Opinion
Civil No. 02-CV-74202-DT
May 30, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Marcel Riddle, ("Petitioner"), presently confined at the E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility in Muskegon Heights, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his application, filed by pro se, Petitioner challenges the legality of his conviction of one count of second degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317, and one count of felony firearm, M.C.L. § 750.227b. Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in the Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit. Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen to thirty years imprisonment for the murder conviction and a mandatory, consecutive two year prison term for felony firearm. Petitioner raises claims of improper jury instructions. The Court concludes for the following reasons that the petition must be denied.
II. Procedural and Factual Background
Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in the Detroit Recorder's Court of second degree murder and felony firearm. Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen to thirty years in prison for murder and a mandatory consecutive two years imprisonment for felony firearm.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions in his appeal of right. People v. Riddle, 2000 WL 33405938, Mich. Ct. App. No. 212111 (October 13, 2000). The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and affirmed Petitioner's convictions in a published opinion. People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 467 Mich. 116 (2002).
On or about October 18, 2001, Petitioner filed the his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court, raising the following claims for relief: (1) the federal constitutional law was applied unreasonably by the courts below when no jury instruction was given relative to the issue of there being no duty to retreat in one's home; (2) Petitioner was entitled to a castle exception jury instruction, since he was in his own home at the time of the incident and was entitled to defend his home; (3) the jury was not properly instructed regarding the mens rea requirement for a second degree murder conviction; and (4) the majority of American jurisdictions reject the duty to retreat rule; and most jurisdictions that recognize that rule of law make an exception for acts which occur within the curtilage.
Respondent has answered the Petition and asserts that Petitioner's claims fail because the state courts are the final arbiters of state law. The question of whether to require a willing participant in mutual combat, which escalates into sudden deadly combat outside the non-aggressor's home, to retreat as far as safely possible before resorting to deadly force is a matter of state law only.
The Michigan Supreme Court summarized the facts of petitioner's case and his jury instruction claim as follows:
On the evening of August 15, 1997, defendant and two friends, Robin Carter and James Billingsley, convened at defendant's home. The three men were in the backyard just outside defendant's house, in the driveway near a detached garage, when defendant shot Carter in the legs eleven times with an automatic carbine rifle. After shooting Carter, defendant immediately drove to the Detroit River, where he disposed of the rifle. Carter, who did not have a weapon in his possession, was resuscitated at the scene but died as a result of the gunshot wounds three days later.
Although the facts in the preceding recitation are undisputed, at defendant's trial on charges of first-degree murder and felony-firearm the prosecution and the defense presented different versions of the events leading to the shooting. Billingsley testified for the prosecution that after Carter made a disparaging comment about defendant's fiancee, defendant went into the house, came back outside armed with a rifle, and began firing at Carter. Billingsley stated that Carter was not armed and did not approach defendant when he came out of the house with the weapon. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he intervened in an argument between Carter and Billingsley and that he told Carter, whom he considered to be "the more aggressive one," to leave. Seeing a "dark object" in Carter's hand and believing it to be a gun, defendant immediately reached for his rifle, which he testified was in his detached garage. Defendant stated that he aimed the rifle at Carter's legs and pulled the trigger, intending only to scare him.
Defendant requested that the jury be instructed, pursuant to CJI2d 7.17, that there is no duty to retreat in one's own home before exercising self-defense. The prosecution objected, contending that the instruction was not appropriate because the shooting took place outside the home, in the curtilage. Although defendant attempted to withdraw his request for CJI2d 7.17, the trial court proceeded to rule that the instruction was not appropriate under the circumstances of the case. The trial court instead instructed the jury, in accordance with CJI2d 7.16, as follows: "If a person [assaulted the defendant in the defendant's own home/forcibly entered the defendant's home], the defendant did not have to try to retreat or get away. Under those circumstances, the defendant could stand [his] ground and resist the [attack/intrusion] with as much force as [he] honestly and reasonably believed necessary at the time to protect [himself]."
By law, a person must avoid using deadly force if he can safely do so. If the defendant could have safely retreated but did not do so, you can consider that fact along with all the other circumstances when you decide whether he went farther in protecting himself than he should have.
However, if the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that it was immediately necessary to use deadly force to protect himself from an [imminent] threat of death or serious injury, the law does not require him to retreat. He may stand his ground and use the amount of force he believes necessary to protect himself.People v. Riddle, 467 Mich at 121-23. ( footnotes omitted).
IV. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because Petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).
Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) ; see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 409-11 ( emphasis in original); see also, Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685; 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1849-50 (2002).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the following additional guidance for determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief:
Under rules set down in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Antiterrorism Act" or "Act"), a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas to a petitioner in state custody with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (1994 Supp. VII), or (2) the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." Id. § 2254(d)(2).
The Act sets a higher hurdle for those seeking habeas than before, but it does not require that the Supreme Court must have previously decided the very case that a lower court has before it. In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court warned that "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" refers to Supreme Court decisions, not those of lower federal courts, and "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629, 637-38 (6th Cir. 2001). At the same time, clearly established law under the Act encompasses more than just bright-line rules laid down by the Court. It also clearly includes legal principles and standards enunciated in the Court's decisions. As the Court stated, a state court decision makes "an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent" when the court "unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply . . ." but, it is important to emphasize, the Court said at the same time that a lower court also errs when it "unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has warned lower federal court to be cautious in finding that a state court has decided "contrary to, or made an unreasonable application of' clearly established federal law. Under the Act, a state court's decision will be contrary to Supreme Court precedent only if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or if the state court "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" and arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court. Id. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Similarly restrictive is the Court's guidance on what constitutes an "unreasonable application" of federal law. It is not enough that a state court correctly identified a governing legal principle, but mistakenly applied it; a federal court should only issue a writ if the state court's application was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850-51 (6th Cir. 2002) ( emphasis added).
With this standard in mind, the Court proceeds to address the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
V. Discussion
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process of law and a fair trial when the state courts found that he was not entitled to the "castle exception" instruction, which states that "there is no duty to retreat in one's own home before exercising self-defense." Riddle, 467 Mich. at 122.
The Michigan Supreme Court resolved this matter as follows:
Defendant, who was outside his home in the driveway or yard between the home and a detached garage at the time of the homicide, contends that he was wholly excused from any obligation to retreat because he was in his "castle." We disagree and hold that the castle doctrine, as it applied in this state and as was codified in our murder statute in 1846, applies solely to the dwelling and its attached appurtenances. Although many courts have extended the castle exception to other areas, we conclude that there is simply no basis in the case law of this state, contemporaneous with the enactment of our initial murder statute, to justify extending the rule in this manner.People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. at 135.
The Michigan Supreme Court also found that:
Defendant was not entitled to a "castle exception" instruction in this case because he was in his yard and not in his dwelling when he used deadly force. However, defendant was entitled to an instruction that adequately conveyed to the jury that, although he was required to avoid using deadly force if possible, he had no obligation to retreat if he honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death and that it was necessary to use deadly force in self-defense. The standard jury instruction that was given adequately imparted these principles.People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. at 142-43.
All four of Petitioner's claims boil down to whether he was entitled to the no duty to retreat in one's own home jury instruction, or the "castle exception" instruction. Because this is a matter of state law and the Michigan appellate courts are the final arbiters of state law questions, Petitioner's claim that he was denied a fair trial because the jury was not instructed that the "castle exception" applied to his case does not entitle him to habeas relief.
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, which have not been demonstrated to the Court, the highest court of a State is the final arbiter of questions regarding the law of its state. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Since under Michigan law as interpreted by the highest court of the State, the "castle exception" applies "solely to the dwelling and its attached appurtenances," People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. at 135. The evidence established that Petitioner's garage was detached and that he was in his yard or driveway, not his house or his garage, at the time of the fatal shooting, he was not entitled to the "castle exception" instruction. Petitioner's claim is a state law claim which is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus and does not merit relief.
One well established rule, not altered by the AEDPA, is that "[a] federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 875, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984)); see also Floyd v. Alexander, 148 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir.) (concluding that violation of a state law is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1025, 119 S.Ct. 557, 142 L.Ed.2d 464 (1998). Petitioner's claim is based on a perceived error of state law; he contends that the Michigan Supreme Court has erroneously failed to extend the "castle rule" to the curtilage surrounding his dwelling. This is an example of a state law question which may not form the basis of habeas relief.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not require a judge to charge on an issue which is not fairly presented by the evidence in the case. Pavkovich v. Brierley, 360 F. Supp. 275 (W.D.Pa. 1973), aff'd. 493 F.2d 1401 (3rd Cir. 1974); Kregger v. Bannan, 170 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.Mich. 1959), aff'd. 273 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1960). Under the facts of this case, petitioner was not entitled to the castle exception because he was not in his "castle," that is, his dwelling, when the shooting took place.
It follows that Petitioner's conviction must stand unless it can be said that these substantive rules of Michigan law somehow violate substantive due process. Petitioner cites no authority in support of his argument that they do; and this Court perceives no basis for so concluding. On rare occasions, federal courts are permitted to reexamine a state court's interpretation of its own law when it appears to be an "obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue." Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129, 65 S.Ct. 1475, 1480, 89 LEd. 2092, 2100 (1945). This is not such a case.
Additionally, Petitioner was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial. See Lundy v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 467, 469-70 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2212 (1990). Petitioner's claim, that the trial court's instructions to the jury were inadequate, does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation because he has not shown that the instructions given, taken as a whole, were so infirm that they rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977).
In the present case, the trial judge instructed the jury that:
By law, a person must avoid using deadly force if he can safely do so. If the defendant could have safely retreated but did not do so, you can consider that fact along with all the other circumstances when you decide whether he went farther in protecting himself than he should have.
However, if the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that it was immediately necessary to use deadly force to protect himself from an [imminent] threat of death or serious injury, the law does not require him to retreat. He may stand his ground and use the amount of force he believes necessary to protect himself.People v. Riddle, 467 Mich. at 141.
This instruction was adequate to provide Petitioner a fundamentally fair trial within which to present his claim of self-defense. This is an additional, alternative reason why Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
VI. Order
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.