Richmond v. Norwich

60 Citing cases

  1. Considine v. Waterbury

    279 Conn. 830 (Conn. 2006)   Cited 196 times
    Finding statute was an attempt to codify municipal common-law tort liability

    Thus, this court has stated that a municipality's immunity from liability for injuries applies only when it "is engaged in the performance of a public duty for the public benefit, and not for its own corporate profit . . . ." Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921). Accordingly, the distinction between whether the municipality was acting in its governmental capacity, or in its corporate or proprietary capacity, was, under the common law, the litmus test for whether the municipality would be held liable for its negligence.

  2. Blonski v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n

    309 Conn. 282 (Conn. 2013)   Cited 11 times
    In Blonski v. Metropolitan District Commission, 309 Conn. 282, 284, 71 A.3d 465 (2013), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negligently maintained the gate in an unsafe and dangerous condition and that the defendant's conduct was connected to the defendant's proprietary function of operating a water supply company.

    ts' operation of a water utility” [emphasis in original] ); Elliott v. Waterbury, supra, at 413, 715 A.2d 27 (noting that, in previous cases, governmental entities were held liable when “allegedly tortious conduct ... was inextricably linked to the operation of the water utility for corporate gain”); see also Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 279 Conn. at 852, 905 A.2d 70 (when defendant city leased clubhouse and restaurant to third party for its own corporate profit, defendant was not entitled to immunity for negligence claim by restaurant customer who was injured when he fell through window panel because maintenance of panel was connected to proprietary function); Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 699, 701–702, 145 A. 158 (1929) (when defendant city rented beach property to third party for its own corporate profit, defendant was not entitled to immunity for claim arising from death of person who was fatally injured when he dove into water and struck his head on submerged concrete pier); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921) (defendant city operating water utility was not entitled to immunity for claim by plaintiff who sought recovery for injuries suffered when she was shot by security guard defendant had hired to protect reservoir, which had been closed to public, from saboteurs); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 366–67, 59 A. 487 (1904) (defendant city was not entitled to immunity for claim that it had negligently conducted work on reservoir, resulting in death of workman). In the present case, the jury's finding that the defendant's conduct in installing and maintaining the closed pipe gate that injured the plaintiff was inextricably linked to the defendant's proprietary water supply operation was supported by the evidence that the purpose of the gate was to protect the water supply.

  3. Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission

    275 Conn. 38 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 262 times
    Deciding as matter of law that defendant's decision whether to supervise, inspect, maintain, close or barricade trails was discretionary rather than ministerial

    It is well established that a proprietary function is an act done "in the management of [a municipality's] property or rights for its own corporate benefit or profit and that of its inhabitants. . . ." Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921). The municipal operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function.

  4. Elliott v. Waterbury

    245 Conn. 385 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 360 times
    Holding that legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct are indistinguishable

    The plaintiff's claim, rather, is that the alleged conduct did not constitute governmental acts because it concerned a proprietary, as opposed to a public activity, namely, the operation of a water utility. In support of her claim, the plaintiff relies upon three cases involving negligence actions arising out of a municipality's operation of a water utility: Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); and Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 355 A.2d 68 (1974). In each of those cases, this court concluded that the municipal defendants could not avail themselves of immunity because the municipalities engaged in the allegedly tortious actions for the sake of corporate gain rather than for the administration of government.

  5. State v. Miranda

    176 Conn. 107 (Conn. 1978)   Cited 50 times
    In Miranda, this court rejected the approach taken in its earlier decision in State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 138 A. 456 (1927), which did not permit the admission of character evidence to prove that the decedent was the aggressor on the ground that "the result of an unlimited application of such a rule would be to interject the character of the deceased with the resulting temptation ‘to measure the guilt of the accused by the deserts of the victim’ into all such cases."

    State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 104, 249 A.2d 232; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) 186. Although the second method is not allowed in a number of states, Connecticut adopted it in Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 594, 115 A. 11, on the rationale that "[p]ersonal observation and personal knowledge are a more trustworthy reliance than general reputation." Both methods are appropriate to prove the character for violence of a homicide victim.

  6. State v. Martin

    170 Conn. 161 (Conn. 1976)   Cited 37 times
    Allowing witness to relate direct observations of person from which trier of fact could infer person's state of mind

    State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 104, 249 A.2d 232. The law in this state also allows proof of character by the testimony of those who have had an opportunity to form, and have formed, an opinion as to whether the accused possessed a particular character trait. State v. Gelinas, 160 Conn. 366, 368, 279 A.2d 552; State v. Blake, supra, 104; see Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 593, 115 A. 11, for the reasoning behind the rule; see also 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) 1980, 1986. Whether or not the accused produces testimony of reputation or opinion to prove a trait, the prosecution may not use specific acts of misconduct to disprove the trait. Richmond v. Norwich, supra, 597; State v. Gilligan, supra; see Verdi v. Donahue, 91 Conn. 448, 454, 99 A. 1041, for the rationale of this rule.

  7. State v. Gelinas

    160 Conn. 366 (Conn. 1971)   Cited 30 times
    Reviewing unpreserved evidentiary claim when parties and trial court “were laboring under the misapprehension” of governing law

    See 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 345; McCormick, Evidence 158, p. 334 n. 9. But, "Connecticut, in Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 593, 115 A. 11, adopted the better, although probably still the minority, rule that character may also be proved by the opinion evidence of those who have been shown to have had an opportunity to form, and who have formed, an opinion as to the character of the . . . [individual] with respect to the trait or traits in issue. This rule is approved in 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 345; 7 Wigmore, . . . [Evidence (3d Ed.)] 1980, 1981; McCormick, . . . [Evidence] 158, p. 334 n. 9.

  8. State v. Blake

    157 Conn. 99 (Conn. 1968)   Cited 44 times
    Reversing conviction where trial court refused to permit defendant's attorney, who wished to testify on defendant's behalf, to withdraw from case

    Character or disposition is an attribute actually possessed, while reputation represents the community's belief as to the actual character or disposition. 5 Wigmore, op. cit. 1608-1610; 7 id. 1981e, p. 145; 1 id. 52, pp. 446, 447. Connecticut, in Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 593, 115 A. 11, adopted the better, although probably still the minority, rule that character may also be proved by the opinion evidence of those who have been shown to have had an opportunity to form, and who have formed, an opinion as to the character of the accused with respect to the trait or traits in issue. This rule is approved in 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, 345; 7 Wigmore, op. cit. 1980, 1981; McCormick, op. cit. 158, p. 334 n. 9.

  9. Cichon v. City of Norwich

    2001 Ct. Sup. 10012 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)

    Additionally, she argues, the common law also recognizes an exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity where, as here, the municipality is exercising a proprietary or private function, especially where the city is operating for corporate gain. Because the city acknowledges that it charged a fee for the use of the ice arena, Cichon argues, as a matter of law, that the city is liable and cannot claim governmental immunity. To support her contention that the doctrine of governmental immunity is not a proper special defense in this case, Cichon relies upon two cases:Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904), and Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921). In both of these cases, the court held that the city does not discharge a public governmental duty when it stores, distributes and sells water to its inhabitants at a profit.

  10. Accashian v. City of Danbury

    1999 Ct. Sup. 772 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    Provision of utilities for profit, such as the operation of a water works, has been ruled proprietary. Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143 (1974); Richmond v. City of Norwalk, 96 Conn. 582 (1921); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358 (1904). A proprietary function is an act "done in the management of [a city's] property or rights for its own corporate benefit or profit and that of its inhabitants."