Opinion
No. 11-03-00321-CR
Opinion filed April 20, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 161st District Court, Ector County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. B-30,545.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., and McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
OPINION
The jury convicted Ronald Evan Richardson of theft and assessed his punishment at two years confinement in a state jail facility and a $10,000 fine. We affirm. In two points of error, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof could not have been met. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We review the fact-finder's weighing of the evidence and cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. Due deference must be given to the jury's determination, particularly concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). This court has the authority to disagree with the fact-finder's determination "only when the record clearly indicates such a step is necessary to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice." Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. Narciso Gomez testified at trial that he sold merchandise such as bed covers, carpets, bicycles, and scooters at a street corner in Odessa. Gomez used a trailer to transport the merchandise to Odessa from California and Mexico. Gomez stated that on October 29, 2001, he locked his merchandise inside of the trailer and closed for the day. When Gomez returned, his trailer and all of his merchandise were gone. Gomez reported the stolen trailer to the police. Several months later, the police called Gomez to identify pictures of a trailer recovered in Abilene, Texas. Gomez was able to verify that the trailer recovered in Abilene belonged to him, and Gomez went to Abilene to get the trailer. Gomez had to replace the wheels on the trailer because they had been removed, and he had to do some welding repairs on the trailer. Gomez was later contacted by the Odessa Police Department to identify some of the merchandise that they recovered while investigating the theft. Officer Jerry Jones of the Odessa Police Department testified that Crystal Faye Keith came to them and gave them information concerning the theft of a trailer. Keith told the police that appellant was involved in the theft of a trailer as well as several other theft offenses. A search warrant was issued for appellant's mother's residence, and the police recovered stolen merchandise from that residence. Jason Reed Cotton testified that he went with appellant, Keith, Shane Crochette, and Nora Dickman to a club; they were all drinking. The group left the club around midnight in Cotton's pickup. Appellant was driving. Cotton testified that they went to the corner of 42nd and Dixie Streets in Odessa and hooked a utility trailer up to his pickup. Appellant continued driving the pickup; and, as he was driving, the trailer broke loose from the pickup. As they were trying to hook the trailer to the pickup again, a police officer arrived on the scene. The officer helped attach the trailer, and now Cotton was driving his pickup. They took the trailer to appellant's business and cut the lock off the trailer. Cotton said that there were blankets, bicycles, and toys inside of the trailer. Cotton testified that appellant, Keith, Crochette, and Dickman used his pickup to take the trailer to Abilene. Dickman also testified at trial and confirmed that the group went to a club in Cotton's pickup. Dickman stated that, after they left the club, appellant drove to the corner of 42nd and Dixie where the men hooked a trailer onto Cotton's pickup. They took the trailer to appellant's shop, and Dickman and Keith took "inventory" of the merchandise inside the trailer. Dickman stated that, after taking inventory, she, appellant, Keith, and Crochette took the trailer to Abilene. Appellant specifically argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show that the value of the stolen property was $1,500 or more but less than $20,000 as alleged in the indictment. Value for purposes of the theft statute is the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the offense or, if the fair market value of the property cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the theft. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.08(a) (Vernon 2003). In order to establish value, the State must produce evidence of the fair market value of the property in question. Sullivan v. State, 701 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Morales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 487, 488 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd). An owner is competent to testify as to the value of property, even though he is not qualified as an expert on the value. Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909; Morales, 2 S.W.3d at 488. When the owner testifies as to value, he may testify in general and in commonly understood terms. Morales, 2 S.W.3d at 488. Testimony of this nature is an offer of the witness's best knowledge of the value of the property. Morales, 2 S.W.3d at 488. Such testimony is sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to determine value, based on the witness's credibility, even absent specific mention of "market value" or "replacement value." Morales, 2 S.W.3d at 489. When an owner testifies, it is presumed that he is testifying to an estimate of the fair market value. Valdez v. State, 116 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd); Jiminez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 493, 505 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd); Morales, 2 S.W.3d at 488. To rebut the owner's opinion evidence, a defendant must do more than just impeach the owner's credibility on cross-examination; he must offer controverting evidence of the value of the property. Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909; Morales, 2 S.W.3d at 488. Gomez testified that he purchased the trailer for $1,700. Gomez further testified that he paid approximately $2,000 for the merchandise in the trailer. On cross-examination, Gomez acknowledged that the trailer was registered for a lower sales price. However, Gomez's testimony established that the value of the trailer and merchandise inside of the trailer was over $1,500. Appellant did not offer any evidence to rebut this testimony. We find that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant committed theft in an amount greater than $1,500 but less than $20,000. Appellant's first and second points of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.