency Order, Plaintiff requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 2 and 3. The Court granted Plaintiffs IFP Motion on September 15,2020, and his Complaint was filed the same day. ECF Nos. 4 and 6.
The Medical Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint on December 23, 2020. ECF No. 33.
Defendants employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “Corrections Defendants”) and Dr. Hartwell moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claims. ECF Nos. 16 and 31. The undersigned submitted Reports and Recommendations as to the Motions to Dismiss, which the Court adopted. ECF Nos. 47, 51, 53 and 55. Asa result, the Court granted in part the Corrections' Defendants Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiffs claims against Defendants John E. Wetzel (“Wetzel”), Mike Edwards (“Edwards”), Jeri Smock (“Smock”), and the Medical Department of SCI-Albion, claims for retaliation and/or falsifying documents against the Corrections Defendants, and Plaintiffs claims against the Corrections Defendants in their official capacities. ECF No. 51. The Court also granted the Motion to Dismiss as to Dr. Hartwell, dismissing Plaintiff s claims against Dr. Hartwell but granting Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint as appropriate. ECF No. 55. Plaintiff did not elect to amend his Complaint.
After resolving the Motions to Dismiss, the Court entered a Case Management Order. ECF No. 57. Discovery was scheduled to end by October 8, 2021. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff s request to extend the discovery deadline until December 17, 2021. ECF Nos. 67 and 68.
In October 2021, counsel entered an appearance for Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 69 and 70. Plaintiff then requested two more extensions of time to complete fact discovery, which the Court granted until June 17, 2022. ECF Nos. 71, 72, 74 and 75.
On March 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Defendants Dr. Hartwell, Edwards, Smock, Capt. Campbell, Sgt. Bell, Sgt. Putnam, COI Buzzio, COI Bromley, COI Powell, COI Hall, Nurse Blair, Wetzel, the Medical Department of SCI-Albion, and “Both Shift Commanders.” ECF No. 105. As a result, the only remaining defendants are: Medical Defendants Dr. Letizio and Stroup and Corrections Defendants Superintendent Clark and Ms. Webb. Id. at 1 n. 1.
Although Plaintiff included Dr. Hartwell, Wetzel, Edwards, Smock, and the Medical Department of SCI-Albion in the Notice of Voluntaiy Dismissal, those Defendants were previously dismissed when the Court granted their Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 51 and 55.
4. Motion for Summary Judgment
After fact discovery was completed, the Medical Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support on March 17,2023. ECF Nos. 101 and 102. The parties also filed a Joint Concise Statement of Material Facts. ECF No. 100. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 2023, together with a proposed order. ECF Nos. 113 and 114. The Medical Defendants then filed a Reply. ECF No. 118.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is now ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof'). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. N.J. Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001).
C. DISCUSSION
1. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Medical Defendants move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. In his Complaint, Plaintiff complains of wrongdoing relative to: (1) his failure to be assigned to an accessible, bottom tier cell when using crutches, and (2) the medical care he received after his fall. ECF No. 6.
While the Medical Defendants move for summary judgment on both grounds, Plaintiff responds that he is only pursuing a claim arising out of his cell assignment. ECF No. 102 at 1314; ECF No. 114 at 1, 8. Thus, the Court should grant the Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to any Eighth Amendment claim relating to Plaintiff s post-fall medical care.
As for Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim related to his cell assignment, the Medical Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted because there is no evidence of their deliberate indifference. ECF No. 102 at 13-14. Rather, they argue, failure to issue an order for bottom tier/bottom bunk status is, at best, a “mistake that sounds in negligence.” Id. The Medical Defendants also argue there is no evidence that Stroup ever issued crutches to Plaintiff or knew he was using them; Dr. Letizio was not involved in Plaintiffs medical care until after he fell; and the record does not show either Medical Defendant was actually involved in deciding Plaintiff s cell assignment. ECF No. 118 at 2.
In response, Plaintiff argues that the Medical Defendants were on notice of Plaintiff s medical condition before his fall. Plaintiff also contends that medical staff had control over housing assignments, and it was both known and obvious that inmates using crutches should be, and regularly were, housed on the bottom tier. Based on this, Plaintiff argues that the Medical Defendants were deliberately indifferent in violation of Plaintiff s Eighth Amendment rights. ECF No. 114 at 6-10.
a. Claim against Dr. Letizio
Upon review, Plaintiff cannot establish an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Letizio because of his lack of personal involvement. In a civil rights claim, as here, individual government defendants must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing and “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior."' Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) (quoting Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also Millbrook v. United States, 8 F.Supp.3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014). “Rather, state actors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316.
Based on the record, Plaintiff proffers no evidence to suggest that Dr. Letizio was personally involved in Plaintiffs medical care or housing decisions before he fell. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Letizio.
b. Claim against Stroup
The Court next considers Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim against Stroup. The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const, amend. VIII. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to provide inmates adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to guarantee” their safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1984) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
In his Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff suggests two theories of liability under the Eighth Amendment: (1) deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; and (2) deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement. ECF No. 114 at 6. As discussed below, Plaintiff cannot establish that Stroup violated the Eighth Amendment under either theory because the record does not show he acted with deliberate indifference.
(1) Deliberate indifference to serious medical need
The Court first considers Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. In order to establish a violation of Plaintiff s constitutional right to adequate medical care, the evidence must show: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) acts or omissions by Defendants that indicate a deliberate indifference to that need. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Fac., 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 582 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In the medical context, “[d]eliberate indifference may be manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, ... or ‘persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.'” Josey v. Beard, No. 06-265, 2009 WL 1858250, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2009) (citing Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64,68 (3d Cir. 1993); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103,109 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
“Mere misdiagnosis or negligent treatment is not actionable under § 1983 as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “The deliberate indifference ‘test affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients.'” Beckett v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 597 Fed.Appx. 665, 668 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)). “[W]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Williams v. Fedarko, 807 Fed.Appx. 177,180 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)). Thus, “deliberate indifference is generally not found when some level of medical care has been offered to the inmate.” Josey, 2009 WL 1858250, at *6 (citing Clark v. Doe, No. 99-5616, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) (“[C]ourts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care.”)).
Upon review, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment against Stroup as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The record reflects that Stroup was attentive to Plaintiffs medical needs. He examined Plaintiff, ordered blood work to check for gout, prescribed medicine, and scheduled a follow up visit for additional care. While Stroup did not recommend a cell reassignment, this fact cannot by itself establish his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff s medical need. See Matthews v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 613 Fed.Appx. 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (medical defendants' refusal to recommend cell reassignment to lower tier for inmate with cast and crutches was at most negligence where they were otherwise attentive to his medical care). Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim against Stroup based on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
(2) Deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement
Plaintiff also suggests that Medical Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his conditions of confinement-specifically, that they failed to prevent harm to him, given that he was housed on a top tier despite needing crutches. ECF No. 114 at 6, 9-10. To establish this claim, Plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: “(1) objectively, the alleged deprivation must have been ‘sufficiently serious,' in that the ‘inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;' and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind' manifesting ‘deliberate indifference' to the inmate's health or safety.” Spillman v. Kollman, No. 3:18-cv-1568,2019 WL 4930141, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7,2019) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
“Deliberate indifference” in this context is a subjective standard: “the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). It is not sufficient that the official should have known of the risk. Id. at 133. A plaintiff can, however, prove an official's actual knowledge of a substantial risk to his safety “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. In other words, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id.Cameron v. Swartz, No. 2:17-cv-00816, 2020 WL 7496317, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2020).
Upon review, Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence to establish the subjective component of this claim. Stroup treated for Plaintiff for complaints of a painful, swollen foot five days before he fell. While Plaintiff argues that it is “obvious” being housed on an upper tier poses a safety risk for an inmate who needs crutches, there is no evidence that Stroup knew that Plaintiff was housed on an upper tier. Plaintiff does not point to evidence, for example, that he notified Stroup of his cell assignment or requested reassignment, or that information about his cell assignment was included in his medical records. Based on this, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement as to Stroup. See, e.g., Spillman, 2019 WL 4930141, at *5 (prison doctor's failure to recommend cell reassignment for inmate using crutches was not deliberately indifferent where inmate did not inform prison doctor of his upper bunk/upper tier housing status or share his concerns about his housing status before he fell); Garza v. Wellpath Med., No. 21-1179, 2023 WL 2588169, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2023) (inmate who fell down stairs after medical professional gave him crutches and inspected his ankle failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement where he did not allege that medical professional was involved in his housing assignment or knew he was assigned to the top tier). Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim against Stroup.
While Plaintiff refers the Court to Dr. Letizio's testimony about the role medical staff play in recommending cell assignments for medical reasons, Dr. Letizio noted that medical staff “kind of don't know where inmates are housed usually before.” ECF No. 100-4 at 6.
2. IIED and Retaliation Claims
The Medical Defendants also argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor as to Plaintiffs retaliation and IIED claims. ECF No. 102 at 14-21. In response, Plaintiff withdraws these claims against the Medical Defendants. ECF No. 114 at 10. Therefore, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff s retaliation and IIED claims.
3. Negligence Claim
The Medical Defendants acknowledge there are four pending claims, including a negligence claim, and they request the entry of summary judgment as to all claims. ECF No. 102 at 3. As Plaintiff points out, however, the Medical Defendants do not proffer any argument in support of summary judgment as to the negligence claim., ECF No. 114 at 6 n. 1. Because this issue has not been briefed for the Court's consideration, the Court should deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claim for negligence against the Medical Defendants.
On the contrary, the Medical Defendants suggest their alleged oversight in failing to assign Plaintiff to a bottom tier cell could, at best, be characterized as negligent. ECF No. 102 at 14 (“Assuming arguendo this to be true, failure to issue and order for bottom tier/bottom bunk status only amounts to nothing more than mere negligence and not deliberate indifference”).
As discussed, Medical Defendants do not dispute there is a pending negligence claim. To the extent Plaintiff asserts that “[a]ccording to the Court's opinion on Defendants' prior Partial Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 102), Plaintiffs negligence claims survive,” however, the Court notes that the Medical Defendants did not file a motion to dismiss and the document at ECF No. 102 does not relate to any motion to dismiss.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 101, should be granted in part and denied in part. The Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims against the Medical Defendants, except that the Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied as to any negligence claim.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.