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Ricky S. v. Superior Court

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
Jan 6, 2020
No. A158762 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2020)

Opinion

A158762

01-06-2020

RICKY S., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEL NORTE COUNTY, Respondent; DEL NORTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. JVSQ19-6032)

Ricky S. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services as to his infant son and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on February 26, 2020. Father challenges the adequacy of the reunification services provided by the Del Norte County Department of Health & Human Services (the department) in the six months following his son's detention. We find no error and shall deny father's petition.

All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Background

On March 7, 2019, a petition was filed alleging that the child came within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged that the mother and child had tested positive for methamphetamine at the birth less than a week before, that father has been unable or unwilling to intervene or prevent mother from using illegal substances during the pregnancy, and that the parents were living in a trailer without access to running water, power or heat. At a hearing the following day, the court ordered the minor detained. At an uncontested jurisdiction hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petition. The court also found that the infant was not an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).

On May 6, the court ordered that the child be placed in a foster home with reunification services to parents. Father's case plan required that he complete a parenting class, obtain safe and stable housing for the child, and demonstrate his ability to live free from drug dependency. The court also ordered supervised visitation for not less than five hours a week.

In advance of the six-month review hearing, the department gave father notice of its recommendation to terminate services. The department's report on the services provided in relevant part: "While both parents attended the 8 weeks of parenting class, they did not retain the information. According to the class coordinator and observation of the parents in class by the department, the parents argued in class, they did not listen to instruction at times and could not retain the teachings. . . . [¶] [Parents] visit[ed] with their son . . . five days a week for two hours per day. They moved from 5 hours per week to 10 hours per week in May 2019. The visits are supervised at Family Connections. The parents, since given extra visitation time, have a tendency to fall asleep during visits. After the child qualified for Regional Center services, the family was having a Regional Center worker come to visitation to teach the parents how to care for their baby properly, including what toys they should play with with the baby to promote his development, and how to hold, feed, and change his diaper. . . . The worker from Regional Center . . . had concerns regarding [father]. During a visit she was concerned that he was not able to focus, read a book, or participate in the session. She was unsure of the reason why he was not able to participate and wondered if he was under the influence at the time. . . . She also reported that on one occasion the parents would not let the baby sleep during the 2 hour visit because it was father's birthday. [¶] Both [parents] attended their psychological evaluation . . . . [The doctor] made observations about the parents that indicated that they would not be able to safely care for their child. He also did not have any recommendations for further services that would assist the family and the parents in reunification. . . . [¶] He stated . . . about [father]: [¶] ' He is compromised in general lifestyle functioning, and any return of a child to his care would likely result in significant deterioration and long-term damage. Accordingly, in good conscience, reunification between [father] and his child cannot be recommended today.' " The report also indicates that father has consistently tested positive for marijuana throughout the review period and the department opined that father's "parental capacity may be inhibited by [his] continuous consumption of marijuana." Father had not by the filing of the report obtained work or stable housing.

At the hearing conducted on October 28, 2019, the review report was entered into evidence without objection. The two social workers assigned to the case also testified regarding the services they provided the family. Father confirmed that he had completed the required parenting classes and indicated that he would stop using marijuana if his child was returned to his custody. He acknowledged that his housing situation was still not suitable for a baby, but that he was on lists for federal and Yurok subsidized housing.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

Discussion

" 'Reunification services implement "the law's strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible." ' " (Christopher D. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 60, 69.) Accordingly, the department "must make a good faith effort to develop and implement reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family [citation] . . . in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success." (Ibid.)

Where, as here, a child is under the age of three on the date of initial removal from parental custody, reunification services are to be provided for a period of six months with a maximum of 12 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) If, at the six-month review hearing, "the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child . . . may be returned to his or her parent or legal guardian within six months or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing." (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)

Father contends the court erred in terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing because he "did not receive sufficiently adequate services to meaningfully try to help him reunite with his infant son." We disagree.

"The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the agency's efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case." (Christopher D. v. Superior Court, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 69.) To support a finding that reasonable services have been offered, the record should reflect that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972-973.) "We review a reasonable services finding to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling. [Citation.] The burden is on the petitioner to show that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings." (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.)

The record demonstrates the department consistently communicated with father and provided adequate services designed to provide him with the skills needed to safely parent his son. The social worker who managed father's case from the initial intake until approximately one month before the hearing testified in detail to father's special needs and the services provided to him. The social worker who was responsible for the case at the time of the hearing also testified regarding her contacts with the parents in the preceding month. Father's characterization of his social workers as "quite lazy" and "lackadaisical" and their efforts as "marginally skimpy," "lax" and "grossly insufficient" is not supported by the record. To the contrary, his criticism is largely based on mischaracterizations of the record.

The original social worker assigned to the case testified at length regarding the services she provided throughout the case. The sole criticism directed at her was that she could not remember the name of the organization that provided group mental health services to mother. The social worker explained that the mental health providers did an assessment and determined that mother needed "a little more intense help" so she was referred to a group, the name of which she could not remember, that met more frequently. The social worker's inability to remember the name of the service provider hardly demonstrates the services provided father were inadequate.

Father faults his second social worker for having only two "real" meetings with him but fails to note that the social worker had only been assigned to his case for the month prior to the hearing and that, in that one month period, she met with him five additional times in connection with his visitation. Father writes that the social worker's "attitude toward this case was so lackadaisical that when asked what services she provided to the . . . family, she replied, 'I probably need to look at the report.' " Her subsequent comments make clear that to give a complete list of services provided throughout the case she "would need to look at the report to go over everything."

Father's primary contention, it appears, is that the department failed to reach out to the Yurok Tribe, of which mother is an enrolled member, to assist the family with obtaining stable housing. The record does not support his argument. Father's original social worker testified that because she knew that mother was an enrolled tribe member, she reached out to the tribe and was informed that there were no services the tribe could provide to mother other than housing. In April 2019, within a month of the filing of the petition, the social worker provided mother with the contact information for Yurok housing, as well as the forms necessary to obtain other low-income housing. At trial, father testified that he and mother were ninth on the list for Yurok housing. It is unclear what more the department could have done to facilitate the family's attempt to obtain affordable housing.

Father quotes "his sadly quite lazy social worker" as stating that she " 'didn't realize [mother] was a tribal member until today when she told me.' " In fact, it was mother's counsel who made that statement. The testifying witness, the second social worker, testified that she thought she had "heard . . . in passing" of mother's tribal membership and that she had only had the case "for about a month or so" and has been "slightly aware of [mother's membership] in the last little bit."

Father states in his writ petition that the family is now "nearly number one" on the Yurok housing list. We do not question the challenges of obtaining affordable housing, particularly in the limited time frame of a dependency proceeding. We express no opinion regarding whether father's potential movement into Yurok or other housing would support a petition for modification of the order before us.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the department had provided reasonable services or by terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing.

Disposition

Father's petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

POLLAK, P. J. WE CONCUR: STREETER, J.
BROWN, J.


Summaries of

Ricky S. v. Superior Court

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
Jan 6, 2020
No. A158762 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2020)
Case details for

Ricky S. v. Superior Court

Case Details

Full title:RICKY S., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEL NORTE COUNTY…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

Date published: Jan 6, 2020

Citations

No. A158762 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2020)