58-1145, to which the two-year limitation applies, means the amount of money that has to be paid, the tax itself, of which it does complain. It was so held, it says, in the case of City of Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397 (Jan. 19, 1942). In that case Eubank, on June 4, 1940, filed his petition to correct an erroneous assessment of sewer tax (held to be a tax on real estate) for the years 1938-39-40.
" In Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397 and St. Andrew's Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 630, 125 S.E.2d 864, this court ruled that the word "assessment," as used in Code, Sec. 58-1145, had two meanings. It was held that in the first sentence of the Code section, " 'assessment' . . . can apply only to one thing, that is, the amount of the tax (the money) the individual is supposed to pay.
Code Sec. 15-676 provides that: "The amount finally assessed against * * *" each landowner "shall be a lien on his abutting land, * * *." In City of Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397, we held that an assessment for a sewer tax made a lien on real estate was a burden on the real estate, and was like any other real estate tax, and such tax fell "within the class designated in the Tax Code Section 414 (now Section 58-1145) as 'Tax on real estate.' " 179 Va., supra, p. 77.
I agree with the parties in this case that the special district tax is generally a tax and, given its "natural and legal effect," is specifically a tax on real estate. Id. ; accord City of Richmond v. Eubank , 179 Va. 70, 77, 18 S.E.2d 397, 400–01 (1942) (holding that a sewer tax, which burdened real estate and was made a lien when unpaid, constituted a real estate tax). 2.
" We have consistently defined the word "levy" as "merely fixing the subject and the amount at which property is to be taxed." City of Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 82-83, 18 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1942) (quoting Breckenbridge v. County School Board, 146 Va. 1, 5, 135 S.E. 693, 695 (1926)); see County of Sussex v. Jarratt, 129 Va. 672, 684-85, 693, 106 S.E. 384, 387-88, 389 (1921). Additionally, we have stated:
We have many times held that the word "assessed" used in the first sentence of the statute refers to the imposition of the tax itself; whereas the word "assessed" in the second sentence refers to the determination of the value of the property. Hoffman v. County ofAugusta, 206 Va. 799, 146 S.E.2d 864 (1966); St. Andrew's Association v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 630, 125 S.E.2d 864 (1962); City of Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397 (1942). The second sentence of the statute does not limit the right conferred by the first sentence. City of Richmond v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority, 204 Va. 596, 598-99, 132 S.E.2d 733, 734-35 (1963).
The word "levy" often, and perhaps usually, means the determination to impose the tax, as distinguished from assessment and collection. City of Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397, 403; Atlantic Coast Line v. Amos, 94 Fla. 588, 115 So. 315. But the word is also susceptible of other meanings, dependent upon the context in which it is used, and may refer to all the steps, collectively, by which public revenue is raised, or only to the assessment and collection of the tax.
The holding in that case does not, we think, render inapplicable the statutory procedure in the situation here. In Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397, it was pointed out that the word "assessment" used in the statute had two meanings, one of which applied to the amount of money that was to be paid. The ordinance of April 30 requires the telephone company to pay a license tax of 3% of its gross receipts. The company is required to make application for its license and file a statement showing the amount of these gross receipt's "and the percentage tax (sic) should be paid thereon."
Code of 1950, section 58-1130. Taxpayers were granted relief under section 414 from local levies and assessments held to be unconstitutional and void, in Southern Ry. Co. v. Richmond, 175 Va. 308, 8 S.E.2d 271, 127 A.L.R. 1368 (as shown by the record, though not by the opinion); Williams v. Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287, 134 A.L.R. 833; Richmond v. Eubank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d 397. (2) The plaintiffs could have proceeded under section 290 of the Tax Code. This section provides:
"This brings us to the issue in the case. It is conceded by counsel for the defendants that the laying of a county levy is a legislative act. 27 Am. Eng. Enc. of L. (2nd Ed.), title Taxation, pp. 729-30; Sussex County v. Jarratt (1921), 129 Va. 672, 684, 106 S.E. 384, 627; McGinnis v. Nelson County (1926), 146 Va. 170, 174, 135 S.E. 696; Richmond v. Eubank (1942), 179 Va. 70, 83, 18 S.E.2d 397; Williams v. Richmond (1941), 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287, 134 A. L. R. 833 and Meriwether v. Garrett (1880), 102 U.S. 472, 26 L.Ed. 197, 200. "Counsel for the petitioners contend that the exception contained in the several levies here involved, namely, 'It is ordered that for the payment of the county levy * * * that there shall be collected a county levy for general purposes of twenty-five cents on each one hundred dollars of value of all real estate and tangible personal property, including stocks of merchandise (except in the towns of Bowling Green and Port Royal) * * * ', etc., is void, and being void should be stricken out of the legislative act laying the levy so that the county levy laid for the years involved in this proceeding would read as the above language would read if the exception as to the towns of Bowling Green and Port Royal was stricken out of each of the several levies.