But restrictive covenants in employment contracts may work only a partial restraint of trade, and they are enforceable if they are reasonable, founded on valuable consideration, reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests, and do not unduly prejudice the public's interest. Riddle v. Geo-Hydro Engineers, 254 Ga. App. 119, 120 ( 561 SE2d 456) (2002). The provision at issue is found in paragraph 6.2 of Malice's employment contract. It provides, in pertinent part, that if Coloplast decides to exercise its right to invoke the clause, after notice, for two years after termination of his employment Malice
Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court's injunction order supported by these erroneous legal conclusions, but we otherwise affirm the order. Riddle v. Geo-Hydro Engineers, 254 Ga. App. 119, 121 ( 561 SE2d 456) (2002). We note that our finding that the agreement's nonsolicitation and noncompetition clauses were unenforceable has no bearing on the issue of whether the agreement's confidentiality clause was enforceable.
Georgia does not follow the "blue pencil" doctrine of severability in construing employment contracts. Therefore, because one restrictive covenant in Brown's agreement is unenforceable, they are all unenforceable. Riddle v. Geo-Hydro Engineers, 254 Ga. App. 119, 121 ( 561 SE2d 456) (2002); Advance Technology Consultants v. Road-Trac, 250 Ga. App. at 320-321(2). Judgment affirmed. Ruffin, C.J., and Bernes, J., concur.
The trial court erred in granting the injunction based on the unenforceable non-solicitation paragraph of the agreement. Pregler, supra; see Riddle v. Geo-Hydro Engineers, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 119, 121 ( 561 S.E.2d 456) (2002).Judgment reversed.
Yet, the interest in upholding the sanctity of contracts may still be protected without the imposition of a preliminary injunction. In addition, the Court recognizes that, under Georgia law, restraints on trade are disfavored. See, e.g., Riddle v. Geo-Hyrdo Eng'rs, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("'A contract in general restraint of trade or which tends to lessen competition is against public policy and is void.'" (citation omitted)).
In Georgia, nonsolicitation agreements are invalid if they do not "limit the purpose for which [the employee] may not solicit [the employer's] clients."Riddle v. Geo-Hydro Eng'rs, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 119, 120 (2002). Here, the nonsolicitation covenant limits the purpose for which Jones may not solicit EMG customers.
CompareHoward Schultz & Assocs. of the Southeast, Inc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 184(2), 236 S.E.2d 265 (1977) (holding, in context of a covenant not to compete, that it was unreasonable because the employee was prohibited from working in any capacity for a competitor and because it failed “to specify with any particularity the nature and kind of business which is or will be competitive with the employer”). FN19. CompareRiddle v. Geo–Hydro Engineers, Inc., 254 Ga.App. 119, 120, 561 S.E.2d 456 (2002) (holding that nonsolicitation covenant was overbroad when it did not limit purpose for which former employee could not solicit clients, prohibited former employee from selling unrelated items, and went beyond what was necessary to protect former employer's business interests); Advance Technology Consultants, Inc. v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga.App. 317, 322(4), 551 S.E.2d 735 (2001) (holding that covenants were unenforceable when “in neither [was] the prohibition against contacting or pursuing [former employer's] clients restricted to efforts competitive with [former employer], but each simply prohibit[ed] contact for any purpose” (emphasis supplied)). FN20. SeeBaggett, 231 Ga.App. at 298(3)(c), 498 S.E.2d 346; see alsoSysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 225 Ga.App. 584, 588(2), 484 S.E.2d 323 (1997) (“An ‘indirect’ solicitation occurs when the former employee undertakes ‘some affirmative action on his part that could be considered a solicitation in the broadest possible sense.’ ”