, mistakenly, to regard new evidence that was presented—an affidavit and hearing testimony from a putative eyewitness to the murder who stated that appellant was not the shooter—as mere “impeachment evidence” that is inadequate to warrant relief under the IPA; (2) discredited that witness's statements on the basis of inconsistencies between statements contained in his affidavit and in his hearing testimony, without regard to whether the inconsistencies were trivial or insignificant and whether they were explainable; (3) did not critically examine the weight of the trial evidence; and (4) contrary to this court's guidance in Bouknight v. United States , 867 A.2d 245 (D.C.2005), appears ultimately to have adjudged the credibility of the (putative) eyewitness's testimony in light of the court's adverse determination about appellant's own credibility. While we accord “great deference to the trial court's role as the trier of fact on the ultimate issue of ‘actual innocence’ under the IPA,” Richardson v. United States , 8 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C.2010), we cannot be confident that, had the judge's decision not been influenced by the foregoing factors, he would have reached the same conclusion about the likelihood that appellant is “actually innocent of the crime.” Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
I. BACKGROUNDIn the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, “[f]ollowing a jury trial, [petitioner] was convicted on October 2, 1996, of five felonies relating to a gun injury suffered by Lanita Spears.” Richardson v. United States, 8 A.3d 1245, 1246 (D.C.2010); see Gov't's Mot. to Dismiss Pet'r's Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Gov't Mot.”) at 1 (listing charges set forth in indictment). The court imposed a sentence of 16 years to life imprisonment.
We review the trial court’s IPA ruling for abuse of discretion. Richardson v. United States, 8 A.3d 1245, 1248-49 (D.C. 2010). As the IPA sets out:
In doing so, “we must give great deference to the trial court's role as the trier of fact on the ultimate issue of ‘actual innocence’ under the IPA, and thus we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial judge's rejection of alleged newly discovered evidence offered to prove ‘actual innocence.’ ”Richardson v. United States, 8 A.3d 1245, 1248 (D.C.2010) ; see also Mitchell v. United States, 80 A.3d 962, 971 (D.C.2013) (“To the extent that the statute affords the trial court discretion in its application of the IPA, we review for abuse of discretion.”) (quoting Veney v. United States, 936 A.2d 811, 822 (D.C.2007), as modified, 936 A.2d 809 (D.C.2007) ).Richardson, 8 A.3d at 1249 (internal citation omitted); see also D.C.Code § 17–305 (2012 Repl.) (setting out the standard of review of bench verdicts).
Veney v. United States , 936 A.2d 811, 822 (D.C. 2007).Richardson v. United States , 8 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2010) (citation omitted).Caston , 146 A.3d at 1090 (citation omitted).