Opinion
CV-20-00328-JCH-BGM
03-24-2023
Eric Rickus, Petitioner, v. C. Howard,[1] Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald United States Magistrate Judge
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Eric Rickus's (“Petitioner” or “Rickus”)pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed a Return and Answer. (Doc. 25.) No reply was filed. The Petition is ripe for adjudication. This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 8.) As more fully set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the district court, after its independent review, dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1).
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner seeks to compel the Bureau of Prisons to credit his Federal sentence with time he spent in Federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Because Rickus was a state prisoner at the time of his Federal custody pursuant to the writ, and because the time in question was applied toward the satisfaction of his state sentence, the Bureau of Prisons cannot apply the time toward Rickus's Federal sentence. For this reason, Rickus is not entitled to the relief he seeks. The Court, therefore, denies his habeas petition.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. Rickus
Rickus is a Bureau of Prisons inmate, who until recently was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary, in Tucson, Arizona, in service of a 151-month sentence. (Doc. 25-2, Ex. A, Declaration of Forrest Kelly, ¶ 3; Doc. 25-3, Doc. 25-4, Atts. 1-2.) He has since been transferred to another Bureau of Prisons facility. Id.
As of March 2023, it appears Rickus has since been relocated to Pollock USP, in Pollock, Louisiana, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator at www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
B. Rickus's State and Federal Sentences
On July 6, 2010, state authorities in Knox County, Tennessee, arrested Rickus on charges of Bank Robbery by Force. (Doc. 25-2 at 2, Exh. A, ¶ 5; Doc. 29 at 15, Att. 3 at ¶ 65.) At the time of his arrest, Rickus was on parole supervision for two previous robbery convictions in Knox County, Tennessee, and one previous robbery conviction in Blount County, Tennessee. (Doc. 29 at 11-13, Att. 3 at ¶¶ 48-50, 52.) He was released on parole from these convictions on June 18, 2010. Id. On July 13, 2010, the State of Tennessee determined that Rickus had violated his state parole supervision. (Doc. 25-2 at 2, Exh. A, ¶ 6, Doc. 25-5, Att. 4.) Thereafter, the state dismissed the new robbery charge, deferring to the Federal prosecution. (Doc. 25-2 at 2, ¶ 6; Doc. 29 at 15, Att. 3 at ¶ 65.) On August 4, 2010, the United States Marshals Service took custody of Rickus from the Morgan County Correctional Complex in Wartburg, Tennessee, in connection with Federal bank robbery charges in case number 3:10-CR-91. (Doc. 25-2 at 2, Exh. A, ¶ 7; Doc. 25-6, Att. 5 at 13.) Thereafter, Rickus pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee to Bank Robbery by Force, Violence and Intimidation, and on April 14, 2011, the court sentenced him to 151 months of imprisonment. (Doc. 25-2 at 2, ¶ 8; Doc. 25-7, Att. 6 at 1-2.) The Judgment included a recommendation that the sentence imposed should “run consecutive to any undischarged state sentence imposed as a result of the revocation of the defendant's parole.” Id. at 2. The United States Marshals Service returned Rickus to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corrections on May 10, 2011. (Doc. 25-2 at 2-3, ¶ 9; Doc. 25-8 at 2, Att. 7 at 2.) On August 1, 2012, the State of Tennessee Board of Parole released Rickus on parole. (Doc. 25-2 at 3, Exh. A, ¶ 10; Doc. 25-9, Att. 8; Doc. 25-5, Att. 4.) The United States Marshals Service took custody of inmate Rickus on the same date for service of the Federal sentence. (Doc. 25-2 at 3, Exh. A, ¶ 10; Doc. 25-10, Att. 9 at 2, Sec. IV.)
C. Rickus's Sentence Computation
To implement the consecutive Federal sentence, the Bureau of Prisons first determined that Rickus's sentence commenced on August 1, 2012-the date on which he was released from the Tennessee Department of Corrections and taken into Federal custody for service of the sentence. (Doc. 25-2 at 3, Exh. A, ¶ 11; Doc. 25-3 at 2, Att. 1 at 2.) Having identified the sentence commencement date, the Bureau determined whether any of the time Rickus spent in custody prior to the commencement of his sentence can be applied toward his Federal sentence as prior custody credit. (Doc. 25-2 at 3, Exh. A, ¶ 12.) Bureau of Prisons policy implements the Federal law, which provides that a defendant “shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences-- (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.” (Doc. 25-2 at 3, ¶ 12; Doc. 25-11, Att. 10 at 1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).) Based on the above Federal law and policy, Rickus's sentence has not been credited with any of the time he spent in Federal custody prior to the commencement of his sentence-including the time he spent in the custody of the United States Marshals service pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus- because the State of Tennessee credited all of the time toward the satisfaction of Rickus's state parole violation sentence. (Doc. 25-2 at 3, Exh. A, ¶ 13; Doc. 25-5, Att. 4; Doc. 2511, Att. 10 at 19-20.) As a result of the above sentence calculation, and assuming he earns all the Good Conduct Time sentence credit for which he is eligible, it is projected that Rickus will satisfy his sentence on October 14, 2023. (Doc. 25-2, Exh. A; Doc. 25-3, Att. 1 at 1, 2.)
II. PETITION
Rickus's sole ground for relief is that the Bureau of Prisons has failed to credit his sentence with the time he spent in Federal custody-from August 4, 2010 until August 1, 2012-pursuant to a Federal writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1 at 4.) He requests that the Court issue a writ to direct the Bureau of Prisons to credit his sentence for the time he spent in custody. (Doc. 1 at 9.)
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A writ of habeas corpus should not issue in this case, because the Bureau of Prisons has calculated Rickus's sentence correctly. Specifically, consistent with controlling law, Rickus's 151-month Federal sentence commenced on the date he was received in custody for service of the term, such that it will run consecutively to his state sentence. Additionally, the period of Federal custody for which Rickus seeks credit was applied toward the satisfaction of his state sentence, and as such, cannot be applied to his Federal sentence. In short, Rickus is not entitled to the relief he seeks, and this petition should be denied.
A. Rickus's Sentence was Calculated Correctly.
The Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, is responsible for computing the amount of prior custody credit an inmate is to receive toward his federal sentence. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992); see also, 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (authorizing Director of Bureau of Prisons to exercise any authority of the Attorney General relating to the commitment, control, or treatment of persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States). This computation occurs once the defendant commences his federal sentence, rather than at the time of sentencing. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333.
Title 18, U.S.C. § 3585 dictates the date on which a federal sentence commences and controls whether time spent in custody prior to the commencement date can be applied to the sentence. Because §3585 controls the calculation of Rickus's sentence in this case, each relevant provision will be addressed in turn, below.
1. Rickus's sentence commenced on August 1, 2012
A Federal sentence “commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). The Ninth Circuit interprets the term “custody” in § 3585(a) to mean that “the federal government has both physical custody of the defendant and the primary jurisdiction necessary to enforce the federal sentence.” Johnson v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2018). Primary jurisdiction in this context “refers to the determination of priority of custody and service of sentence between state and federal sovereigns.” Id. at 759, n. 1 (quoting Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998)). Under the long-standing rule of primary jurisdiction, “the first sovereign to arrest a defendant obtains primary jurisdiction over him as against other sovereigns.” Johnson, 883 F.3d at 762 (citing Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 259 (1922)). When Federal authorities take custody of a State prisoner pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the defendant is not in Federal custody to commence service of a sentence. See Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Crawford v. Jackson, 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C.Cir. 1978)) (“When an accused is transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum he is considered to be “on loan” to the federal authorities so that the sending state's jurisdiction of the accused continues uninterruptedly.”). Thus, a Federal sentence imposed on a state prisoner in Federal custody pursuant to a writ does not necessarily commence when it is imposed. Separately, under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), “if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively.” Additionally, § 3585(a) presumes that multiple terms imposed at different times run consecutively, unless the court “orders that the terms are to run concurrently.” Id. In this case, Rickus's Federal sentence was imposed when he was subject to a parole revocation sentence in the State of Tennessee. (Doc. 25-2 at 2, Exh. A., ¶ 6; Doc. 25-5, Att. 4, ¶ 8; Doc. 25-7, Att. 6 at 2. As a result, and consistent with § 3584(a), the district court recommended in its Judgment that Rickus's 151-month sentence run consecutively to his state parole violation sentence. Doc. 25-2 at 2, ¶ 8; Doc. 25-7, Att. 6 at 2.) Moreover, to the extent the transcript attached to the petition is a true and accurate copy, it appears that the court more ordered as much at Rickus's sentencing. (Doc. 1 at 2933.) As a result, the Bureau of Prisons determined Rickus's Federal sentence to commence on August 1, 2012-the date on which the state of Tennessee relinquished its primary jurisdiction of Rickus, and Federal authorities assumed custody of him for service of his sentence.
2. Rickus is not entitled to credit for time he spent in Federal custody prior to the commencement of his Federal sentence.
Having determined the date on which Rickus's sentence commenced, the Bureau of Prisons can then determine what, if any, prior custody credit can be applied to Rickus's sentence. Section 3585(b) states: “A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences- (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added). As relevant to this case, then, any time Rickus spent in official detention prior to August 1, 2012, may be applied to his sentence, as long as such time has not been applied to some other sentence. See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337. As the Supreme Court noted, by enacting § 3585(b), “Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.” Id.
It is undisputed that at the time Rickus was brought into Federal custody pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, he was in service of a parole violation term in the state of Tennessee, and he was returned to the state authorities after his Federal sentence was imposed. (Doc. 25-2, Ex. A, ¶¶ 6-10; Doc. 25-5, Att. 4; Doc. 25-9, Att. 8.) Rickus's state sentence continued to run until his discharge from State Custody on August 1, 2012. Id., ¶ 10, Atts. 4 & 8. In short, the time in question-August 4, 2010, to August 1, 2012-was applied toward the satisfaction of Rickus's state sentence, and under a plain reading of § 3585(b) and Wilson, such time cannot be applied to Rickus's Federal sentence.
Rickus asserts that the District Court Judge directed that time during which Rickus was in the “physical custody and control of the United States” was to be credited toward Rickus's Federal sentence. (Doc. 1 at 4.) He relies on what purportedly is a transcript of his sentencing, in which the court is reported to have stated, “the Court will further recommend that-actually the court will direct that the defendant receive credit for all of the time he has spent in detention in federal custody pending his sentencing in this case pursuant to 18 United States Code § 3585.” (Doc. 1 at 38.) Rickus's claim is not supported by settled law, and the court's statement does not accomplish what Rickus believes it should.
First, as noted above, the authority to calculate prior custody credit under § 3585(a) rests with Bureau of Prisons once a Federal sentence commences, not with the district court at the time of sentencing. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333; United States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1992) (the prerogative to grant credit under § 3585(b) rests with the Attorney General in the first instance and the credits cannot be calculated until the defendant actually commences serving the sentence). As such, the district court does not have authority to calculate or award such time. In fact, in response to Rickus's motion for the district court to commence his sentence as of the date of his arrest-in essence, to credit his Federal sentence with all of his prior custody time-the district court acknowledged that the authority to determine when a Federal sentence commences, and whether Rickus is entitled to prior custody credit, rests with the Bureau of Prisons, not the Court. See Doc. 45, Order, United States v. Rickus, No. 3:10-cr-091 (E.D.Tenn., July 13, 2015). Second, despite the court's recommendation or direction, the statement references the award of credit should be “pursuant to 18 United States Code § 3585.” See Doc. 1 at 38. As noted above, the Supreme Court stated that the language of § 3585 clearly prohibits an award of double credit. See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337. Where Rickus received credit toward his state sentence for the period of custody in question, Federal law prohibits the Bureau of Prisons from applying that time toward Rickus's Federal sentence. (Doc. 25-2, Exh. A, ¶¶ 6, 12-13.) In short, the time Rickus seeks to have credited toward his Federal sentence was applied toward the satisfaction of his State sentence and therefore cannot be credited toward his Federal sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, a writ of habeas corpus should not issue in this case, and Rickus's petition should be denied.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge enter an order DISMISSING Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:
CV-20-00328-JCH
Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination for the Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties.