Id. Shortly after Thompson, the Appellate Court clarified that the burden of proving unclean hands rests upon the party asserting the defense, when it held, in Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn.App. 321, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002), that “[t]he party seeking to invoke the clean hands doctrine to bar equitable relief must show that his opponent engaged in wilful misconduct with regard to the matter in litigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

“A stipulated agreement is in the nature of a contract.” Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn.App. 321, 338, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002). “A judgment rendered in accordance with the stipulation of the parties is to be construed and regarded as a binding contract.... Construction of such an agreement is an issue of fact to be resolved by the trial court as the trier of fact.... The construction and interpretation of the agreement necessarily depends upon the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the agreement.... Where the language of the agreement is unclear, the trier of fact must look to other factors to determine the parties' intention.”

As Tejany notes, application of the doctrine of unclean hands requires a showing of "wilful misconduct." Defs.' Opp. at 12 (Doc. No. 41) (quoting Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn. App. 321, 335 (2002)). In another context, the Connecticut Supreme Court has defined "wilful misconduct" as "intentional conduct designed to injure for which there is no just cause or excuse."

"Whether there was a breach of contract is ordinarily a question of fact." Town of Ridgefield v. Eppolti Realty Co., Inc., 71 Conn. App. 321, 338 (2002) (quoting Paulus v. Lasala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 153 (1999)). That said, if the "facts are undisputed . . . the question becomes one appropriate for summary judgment."

The existence of a breach is "`ordinarily a question of fact.'" Id. (quoting Town of Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn. App. 321 (2002)). Both sides seem to agree that Lin requested and was promised a salary of $14.50 following his promotion to chef in 2005, thus creating an oral wage contract. Lin Affidavit ¶ 10; Brennan Dep. 110:8-12.

"Whether there was a breach of contract is ordinarily a question of fact." Town of Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., Inc., 71 Conn. App. 321, 338 (2002). Saye claims that he has followed the terms of the Shareholder Agreement, whereas OHP insists that Saye has not conformed to the contract's terms.

Decided September 19, 2002 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 71 Conn. App. 321 (AC 20491), is denied. Paul L. Bollo, in support of the petition.

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn. App. 321, 334–35, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002). Our Supreme Court has stated that "[a]pplication of the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Whether a waiver has occurred is a question of fact for the trier of fact. See Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co. , 71 Conn. App. 321, 340, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002). An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co. , 71 Conn.App. 321, 328, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002). An understanding of the law and history of establishing highways in this state provides a useful background for our resolution of the plaintiffs' claim.