Ricks v. City of Philadelphia

Full title: ALFONSO R. RICKS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Jan 3, 2005

Civil Action No. 04-2082 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 04-2082.

January 3, 2005

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARY A. McLAUGHLIN, District Judge

The pro se plaintiff has sued several Philadelphia police officers, the City of Philadelphia, an Assistant District Attorney, and the District Attorney, alleging various civil rights violations, including illegal search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy. The case stems from the plaintiff's arrest for robbery on June 4, 2002, and his pre-trial custody until convicted by a jury on May 28, 2003, of robbery, criminal conspiracy, and unlawful restraint.

All the defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. The police officers and the City of Philadelphia ("the police motion") have joined together in one motion and the Assistant District Attorney and District Attorney ("the District Attorney motion") in another. The police motion argues that all claims should be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that the complaint fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution, that the police officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and that the state law claims against the city are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. The District Attorney motion argues that Heck bars this lawsuit, that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiff's constitutional claims, and that the complaint fails to state individual capacity or official capacity claims against the District Attorney defendants.

The Court will discuss Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), first because it is raised in both motions. In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 487. In order to determine whether a prior criminal conviction requires the dismissal of a subsequent § 1983 action under Heck, the Court must compare the elements required for the initial criminal conviction and the elements the plaintiff seeks to prove in the § 1983 action. Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1997).

In this case, the plaintiff is challenging the constitutional validity of the searches that lead to the seizure of evidence that was introduced in his state court criminal trial. The Supreme Court made clear in Heck that "a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction." 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7;see also Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court, therefore, will deny both motions to the extent they are based on Heck.

The Court will grant the District Attorney motion on other grounds. The wrongdoing alleged in this case is almost exclusively conduct by the police officers. There is no allegation that the District Attorney, herself, knew anything about the conduct at issue here. The plaintiff sued the Assistant District Attorney on a theory that the Assistant District Attorney was supervising the police and sued the District Attorney on the theory that she was supervising the Assistant District Attorney. There are no facts alleged to support either of these theories. In any event, the conduct of the Assistant District Attorney in prosecuting the plaintiff in state court is protected by absolute immunity. All claims against the Assistant District Attorney and the District Attorney will be dismissed.

As to the police defendants, the Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not applicable here. The plaintiff's counsel at his state criminal trial told the state court that his client (the plaintiff here) wanted him to file a motion to suppress, but he was not going to do so because he thought that such a motion would be frivolous. The trial court then refused to hear the motion. Under these circumstances, the Court does not think the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable.

The state law claims against the City will be dismissed because they are barred by the Tort Claims Act. The malicious prosecution count fails to state a claim because the plaintiff was convicted at his criminal trial. Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002). Although principles of qualified immunity may be applicable to this case, it is too early to make a decision on qualified immunity.

An appropriate order follows.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 29^th day of December, 2004, upon consideration of Motion of Defendants Lynne Abraham and Todd Nickischer to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Docket No. 13), the Motion to Dismiss of defendants Police Commissioner Sylvester Johnson, Detective Terrence Sweeney, Lieutenant Richard Thompson, Detective Mike Venson and the City of Philadelphia (Docket No. 14), and the plaintiff's response thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that motion of defendants Lynne Abraham and Todd Nickischer is GRANTED. This case is dismissed against defendants Lynne Abraham and Todd Nickischer.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the motion of defendants Police Commissioner Sylvester Johnson, Detective Terrence Sweeney, Lieutenant Richard Thompson, Detective Mike Venson and the City of Philadelphia is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the malicious prosecution claim against all the police defendants is DISMISSED, and the state law claims against the City of Philadelphia are DISMISSED. In all other respects the motion is DENIED.