Summary
In Richardson v. State, 283 Ark. 82, 671 S.W.2d 164 (1984), the same problem arose when the appellant challenged the admission of custodial statements and the statements were not abstracted as required by Sup. Ct. R. 9.
Summary of this case from Sutherland v. StateOpinion
Avery Nathan Richardson, pro se.
Carl J. Madsen, Stuttgart, for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Theodore G. Holder, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
[283 Ark. 91] SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
HUBBELL, Chief Justice.
In our opinion of June [283 Ark. 91-A] 25, 1984, 283 Ark. 82, 671 S.W.2d 164, we affirmed the conviction of appellant, Avery Nathan Richardson, of first degree murder and arson. On rehearing, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant received consecutive sentences of forty years for murder and twenty years for arson in connection with the death of Lester Richardson, his uncle. Appellant argues two points for reversal: (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress three custodial statements because he was held in custody for fifty-six days without counsel and without being brought before a judicial officer; and (2) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence because the arrest was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
In the early morning hours of September 1, 1982, the home of Lester Richardson near DeWitt, Arkansas, was badly damaged by fire. Richardson's body was found among the debris. Sometime that day a sheriff's deputy went to appellant's home, which was near the Lester Richardson dwelling, and brought appellant, his father, and stepmother to the DeWitt police office for questioning. Richardson moved about the waiting room, which was open to the public, and made frequent trips to the restroom. The Chief Deputy, Don Ellenburg, who was also appellant's uncle, said appellant became increasingly talkative, was flushed, and had a strong odor of alcohol about him. Ellenburg asked another deputy to search appellant, and an empty whiskey bottle was found in his boot.
Appellant was arrested and jailed for public intoxication. Ten days later that charge was dropped, and the murder and arson charges were filed. Not until October 25, 1982, was appellant taken before a judicial officer for arraignment and the appointment of defense counsel. During the nearly two months between arrest and arraignment, appellant gave statements relating to Lester Richardson's death, one on the day of his arrest and later ones on October 5 and 6.
Appellant insists it was error for the trial court to permit [283 Ark. 91-B] these statements to be introduced in evidence because of the flagrant violation of Rule 8.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure:
An arrested person who is not released by citation or by other lawful manner shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. (Our italics).
The observance of this rule is mandatory. Bolden v. State, 262 Ark. 718, 561 S.W.2d 281 (1978). The state does not attempt to justify the extraordinary delay in taking appellant before a judicial officer. It argues instead that no prejudice occurred because the statements are not incriminating. It is difficult to assess this argument because the statements themselves are not abstracted. However, we have the substance of the two October statements from abstracted testimony. Chief Deputy Ellenburg testified at the suppression hearing that appellant sent for him after he had left work. Appellant's rights were explained, and appellant told of Lester Richardson having asked appellant to come and fix a butane stove. When appellant had finished, his uncle suggested he spend the night. In the process of making up a bed, Lester accidentally discharged a shotgun he kept on the bed, the charge striking him in the left chest. Appellant stopped at a rice well to wash his hands and face and noticed Lester's house was on fire. He thought an oscillating fan, knocked over when Lester fell, might have ignited a stack of newspapers. Appellant and his father called the fire department and went back to Lester's house.
The October 6 statement, given in substance through the testimony of another officer, is generally the same, though in this statement appellant said the shotgun was lying on the bed slats presumably under the mattress. The substance of the September 1 statement is not abstracted.
Although compliance with A.R.Crim.P. 8.1 is mandatory, a breach does not compel a dismissal of the charges; rather, it requires that evidence gained as a result of the unnecessary delay be suppressed. Cook v. State, 274 Ark. 244, 623 S.W.2d 820 (1981). Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
[283 Ark. 91-C] While the statements here can be said to be exculpatory in the sense that they describe the event as accidental, it can hardly be doubted that they were used to advantage by the state and worked to appellant's prejudice. They were self-contradictory, and they may have been inconsistent with other physical evidence surrounding the death of Lester Richardson.
The state contends that Cook v. State, supra, is distinguishable. There, an in-custodial statement was suppressed because of a thirty-one day delay. In Cook, the defendant repeatedly asked for the appointment of counsel whereas there is no indication appellant requested counsel. That distinction may be significant in some situations, but not where the delay extends clearly beyond any reasonable length of time. We conclude that the October 5 and 6 statements, taken after appellant had been held in jail for thirty-five days in violation of Rule 8.1, should have been suppressed.
The September 1 statement and other evidence obtained at the time of arrest do not come under the same stigma because their procurement is not tainted by what came afterward. We make no inference that the statement and other evidence are otherwise admissible as the abstract tells us almost nothing about the statement one way or the other. Our holding with respect to the violation of Rule 8.1 is limited to the two statements which were not obtained until well after the rule was breached.
Since the case is being remanded, the trial court should rehear the issue of appellant's arrest to determine whether there was probable cause to support the arrest for public intoxication, independent of murder and arson charges. In that regard, appellant's condition at the time he was picked up is of significant importance in evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Also, the circumstances under which appellant was brought to the police station are important, especially whether A.R.Crim.P. 2.2, 2.3, and 3.1 were followed. The degree of inebriation at the time of arrest is a relevant consideration. All of these circumstances should be weighed in determining whether [283 Ark. 91-D] appellant's September 1 statement and other evidence seized should be admitted.
The petition for rehearing is granted, and the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
HICKMAN, J., dissents.