We have addressed the dormant mineral statutes in recent years. See, WTJ Skavdahl Land v. Elliott, 285 Neb. 971, 830 N.W.2d 488 (2013); Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952, 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013); Peterson v. Sanders, 282 Neb. 711, 806 N.W.2d 566 (2011); Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010). However, those cases all addressed issues outside the scope of a verified claim.

Legislatures sought to remedy some of those problems by enacting statutes to reunite dormant mineral estates with surface estates." Ricks v. Vap, 784 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Neb. 2010) (footnotes omitted). "Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes are representative of those concerns.

Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-228 et seq., provide that a severed mineral interest shall be considered abandoned if, for a period of 23 years, its "right of ownership" is not publicly exercised by its record owner. Ricks v. Vap, 784 N.W.2d 432, 433 (Neb. 2010). If a severed mineral interest is abandoned, the owner of the surface estate can sue to terminate the mineral interest. Id.

That definition does not control here.Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010).Peterson, supra note 6.

See Schauer v. Grooms, 280 Neb. 426, 786 N.W.2d 909 (2010). 3. Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010). 4. Wheelock & Manning OO Ranches, Inc. v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).

The meaning of a statute is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010). ANALYSIS

When possible, an appellate court determines the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself. See, Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010); Concrete Indus. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 277 Neb. 897, 766 N.W.2d 103 (2009).Cargill Meat Solutions v. Colfax Cty. Bd. of Equal., ante p. 93, ___ N.W.2d ___(2011).

We reject this argument. We give the language of § 70-1014 its plain and ordinary meaning, see Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010), and a sensible construction, see Walton v. Patil, 279 Neb. 974, 783 N.W.2d 438 (2010). We conclude that "most" describes the word "applicant," the protestors misread § 70-1014, and the PRB correctly applied § 70-1014 to the facts of this case.

And we will not read into a statute a meaning that is not there. See, Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010); In re Adoption of Kailynn D., 273 Neb. 849, 733 N.W.2d 856 (2007). See In re Adoption of Kailynn D., supra note 5.

We are guided by principles of statutory construction, which we find equally applicable here as both the meaning of a statute and meaning of a decree present questions of law. See, Ricks v. Vap, 280 Neb. 130, 784 N.W.2d 432 (2010) (meaning of statute is question of law); Strunk v. Chromy–Strunk, 270 Neb. 917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006) (meaning of decree presents question of law). As a general rule, in the construction of statutes, the word “shall” is considered mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Forgey v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 15 Neb.App. 191, 724 N.W.2d 828 (2006). Nonetheless, while the word “shall” may render a particular statutory provision mandatory in character, when the spirit and purpose of the legislation require that the word “shall” be construed as permissive rather than mandatory, such will be done. Id.