Opinion
EP-22-CV-00263-DB-MAT
02-08-2024
JOSE RICO, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION1 Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MIGUEL A. TORRES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jose Rico (“Plaintiff”) appeals from a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act. On August 17, 2022, Senior United States District Judge David Briones referred this case to the undersigned for review and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C to the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff is 27 years old and, in the past, worked as a custodian and a warehouse worker. Tr. of Admin. R. at 46 [hereinafter, “Tr.”], ECF No. 12. On November 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for SSI and on November 17, 2020, Plaintiff also filed a Title II application for DIB. Tr. at 35. In both applications, Plaintiff alleged his disability commenced on October 1 Martin O'Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O'Malley should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit. 29, 2019. Tr. at 246. He claimed disability due to a low back injury he suffered at work after he lifted a table off a stage. Tr. at 249. On March 8, 2021, Plaintiff's claims were denied, and again upon reconsideration on May 25, 2021. Tr. at 35. Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Regina Sobrino held a hearing by telephone on December 13, 2021, and later issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claims on January 31, 2022. Tr. at 29-48. Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision, which was denied by the SSA's Appeals Council on April 29, 2022. Tr. at 1. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner at that time. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to a determination of whether (1) the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record and (2) the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sun v. Colvin, 793 F.3d 502, 508 (5th Cir. 2015). In applying the “substantial evidence” standard, “the court scrutinizes the record to determine whether such evidence is present,” id., but it may not “try the issues de novo” or “reweigh the evidence,” Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018). “[N]or, in the event of evidentiary conflict or uncertainty,” may the court substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's, “even if [it] believe[s] the evidence weighs against the Commissioner's decision.” Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018). “Conflicts of evidence are for the Commissioner, not the courts, to resolve.” Sun, 793 F.3d at 508. “A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision.” Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2016).
Generally, “[w]here . . . the Secretary has relied on erroneous legal standards in assessing the evidence, he must reconsider that denial.” Leidler v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1989). However, even if the ALJ commits legal error, “remand is warranted only if the . . . error was harmful.” Miller v. Kijakazi, No. 22-60541, 2023 WL 234773, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Shineski v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407-08 (2009)); see also Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required. This court will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected.”). “Harmless error exists when it is inconceivable that a different administrative conclusion would have been reached even if the ALJ did not err.” Keel v. Saul, 986 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2021). It is the plaintiff's burden to show prejudice or harm from the error. Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2012).
B. Evaluation Process
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(i). In evaluating a disability claim, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential process to determine whether: (1) the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; (2) the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from performing other substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ determines the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The RFC “is the most [the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determines the RFC by examining “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). When using medical opinions as evidence, the ALJ must assess the persuasiveness of such evidence in her opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(a). Persuasiveness is based on a number of factors that the ALJ must consider, but the ALJ is only required to articulate “supportability” and “consistency” in her decision. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). “Supportability” means that a medical opinion is “more persuasive” when it is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and explanations provided by the source. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). “Consistency” means that medical opinions are “more persuasive” when it coincides “with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2). In other words, “supportability looks internally to the bases presented by the medical opinion itself” while “consistency is an external inquiry that juxtaposes a medical opinion to other evidence in the record, including opinions of other medical professionals.” Probst v. Kijakazi, No. EP- 22-CV-00286-RFC, 2023 WL 3237435, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 3, 2023) (citing Sharon H. v. Kijakazi, No. 5: 21-CV-167-H, 2022 WL 3951488, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2022)). The ALJ then uses the claimant's RFC in making determinations at steps four and five. Id. § 404.1520(e).
“[A]n individual claiming disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act has the burden of proving her disability.” Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, the claimant carries the burden of proof through the first four steps. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1989). “However, if after proceeding through the first four ... steps, the claimant shows that he is unable to return to his past work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to meet the fifth and final step.” Guillen v. Astrue, 584 F.Supp.2d 930, 934 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Anderson, 887 F.2d at 632).
C. The ALJ's Findings
In this case, at step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 29, 2019, his alleged disability onset date. Tr. at 37. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's “degenerative disc disease, lumbar stenosis, neuropathy, obesity, and hypertension” constituted severe impairments. Id. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's reported headaches, neck pain, and depression were not medically determinable impairments. Tr. at 37-38. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. at 38.
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC:
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) with the following additional limitations: the option to use cane for walking, but with a cane can use the free hand to lift and carry up to the sedentary exertional limits; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of stairs and ramps, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no balancing as that term is defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its companion publications; no exposure to hazards such as unprotected elevations or dangerous moving machinery; no concentrated exposure to vibration; and no foot or leg controls.Tr. at 39. At the fourth step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could “not perform past relevant work as a custodian ... [or] warehouse worker, ... as they are actually or generally performed.” Tr. at 46. At step five, considering the Plaintiff's relatively young age, college education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that “jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” Tr. at 47. The ALJ also relied on the vocational expert testimony that given all of these factors Plaintiff would be able to perform representative occupations such as inspector, sorter, and assembler. Id. Considering the ALJ's findings, she determined Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act from October 29, 2019 (his alleged disability onset date), through January 31, 2022 (the date of the ALJ's decision). Tr. at 48.
D. Analysis
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision on one ground: that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical opinion of Dr. Daren McCalla, M.D. Pl.'s Br. 6, ECF No. 15. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is based on legal error because ALJ's supportability and consistency analysis of Dr. McCalla's medical opinion are legally insufficient. Id. at 13. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ did not provide a sufficient explanation, the Court cannot undertake a meaningful review of whether her reasoning was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 6, 910.
While the ALJ must explain how she considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source's medical opinions,
[t]here is little authority discussing what an ALJ must do to adequately explain supportability and consistency nor have courts found that “magic words or [a] specific amount of explanation [is] required.” .. However, the ALJ's discussion on supportability and consistency must be ample enough “to permit meaningful judicial review.” .. When the ALJ's “decision reflects consideration of these two factors as well as a review and analysis of the objective record,” this is generally deemed sufficient. ... See also Ray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 4: 21-cv-1709, 2022 WL 3566844, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (finding that “although the ALJ did not specify which pieces of evidence in the record and evidence at the hearing [the doctor's] opinion is inconsistent with, the ALJ outlined in detail Plaintiff's testimony, his reported daily activities, and his medical records before evaluating the medical opinions.”).Ida D. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-00206-BU, 2022 WL 19518458, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2022) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-206-H-BU, 2023 WL 2474210 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023). The ALJ's explanation of persuasiveness must “enable[] the court to undertake a meaningful review of whether his finding with regard to the particular medical opinion was supported by substantial evidence” and must not “require the [c]ourt to merely speculate about the reasons behind the ALJ's persuasiveness finding or lack thereof.” Probst, 2023 WL 3237435, at *4 (citing Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 587 F.Supp.3d 489, 499 (S.D.Miss. 2021)).
More generally, the “ALJ does not need to comment on every piece of evidence, but only must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the final determination.” Price v. Astrue, 401 Fed.Appx. 985, 986 (5th Cir. 2010). While many decisions use the above-stated rules to conclude that the ALJ properly evaluated the supportability and consistency factors, even when the ALJ's decision is not very comprehensive, at least one court has concluded that the ALJ did not provide enough of an explanation for its evaluations, which were “conclusory” in nature:
While the ALJ is only required to show consideration of supportability and consistency in rejecting parts of a medical expert's opinion, the ALJ must do this in such a way that the Court understands the ALJ's reasons for rejecting an opinion. Lara, 2022 WL 4486085, at *13. Here, the ALJ's conclusory discussion of supportability and consistency leaves the Court incapable of properly reviewing her decision.Donna B. O. v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 5004504, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5004142 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2023); see also Id. at *5 (“The [c]ourt should not be required to infer which limitations the ALJ finds unsupported and inconsistent with the record.”).
The general proposition on this point from these cases-that the ALJ's articulation of the supportability and consistency factors need not be comprehensive, but must be more than conclusory-is supported by the SSA's comments on the proposed rules that were codified in the regulation:
[We must] include in a determination that is not fully favorable to an individual, a statement of the case, in understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the reason(s) upon which we based the determination or decision. The intent of the statute was not to impose a burdensome articulation requirement.
Revisions to Rules Regarding Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844, 5859 (Jan. 18, 2017).
An ALJ is deemed to have implicitly rejected an opinion that they do not mention in their decision if their conclusions are inconsistent with the opinion. See Kneeland v. Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 759 (5th Cir. 2017) (treating the ALJ's decision to base his RFC off other medical opinions as a rejection of a contrary medical opinion that he did not mention in the decision).
1. Supportability of Dr. McCalla's Opinion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to articulate the “supportability” of Dr. McCalla's medical opinion. Pl.'s Br. at 17-18. Here, the ALJ considered Dr. McCalla's medical opinion from October 7, 2020, and concluded that it was unpersuasive. Tr. at 46. In his opinion, Dr. McCalla, opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff “could frequently and occasionally lift and/or carry less than ten pounds; walk less than two hours in an 8-hour workday; and sitting was not affected.” Tr. at 43. Dr. McCalla also opined that Plaintiff's “abilities to push and/or pull with the lower extremities were affected by [Plaintiff's] impairment ... and [Plaintiff] could occasionally kneel and crouch, and could never climb ladders . crawl, or stoop.” Id. (emphasis added). The ALJ reasoned that Dr. McCalla's opinion was unpersuasive because there were “few treatment records from this provider and . the limitations regarding pushing/pulling with the lower extremities were nonspecific.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in the analysis of the supportability factor because “standing alone, having a ‘few treatment records' from a provider is not a sufficient basis to outright reject a medical opinion.” Pl.'s Br. at 17. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ's notes that “the record contained few treatment notes from Dr. McCalla and his recommended lower extremity pushing/pulling limitations were ‘nonspecific'” indicate that the ALJ “considered the factors of supportability and relationship with the Plaintiff.” Br. in Supp. of Comm'r's Decision 6 [hereinafter, “Comm'r's Br.”], ECF No. 17. Additionally, the Commissioner alleges that the “ALJ may also properly consider a medical source's relationship with the [Plaintiff], as the ‘frequency of [Plaintiff's] visits with the medical source may help demonstrate whether the medical source has a longitudinal understanding of [Plaintiff's] impairments.'” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(3), 416.920c(c)(3)).
The Court finds the ALJ's supportability assessment for Dr. McCalla's opinion to be deficient. First, the Court notes that the Commissioner's response cites to a different factor, “relationship with the claimant,” when explaining why few treatment notes indicate a form of supportability analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(3). Next, the record in this case contains two medical opinions from Dr. McCalla. The ALJ only addressed the “supportability” factor in his decision as to certain limitations. That opinion does not relate to the limitations discussed in the opinions of Dr. McCalla that the ALJ departed from in his RFC analysis. Specifically, the ALJ's supportability analysis of Dr. McCalla's opinion only concerns his conclusion regarding pushing and pulling with the lower extremities. Tr. at 46. The ALJ did not address, however, Dr. McCalla's opinions that Plaintiff could not crawl or stoop, which he implicitly rejected when he concluded, in his RFC, that Plaintiff could occasionally crawl and stoop. Tr. at 39.
Under the revised regulations, ALJs “are not required to articulate how [they] considered each medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding from one medical source individually.” 20 CFR § 404.1520c(b)(1). “Instead, when a medical source provides multiple medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), [ALJs] will articulate how [they] considered the medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings from that medical source together in a single analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id. However, even in cases governed by the new regulations, the Fifth Circuit held that “[a]n ALJ usually cannot reject a medical opinion without some explanation.” Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, while an ALJ need not address each medical opinion of a single medical source individually, the analysis must still adequately explain why certain medical opinions were rejected.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the ALJ may adequately address their rejection of a medical opinion by either specifically addressing that opinion, or by providing a more general discussion of supportability and consistency for all opinions of that source that adequately explains the rejection, even if the rejected opinion is not specifically mentioned. What the ALJ cannot do, as was done here, is to only include an analysis of supportability and consistency that specifically addresses certain opinions, but does not address, directly or indirectly, medical opinions that the ALJ rejects. Absent any explanation for the rejection of these opinions, “the Court is left to speculate why [Dr. McCalla's] records fail to support his medical opinion.” Probst v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 3237435, at *4 (W.D. Tex. May 3, 2023) (citing Miller v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 234773, at *3 & n.2). The ALJ erred by not including a discussion of the supportability factor that adequately explained why she rejected Dr. McCalla's opinion regarding the two limitations-no crawling or stooping-that she reached a different conclusion on. Accordingly, the ALJ failed to bridge the gap between the evidence and her supportability determination, and without such guidance, the Court is left to speculate why Dr. McCalla's records fail to support his medical opinion.
2. Consistency of Dr. McCalla's Opinion
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to articulate the “consistency” factor in Dr. McCalla's medical opinion. Pl.'s Br. at 14. After considering Dr. McCalla's opinion, the ALJ determined the opinion unpersuasive because the “objective findings in longitudinal treatment records do not fully support the limitations identified.” Tr. at 45-46. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “simply provided a conclusory statement that it was inconsistent with the longitudinal record” without explaining what precisely in the medical opinion was inconsistent with the longitudinal record. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that the “ALJ seemingly adopted limitations in the RFC that were almost entirely consistent with the doctor's opined limitations.” Pl.'s Br. at 14.
In response, the Commissioner posits that the ALJ's “RFC finding differs from Dr. McCalla's opinion in two key aspects.” Comm'r's Br. at 7. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform the exertional requirements of sedentary work, while Dr. McCalla's “opinion is consistent with the ability to perform less than sedentary work.” Id. Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff could “occasionally” climb stairs and ramps, crawl, and stoop. Id. In contrast, Dr. McCalla opined that Plaintiff “could never” climb, crawl, or stoop. Id. Throughout in the ALJ's decision, the ALJ discussed the inconsistency in Plaintiff's disabling symptoms and limitations. For example, the ALJ states in her opinion, “allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations for 12 continuous months ... are not fully supported by the objective medical evidence of record .... The claimant had decreased range of lumbar spine motion, and decreased strength and sensation were reported at some examinations. At other examinations strength was 5/5 and sensation was described as intact.” Tr. at 45 (citing Exhibits 1F, 4F, 5F, 6F, 9F). The Commissioner argues there is ultimately substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination. Comm'r's Br. at 9.
The Court reviews the ALJ's explanation regarding lack of consistency and finds that it is supported by substantial evidence. See Tr. at 39-46. Because the ALJ sufficiently explains the connection between her consistency determination and the record evidence, her consistency assessment meets the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c requirements. See Cooley, 587 F.Supp.3d at 499 (holding that the ALJ's failure to provide any detail explaining how a medical opinion was wholly inconsistent with the entire record “fell short of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (b)(2)'s ‘explanation' demands”); Miller v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 234773, at *3 & n.2 (finding that the ALJ failed to provide enough explanation to meet the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c requirements).
3. Harmless Error
In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit recently specified that, to show prejudice from an ALJ's failure to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c articulation requirements, the plaintiff must “show that if the ALJ had given further explanation [of the medical opinion at issue], then she would have adopted them.” Miller, 2023 WL 234773, at *4. Otherwise, the plaintiff would “essentially [be] asking [the court] to reweigh the evidence to show that she was prejudiced by the ALJ's failure to explain, which [the court] cannot do.” Id. (citing Garcia, at 704). The Court reads Miller as a specific application of the broader principle that harmless error “exists when it is inconceivable that a different administrative conclusion would have been reached even if the ALJ did not err.” Keel, 986 F.3d at 556.
Plaintiff argues that Dr. McCalla's opinion is, “in fact, consistent with the longitudinal record,” and thus the “ALJ's determination ... is unpersuasive, misleading, and the entirety of the analysis of Dr. McCalla's opinion is tainted.” Pl.'s Br. at 13. Plaintiff highlights the lack of mention in the persuasiveness analysis and RFC of limitations regarding “no crawling” and “no stooping.” Id. at 15. Further, Plaintiff contends that “if the ALJ analyzed the limitation to ‘no stooping' and found it to be persuasive, then the case would have had a completely different outcome, and the Plaintiff would be found disabled.” Plaintiff supports this argument by stating that “SSR 96-9 dictates that a complete inability to stoop would significantly erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the individual is disabled would usually apply.” Id.
Plaintiff concedes that the “ALJ accounted for each and every single other limitation assessed ... even accounted for pushing and pulling limitations with the lower extremities ... despite finding that specific limitation unpersuasive because it was nonspecific.” Id. at 16. The Commissioner argues that “Dr. McCalla's opinion that Plaintiff could not crawl or stoop would not undermine the ALJ's step five finding in this case.” Comm'r's Br. at 8. Specifically, the Commissioner says, “a restriction to crawling is not usually required in sedentary work and would not usually erode the occupational base for unskilled sedentary work.” Id. (citing SSR 96-9p, at *8). The Commissioner further notes that although SSR 96-9p provides that “a complete inability to stoop would significantly erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the individual is disabled would usually apply,” SSR 96-9p also provides that consulting a vocational resource can be useful “for cases where the individual is limited to less than occasional stooping.” Id. at 8. The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ relied on the vocational expert's testimony that Plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy such as “inspector, sorter, and assembler.” Id. (citing relevant sections of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)). Moreover, the Commissioner asserts that the “DOT provisions that correspond to all three positions reveal that crawling and stooping” is not required. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff does not show that, had the ALJ properly assessed the supportability of Dr. McCalla's opinion, the ALJ would have adopted the opinion, and that such a turn of events could conceivably lead to a different outcome in Plaintiff's case. Miller, 2023 WL 234773 at *4 (noting plaintiff fails to show how the ALJ's error was harmful where the ALJ considered the medical opinions but the ALJ's error was that she did not provide sufficient explanation of her consideration of the medical opinions); Keel, 986 F.3d at 556 (holding that plaintiff failed to overcome the harmless error rule where the ALJ failed to consider the effect of some of her non-severe impairments in combination with her other impairments). Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to speculate that the ALJ meant to adopt Dr. McCalla's opinion since it was “nearly identical,” but “reject[ed] the medical opinion as a whole ... [to] avoid one limitation in the doctor's opinion that could be completely work preclusive.” Pl.'s Br. at 12. More importantly, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently. Id. at 15. As discussed, the Court cannot reweigh the evidence on judicial review. Salmond, 892 F.3d at 817. Regardless of the extent to which the ALJ found Dr. McCalla's opinion persuasive, she need not account for every limitation opined by Dr. McCalla, such as that regarding stooping and crawling. See Fletcher v. Comm'r, SSA, No. 4:21-CV-00173-SDJ-CAN, 2022 WL 3130860, at *8 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2022) (collecting cases holding that “[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ adopt any single medical opinion in its entirety”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-173-SDJ, 2022 WL 3107905 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2022); Wilson v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-3964, 2022 WL 17742005, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022) (collecting cases holding that “[t]he ALJ is not required to create an RFC that corresponds exactly with the medical opinions of record”), report and recommendation adopted, No. H:21-3964, 2022 WL 17738736 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2022). Thus, Plaintiff does not show that the ALJ's erroneous supportability assessment was prejudicial. The Court further finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Therefore, remand is not warranted.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
SIGNED and ENTERED.
NOTICE
FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOREGOING REPORT, WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS OF SERVICE OF SAME, MAY BAR DE NOVO DETERMINATION BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE OF AN ISSUE COVERED HEREIN AND SHALL BAR APPELLATE REVIEW, EXCEPT UPON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR, OF ANY UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS MAY BE ACCEPTED OR ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.